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Abstract 
This dissertation is broken into two interrelated parts.  The first explores the consequences of 
what is often called the "dual-use problem," that many of the technologies and knowledge 
required for the production of nuclear weapons may be obtained either directly or indirectly from 
other processes, whether they be civilian, commercial, or conventional military.  As there is no 
real "smoking gun" that indicates that nuclear weapons are being developed, other than the 
conduct of a nuclear test (which, as Hymans 2010 has argued, is a poor indicator of weapons 
development), nor is there an independent body either capable of or charged with identifying 
occurrences of proliferation, I argue that states must make their own determinations as to 1) 
whether proliferation is occurring or has occurred and 2) whether and to what extent it 
constitutes a threat.  To do this, they rely on the interpretation of information, which I classify as 
being either political (membership in the NPT, for example) or technical (reactor design, as an 
example), that may suggest, either one way or another, whether proliferation is likely.  This 
interpretation, however, is subject to what I call relational-driven interpretive bias, such that, 
when compared to states that have more neutral relationships with potential or suspected 
proliferators, states with more historically conflictual relationships are likely to view the nuclear 
related activities of other states as proliferation and, therefore, threatening.  Conversely, states 
with more cooperative relationships with potential or suspected proliferators are less likely to 
view actions and/or behaviors as proliferation than those with more neutral relationships.   
 
The second part of the dissertation looks at the relationship between the perception of threat and 
the likelihood that states will 1) choose to respond to proliferation-related activity and/or 
behavior and 2) how they will do so, if they elect to respond, with particular attention paid to 
those forms of response that are generally viewed as aggressive, destabilizing, or hostile (such as 
reciprocal proliferation, the conduct of military attacks, the imposition of sanctions, etc.).  I 
argue that the bias affecting the interpretation of information has a direct effect on both the 
likelihood and hostility of responses, such that states with more conflictual relationships are 
more likely to respond and do so in ways that may appear aggressive or hostile.  States with 
cooperative relationships, on the other hand, are less likely to respond and, when they do, do so 
in less aggressive ways. 
 
To investigate the hypotheses produced by the central theoretical mechanism presented in the 
dissertation, that of relational-driven interpretive bias, I construct a new dataset consisting of 1) 
all instances of nuclear technology development (which informs the construction of a pool of 
potential proliferators), 2) political and technical signals, and 3) responses to proliferation (coded 
dichotomously and categorically).  I employ quantitative methods to test the explanatory power 
of the framework and find that, although conflictual states are generally more likely to respond 
and do so in ways that may appear aggressive or hostile (confirming one of the principle 
expectations of the given theory) than either neutral states or cooperative ones, cooperative states 
are no less likely to respond than those with more neutral relationships.  This suggests that the 
bias is not symmetrical, but asymmetrical.   
 
This result is significant for a number of reasons.    First, membership in institutions that are 
meant to signal compliance with the nonproliferation norm, such as the NPT, do not affect, in 
any meaningful way, the likelihood that conflictual states will respond to the development of 
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nuclear weapons-related technologies.  Only those that have compliance mechanisms have an 
effect on the likelihood of responses to proliferation.  This brings their fundamental utility into 
question.  Second, that proliferation may lead conflictual states to adopt actions and/or behaviors 
that may themselves be destabilizing, either dyadically or regionally, has implications both for 
academic research and policy-making.  From an academic perspective, it suggests that research 
should not only focus on the causes of proliferation, but on its consequences.  From a policy-
making perspective, it indicates that it is not enough to focus on preventing or deterring 
proliferation, it is also necessary to address how other states, particularly those with a history of 
conflictual interactions with potential or suspected proliferators, respond to said actions and/or 
behaviors. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 The discovery of trace amounts of highly enriched uranium in Iran by IAEA weapons 
inspectors in 2003 launched what has now been a decade-long campaign by the international 
community to prevent or deter the Islamic state from developing nuclear weapons.  Cyber-
attacks, economic sanctions, and the threat of military force have been employed to this end.  
Although Iran represents the most recent example in which states have acted to prevent the 
development of nuclear weapons by another state, it is not the first such occurrence.  On June 7, 
1981, for example, Israeli warplanes executed Operation Opera, the aerial bombardment of a 
nuclear research reactor located 17 miles to the southeast of Baghdad, Iraq.  Iraqi officials 
insisted that this reactor was for research purposes only, as did their French counterparts who 
supplied the reactor five years prior to its destruction, but the Israeli government concluded that 
the reactor was most likely meant for use in the production of nuclear weapons.   
 In both of the aforementioned cases, states responded to what they perceived to be 
threatening behavior by a state whose intentions were somewhat uncertain.   Even if there is 
some probability that said state is not actually developing nuclear weapons or is incapable to 
successfully doing so, the scale of the potential threat faced by states when other states, 
particularly those that are geographically proximate (i.e. neighbors), are suspected of attempting 
to acquire nuclear weapons is such that they may be motivated to prevent or in some other way 
respond to said acquisition development.  Not all states, however, act to prevent, deter, or in 
some way respond to the potential development of nuclear weapons by other states.  
Furthermore, not all states that develop such technologies are viewed as threatening.  Similar 
technologies have been developed and/or acquired by states such as Japan, Germany, and the 
Netherlands; in each of these cases, however, no action was taken to prevent the acquisition of 
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nuclear technologies and, in fact, each of these states is now considered fully capable of 
producing nuclear weapons, if the desire and/or need should arise.  This suggests that there is a 
difference between how these states’ activities are and were perceived and those of states such as 
Iran, Iraq, and North Korea.  What, then, explains the difference in the perception of these state’s 
activities.  Why are some states allowed to develop high degrees of nuclear latency, without 
incurring outside intervention or response, while others are not?  Is it simply that they are more 
trustworthy?  Or is there some other factor at play?  On this question, the existing scholarly 
literature is unclear. 
 In those situations in which states do choose to act to prevent or respond to the 
acquisition of nuclear-related technologies by other states, there are a number of actions or 
behavior that may be undertaken.  This includes economic sanctions, the cessation of formal 
diplomatic ties, and even the launching of military strikes.  The adoption of any of these 
responses, or the numerous others that may exist, is done so to in some way 1) affect either the 
willingness or capability of a suspected proliferator to actually acquire nuclear weapons, or 2) 
reduce or guard against the expected insecurity caused by the acquisition of nuclear weapons.  
Even though there is some expectation that any adopted form of action or response will have the 
desired effect, the historical record shows that some states are more willing to adopt forms of 
response that may be perceived by the suspected proliferator as openly aggressive or hostile.  By 
adopting these forms of response, an example being the launching military strikes, states risk 
potential retaliation by the suspected proliferator or retribution by internal or external actors.  As 
the previous examples demonstrate, Israel and the United States employed 
preemptive/preventive measures that might be perceived by the targeted state as either aggressive 
or hostile, whereas the states of the European Union chose to focus on the imposition of 
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economic sanctions, a form of response that is traditionally perceived to be less so.  The inability 
to know, a priori, whether any form of response will have an effect points towards the reality 
that other factors contribute to the adoption of an observed form of response.  Again, the existing 
literature fails to address these factors.  
Research Questions  
 This dissertation seeks to answer the following interrelated questions: 1) how do states 
make determinations as to whether other states who are developing nuclear technologies are or 
are not engaging in nuclear proliferation, 2) why do some states seem to perceive occurrences of 
proliferation to be more threatening than others, 3) why do some states choose to respond to the 
perceived development of nuclear weapons by other states, while others do not, 4) in what ways 
can states respond to the occurrence or suspected occurrence of nuclear proliferation, and 5) why 
would some states adopt more hostile forms of response than others? 
Overview of Main Theoretical Predictions and Findings 
 In this dissertation, I argue that states must, for the most part, make their own 
determinations as to 1) whether proliferation is occurring, 2) whether and to what extent the 
proliferation-related activity or behavior constitutes a threat, including whether it is likely to 
continue, 3) whether to respond to such occurrences, and 4) how to respond if and when the 
decision to do so is made.  States make such determinations and decisions based on the 
interpretation of information, or what I call proliferation signals.  This interpretation is subject to 
bias informed by the characteristics of the relationship between the potential respondent and the 
suspected proliferator (a proliferator-respondent dyad).  Thus, given the same information, 
potential respondents that have a history of conflictual interactions with suspected proliferators 
are more likely 1) to perceive proliferation to be occurring, 2) be motivated to act to prevent or 
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deter future development, and 3) respond in ways that might be perceived by the suspected 
proliferator as hostile or aggressive, than respondents whose relationships with suspected 
proliferators are either more neutral or cooperative/peaceful.  States that have more historically 
cooperative/peaceful relations with potential proliferators are, on the other hand, systematically 
less likely to respond to indicators of proliferation intent and/or capabilities and, whey they do 
respond, do so in less hostile ways than states with more neutral or conflictual relationships.   
 I employ the Peace Scale (Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2008) in the operationalization of 
relational characteristics and find that states on the conflictual side of the scale (those at the .75 
or 1.0 levels) are more likely to both respond to the development/possession of nuclear weapons-
related technologies, regardless of the strength and/or clarity of the signal produced by the 
potential proliferator’s activities, when compared to states at the neutral .5 level.1  This suggests 
that these states are systematically likely to over-estimate the threat of proliferation, regardless of 
the signal produced by the developing/possessing state.  This, in turn, suggests that the 
information with which they made said determination was interpreted in a fundamentally 
different way than what a state at the baseline .5 level would have, given the same information.  
This confirms the expectations of the presented theoretical framework. 
 States on the cooperative/peaceful side of the scale (those at the 0.0 and .25 levels) are 
expected to be similarly biased, such that they will systematically under-estimate the threat of 
proliferation.  The results of an investigation of this relationship indicate otherwise, however.  
This suggests that the interpretive bias affecting states on the conflictual side of the peace scale 
either does not affect states on the peaceful side of the scale, or at least not to the same extent. 
                                                
1 James Klein, Gart Goertz, and Paul Diehl, “The Peace Scale: Conceptualizing and Operationalizing Non-Rivalry 
and Peace,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 25:1 (2008) pp. 67-80. 
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 I have briefly previewed the main theoretical predictions and summarized the findings of 
this dissertation. In the following sections, I highlight the theoretical and 
empirical/methodological contributions of the dissertation to research on nuclear proliferation, 
international relations more broadly, and to policymakers. I conclude by presenting an overview 
of the organization of the dissertation.  
Theoretical Contributions of Dissertation 
 This dissertation makes theoretical contributions to four different strands of literature 
within international relations: 1) nuclear proliferation, non-proliferation, and counter-
proliferation, 2) threat perception and misperception, 3) reciprocity and responses to threat, 4) 
differences in relational characteristics and its effect(s). 2 
Nuclear Proliferation, Non-Proliferation, and Counter-Proliferation 
 
 This dissertation makes a number of theoretical contributions to the literature on nuclear 
proliferation, non-proliferation, and counter-proliferation.  The first is a broadening of how states 
respond to proliferation-related activities or behavior to focus not only on counter-proliferation, 
but other of responses as well.  More specifically, I incorporate “foreign policy substitutability”  
(i.e. the range of options available to policy-makers in any given circumstance) as doing so better 
reflects the actual foreign policy-making process.3  Previous research has focused almost 
exclusively on the various responses that states adopt in isolation, or as a component of broader 
investigations of the use of coercive tactics, both diplomatic and economic.  Kreps and 
Fuhrmann (2010) and Fuhrmann and Kreps (2010), for example, investigate why states employ 
                                                
2 This literature can either be conceptualized as unified (they all focus on nuclear weapons on one form or another), 
or as distinct components resultant from a common cause or stimuli (nuclear weapons).  This dissertation treats them 
as separate but inter-related components of a general literature.  
3 Benjamin Most and Harvey Starr, “International Relations Theory, Foreign Policy Substitutability, and ‘Nice’ 
Laws,” World Politics 36:03 (1984) pp. 383-406 and Benjamin Most and Harvey Starr, Inquiry, Logic, and 
International Politics (Columbia, S.C.; University of South Carolina Press, 1989). 
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targeted military strikes as a form of counter-proliferation, while Braut-Hegghammer (2011) and 
Cordesman (2008) conduct research on the role of economic sanctions in the prevention or 
deterrence of nuclear weapons development.4  Although researching specific forms of response 
aids our understanding of the phenomenon, doing so ignores the alternate responses that states 
may adopt for any given situation, which not only fails to reflect how decision-making occurs in 
reality, but also introduces potential uncertainty into the conclusions drawn from these analyses.    
 This dissertation contributes to the literature on non-proliferation by investigating the 
effects of membership in non-proliferation-related treaties and institutions on whether they have 
an effect on whether other states perceive their nuclear-related activities as threatening or not.  
Also, for cases in which the International Atomic Energy Agency does render a state in violation 
of its treaty commitment, I seek to determine whether it leads to an increase in the likelihood that 
states will respond; a heretofore under-investigated question in the existing non-proliferation 
literature. 
Threat Perception and Misperception 
 This dissertation seeks to contribute to the literature on threat perception, which largely 
focuses on the processes by which actors make decisions about other actor’s actions or 
behaviors.  Most notable is the work of Jervis (1968 & 1976), who argues that leaders are prone 
to misinterpreting the information they receive regarding other state’s activities, thus leading to 
                                                
4 Kreps, Sarah and Matthew Fuhrmann, “Attacking the Atom: Does Bombing Nuclear Facilities Affect 
Proliferation?” Journal of Strategic Studies 34, no. 2 (2011) pp. 161-187, Fuhrmann, Matthew and Sarah Kreps, 
“Targeting Nuclear Programs in War and Peace: A Quantitative Empirical Analysis, 1941-2000,” Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 54, no. 6 (2010) pp. 831-859, Braut-Hegghammer, Målfrid, “Revisiting Osirak: Preventive 
Attacks and Nuclear Proliferation Risks,” International Security 36, no. 3 (2011) pp. 101-132, Cordesman, Anthony 
H. The Iraq War: Key Trends and Developments. Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2008. 
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either an under- or over-estimation of the threat posed by said state’s actions.5  This theory, 
which Jervis terms “dissonance theory,” represents the core of the “spiral model” of international 
relations, or what is more commonly known as the “security dilemma.”6  Somewhat surprisingly, 
even though the spiral model is frequently employed as an explanation at the systemic or dyadic 
levels of analysis, it is rarely used as a justification for or explanation of foreign policy decision-
making (monadic level).  The theoretical framework of this dissertation represents both a 
reformulation and extension of dissonance theory, focusing explicitly on both general patterns of 
behavior and specific instances of foreign policy decision-making. 
Reciprocity and Response to Threat 
 This dissertation contributes to a somewhat fragmented literature on how states respond 
or should respond to threat.  Many of the major theories of international relations, including 
realism, liberalism, and constructivism, give explanations for why states respond to threat, but 
very few suggest how states should respond to specific instances of threat.  Common to much of 
this literature is the concept of reciprocity which suggests that states should respond to the 
threatening or aggressive behavior of other states in a like manner.7  An assumption made in this 
literature is that states are capable of responding in a like manner.  With nuclear proliferation, 
this might not necessarily be the case.  This dissertation therefore contributes to this literature by 
discussing how states may respond in situations where direct reciprocity might not be a tenable 
or even feasible foreign policy option. 
 
                                                
5 Jervis, Robert. "Hypotheses on misperception." World Politics 20, no. 03 (1968): 454-479, and Jervis, 
Robert. Perception and misperception in international politics. Vol. 49. Princeton University Press, 1976. 
6 ibid 1976 and Herz, John H. Political realism and political idealism, a study in theories and realities. University of 
Chicago Press, 1951. 
7 For an example, see Axelrod, Robert, and William D. Hamilton. "The evolution of cooperation." Science 211, no. 
4489 (1981): 1390-1396. 
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Relational Characteristics 
 A final literature that this dissertation makes contributions to is what might be termed 
relational characteristics; i.e. the particular factors that inform the way states relate to each 
other.8  What has historically been two distinct literatures, one focusing on the characteristics 
that are likely to cause conflict (i.e. rivalry, regime type differences, etc.), and the other on those 
that are likely either to reduce the likelihood of conflict (democratic peace, capitalist peace, 
neoliberal institutionalism, etc.) or create the conditions for sustainable peace, has recently been 
re-conceptualized as one coherent literature with the creation of the Peace Scale.9  While there 
has been a long-standing effort on the part of international relations scholars to predict and 
measure the effects of being in relationships that are more conflictual or peaceful, they are 
largely done so dichotomously; i.e. either a pair of states is in a certain type of relationship or 
not.  The one notable exception may be the work of Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2005), who 
directly compare the effects of differences in regime type between pairs of states on conflict 
initiation and war willingness, yet ignore many of the other factors that have been identified over 
the past few decades that may contribute to differences in behavior among states in areas other 
than conflict initiation.10  The peace-scale approach remedies many of these problems.  This 
dissertation contributes to this literature by exploring differences in the perception of threat for 
states at various levels of the peace scale; an approach that has heretofore been un-used in the 
existing research on the subject. 
 
                                                
8 It should be noted that the term relational could be defined and measured in a number of ways, beyond the 
particular use presented in this dissertation.  However, specifying its precise meaning is necessary at this point of the 
analysis, as the proceeding discussion largely builds on the conceptualization of the term presented here.  
9 Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2008. 
10 De Mesquita, Bruce Bueno, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow. "The logic of political 
survival." MIT Press Books 1 (2005). 
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Empirical/Methodological Contributions of Dissertation 
 This dissertation makes three notable empirical/methodological contributions.  The first 
is to explicitly identify those states that are most likely to be affected by the development of 
nuclear weapons.  Similar to the introduction of the concept of the politically relevant dyad (eg. 
Weede 1976 and Lemke and Reed 2001), which identifies the set of states any one state is most 
likely to engage in conflict with, the nuclear neighborhood is the set of states most likely to be 
affected by any one state’s acquisition or suspected development of nuclear weapons (and 
therefore most likely to respond in some way).11  This represents an important contribution to the 
literature, which largely lacks specification and therefore potentially mis-estimates the effect(s) 
of nuclear weapons and nuclear proliferation on a range of behaviors, including conflict initiation 
and escalatory propensities. 
 This dissertation also provides a new approach to the study of nuclear proliferation, 
focusing not on whether archival evidence suggests that a state had the political will to 
proliferate at a given moment in time (the focus of such scholars as Singh and Way 2004 and Jo 
and Gartzke 2009), but on what information states had about other state’s intentions and 
capabilities at the moment proliferation was actually suspected.12  As I am primarily focused on 
an exploration of policy-making behavior, this type of approach better reflects how policy-
makers actually make decisions.  Relatedly, this dissertation also contributes to the existing 
literature by treating proliferation not as a dichotomous measure (i.e. a state is either proliferating 
or not) (e.g. Jo and Gartzke 2009), but rather as a series of inter-related actions and/or behaviors 
                                                
11 Weede, Erich. "Overwhelming preponderance as a pacifying condition among contiguous Asian dyads, 1950–
1969." Journal of Conflict Resolution 20, no. 3 (1976): 395-411 and Lemke, Douglas, and William Reed. "The 
relevance of politically relevant dyads." Journal of Conflict Resolution 45, no. 1 (2001): 126-144. 
12 Singh, Sonali, and Christopher R. Way. "The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation A Quantitative Test." Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 48, no. 6 (2004): 859-885, and Gartzke, Erik, and Dong-Joon Jo. "Bargaining, nuclear 
proliferation, and interstate disputes." Journal of Conflict Resolution (2009). 
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that provide information to other states about a state’s nuclear weapons-related intentions and 
capabilities.13   
Policy Implications of Dissertation 
 This dissertation has implications for policy-making first and foremost because it better 
reflects the realities of the policy-making process than what currently exists in the quantitative 
nuclear proliferation literature.  Second, although membership in or accession to non-
proliferation institutions and/or treaties has always been espoused by policy-makers as an 
important, if not the most important, signal of compliance with the non-proliferation norm, there 
have been virtually no systematic investigations of whether doing so has an effect on other 
state’s perceptions of nuclear technology development/possession.  That I find there to be no 
additional benefit to signing IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSAs) than what is 
gained by acceding to the NPT, especially on the perception of rivals, suggests that there is a 
disconnect between expectation and reality.  Relatedly, a finding of non-compliance by the 
IAEA, which can only be pronounced for states that have entered into CSAs, significantly 
increases both the likelihood and hostility of responses adopted by states on the conflictual side 
of the peace scale, further indicating that states should strongly consider whether entering into 
such agreements is worth the potential cost(s).  Fourth, and perhaps most alarmingly, because the 
results of this analysis show that rivals are systematically more likely to respond to proliferation 
and do so in hostile ways to virtually all signals of proliferation intent and/or capability 
development/possession, there should be an increased awareness not only of the effects of the 
occurrence of nuclear proliferation directly, but also in how other states might respond to such 
occurrences.  
 
                                                
13 ibid. 
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Organization of Dissertation 
 This dissertation begins by reviewing the existing literature on the subject of nuclear 
proliferation, with emphasis placed on its consequences for state behavior.  I then explore the 
extant literature on the subject of threat perception and misperception.  This is followed by a 
review of whether and how both the major theories of international relations and a select few 
alternate relationally-driven explanations, such as rivalry and the democratic peace, suggest 
states should respond to threats generally and to nuclear proliferation specifically.  
 Chapter 3 presents the main theoretical framework used in this dissertation. I argue that 
the decision as to whether and how to respond is a multi-stage process that begins with the 
collection of information regarding both the intentions and capabilities of a potential proliferator, 
what I call proliferation signals.  These signals are evaluated by states to determine 1) whether 
proliferation is likely and 2) whether it currently constitutes a threat or may do so in the future.  I 
suggest that this evaluation is subject to bias informed by the past interactions between the 
potential respondent and the suspected proliferator, such that the perception of threat in these 
cases may be prone to under- or over-estimation. I develop hypotheses based on this framework 
to be tested in the subsequent chapters. 
 Chapter 4 introduces a typology of responses to proliferation.  It is organized by the 
primary mechanism of each form of response, whether nuclear, military, economic, or 
diplomatic.  Each of the identified responses has as its main goal the reduction of threat. 
 Chapter 5 introduces the research design to be employed in this dissertation.  I test the 
expectations of the theoretical framework using quantitative analysis on a new dataset of 
proliferation signals and responses.  For this, I introduce a novel unit of analysis, the response-
year.  I employ both logistic regression and ordinary least squares regression to investigate the 
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effects of both signals and signals in the context of relationships on two dependent variables: the 
occurrence of years in which a response occurred (a positive response-year) and the hostility of 
the most hostile form of response undertaken during a given year (which I operationalized two 
ways).   
 Chapter 6 presents the results of part one of the analysis, which investigates the effect of 
signals and signals in context of the likelihood of the occurrence of responses.  Chapter 7 then 
presents the second part of this analysis, focusing on the hostility of observed response years.  I 
conclude, in Chapter 8, by discussing the implications of the results of this dissertation on the 
study of nuclear proliferation specifically and international relations generally.  I then present 
directions for future research, informed to a great extent by the results of the analysis presented 
herein. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 This dissertation asks the following questions - 1) why do some states respond to (i.e. act 
to slow or halt) nuclear proliferation, while others do not, 2) what forms of response are available 
to states when deciding whether or not to respond to nuclear proliferation, and 3) what motivates 
states to respond in the manner in which they do?  A review of the extant literature on responses 
to nuclear proliferation and counter-proliferation more specifically indicates that, although the 
theoretical mechanisms underlying select specific forms of response, such as the imposition of 
economic sanctions, have been investigated (albeit only recently), there has been little attempt to 
address the various forms of response in either a comparative or systematic, integrated manner.  
To illustrate this, I review the consequences of proliferation and proliferation response 
literatures.  In addition, as nuclear proliferation is a specific form of threat, a topic long of 
interest to scholars of international relations, I review the literatures on both threat perception 
and misperception.  I conclude by reviewing the major international relations theories to 
determine whether they predict not only when states should respond to threat, but also how they 
should respond (both to threat generally and to nuclear proliferation specifically).  I begin by 
defining, precisely, what is meant by “nuclear proliferation.” 
Defining Nuclear Proliferation 
 The most oft-cited definition of nuclear proliferation in the academic literature on the 
subject is the “attainment of nuclear weapons by the next nuclear state.” Although seemingly 
straightforward, an analysis of this definition raises a number of concerns, which are largely 
indicative of the types of issues faced when attempting to define nuclear proliferation.  The 
definition suggests that states are the only actor(s) capable of developing nuclear weapons.  
Although beyond the scope of this analysis, this component of the definition is particularly 
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relevant in discussions regarding the possibility of non-state and sub-state actors developing 
nuclear weapons for terrorist-related purposes.  As Allison (2004) and Mueller (2009) have 
argued, although the infrastructure requirements makes it highly unlikely that any actor other 
than a state would be capable of developing nuclear weapons without substantial state-sponsored 
support, it does not address the possibility that non-state actors might procure these weapons in a 
method other than indigenous production, such as theft or purchase.14  The aforementioned 
definition, as formulated, would exclude such actions as being considered “nuclear 
proliferation.”15  Even though it may be possible to identify both theoretical and empirical 
justifications for such a distinction, such as differences in the motivation to acquire such a 
capability and the likelihood of use between state and non-state actors, there has been little effort 
to develop such an understanding in the extant literature.   
 Perhaps more importantly, or at least more relevantly, the previously cited definition 
suggests that nuclear proliferation occurs only when a state “attains” nuclear weapons.  Although 
this would seem like a relatively straightforward assumption, there is both widespread 
disagreement as to what “attaining” nuclear weapons means and whether this is a useful 
benchmark to employ when attempting to distinguish between those states who are or are not 
capable of producing nuclear weapons.  As Hymans (2010) has recently argued, a reliance on 
public demonstrations of nuclear capability neither captures the many states that have the 
capability to produce nuclear weapons yet have refrained from doing so, such as Japan and 
Germany, nor those that have constructed nuclear weapons but have chosen not to demonstrate 
                                                
14 Allison, Graham. Nuclear terrorism: The ultimate preventable catastrophe. Macmillan, 2004, and Mueller, 
John. Atomic obsession: nuclear alarmism from Hiroshima to al-Qaeda. Oxford University Press, 2009. 
15 It is more likely that such an action would be classified as nuclear terrorism. 
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this capability publicly, such as Israel or South Africa.16  This is particularly problematic when 
attempting to identify when a state has “gone nuclear,” and can lead to inaccurate or conflicting 
determinations of dates of nuclear attainment.  Attainment could mean, for instance, that a state 
has produced deployable, somewhat sophisticated nuclear weapons.  Conversely, it could simply 
mean that a state has assembled a rudimentary device capable of producing some sort of nuclear 
yield, yet would only be usable in very limited circumstances.  Obviously, there is a difference 
between these two types of devices, but, without further specification, it would be impossible to 
judge whether they both should be considered as thresholds, or if one should be privileged over 
the other.  
 An alternate definition, one that is referred to frequently in the academic literature, is that 
proliferation is the “spread of nuclear weapons” or even “nuclear-related technologies” to states 
that previously had no such capability.  This definition focuses more on the mechanism by which 
proliferation occurs, but fails to clarify what, exactly, is meant by “spreading” nuclear weapons 
or weapons-related capabilities.  This becomes seminally important when attempting to identify 
who proliferated, and, for example, whether the exporting party must have known, explicitly, 
that the technology was going to be used in the production of nuclear weapons.  Obviously, one 
can envision a number of scenarios in which a focus on the spread of weapons-related 
technologies might lead to the identification of proliferators that might not fit our normal 
understanding of the phenomenon.  For instance, if an academic paper on a new form of 
enrichment technology is used as a resource by a weapons designer in another country (not party 
to the NPT) to produce nuclear materials, would the scholar have therefore engaged in nuclear 
proliferation?  The aforementioned definition seems to suggest such a conclusion, which, 
                                                
16 Hymans, Jacques EC. "When Does a State Become a “Nuclear Weapon State”? An Exercise in Measurement 
Validation." Nonproliferation Review 17, no. 1 (2010): 161-180. 
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obviously, fails to reflect how we normally think about proliferation.  An easy solution may be to 
restrict the designation of proliferation only to the activities of states, yet A.Q. Khan or perhaps 
more accurately the A.Q. Khan network, for example, is routinely identified as a non-state actor 
that has engaged in nuclear proliferation.17 
 A definition that remedies many of the problems inherent in the previously cited examples 
is given by Montgomery and Sagan (2009), who suggest that nuclear proliferation is,   
 ...a process by which countries move closer to or away from different 
 thresholds toward developing the bomb. Countries will not necessarily  
 stay solidly in one state of “nuclear latency” or another, as internal and  
 external conditions that fuel or suppress proliferation may change over  
 time. Governments do not actually need to “decide” to “go nuclear” until  
 the moment that they test a nuclear device; even then, the decision to  
 develop a deliverable weapon or declare nuclear-weapons status can  
 be independent of a nuclear test.18 
 
This definition represents a much-needed advancement of our understanding of nuclear 
proliferation, by viewing nuclear proliferation as a process, rather than a single event (acquire or 
not acquire).  Nevertheless, it suffers from a number of limitations of its own, including that it 
overemphasizes certain components of the nuclear proliferation process. In a sense, activity 
within the various phases is somewhat secondary to a state’s decision to transition between them.  
Nevertheless, developing an understanding of the activities and events that occur during the 
phases themselves is important for a number of reasons, including, for example, that some states 
choose one form of nuclear explosive material over others, or that some states have sought to 
achieve a second-strike capability, while others have not done so.   
 Another criticism of this framework is that it seems to treat the various phases as distinct 
and unrelated, in that the decisions made during one phase have little to do with the decisions 
                                                
17 For an excellent overview of the proliferation-related activities A. Q. Khan, see 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/11/the-wrath-of-khan/304333/ 
18 Montgomery, Alexander H., and Scott D. Sagan. "The perils of predicting proliferation." Journal of Conflict 
Resolution (2009) p. 309.  
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made in another.  Yet, this is obviously not the case.  An example is given by the construction 
and testing of a fusion or thermonuclear device.  Although doing so represents an advancement 
in technology, it is only possible to construct a two-stage design after first achieving the ability 
to produce the single-stage design.  Similarly, the testing of a two-stage device is largely 
endogenous to the testing of a first device, in that a state that is willing to signal, publicly, its 
acquisition of the capability to produce single-stage weapons is most likely also willing to test 
subsequent device designs.  Thus, no country that has tested a two-stage device has done so 
without first testing a single-stage design.    
 Many other variations of the aforementioned definitions exist, each with its own 
advantages and disadvantages.  An example of those commonly cited is shown below in Table 
2.1. 
Table 2.1: Proliferation Definitions 
[Nuclear proliferation is…] 
Definition 
…the spread of nuclear capabilities1 
…the development of nuclear weapons2 
…joining the nuclear club3 
…the import or export of weapons-related technologies4 
…the next incremental addition to the number of nuclear weapon states5 
…nuclearization6 
…becoming a nuclear weapon state7 
…becoming a nuclear power8 
…the spread of nuclear weapons and the technologies and the materials to make them9 
1 Eric Arnett, “Deterrence After Nuclear Proliferation: Implications for Nuclear Forces and Defense Spending,” The Nonproliferation 
Review 4 (Fall/Winter 1994), pp. 10-17 and  Clarence D. Long, “Nuclear Proliferation: Can Congress Act in Time?” International 
Security, Volume 1, Number 4, Spring 1977, pp. 52-76 
2 Robert E. Harkavy, “Pariah States and Nuclear Proliferation,” International Organization (Winter81) Vol. 35 Issue 1, p135. 29p., 
Joseph DiChiaro III and Edward J. Laurance, “Nuclear Weapons in a Changing World: Consequences for Development,” The 
Nonproliferation Review (1994). 
3 Motoya Kitamura, “Japan’s Plutonium Program: A Proliferation Threat?” The Nonproliferation Review (1996). 
4 Reinhard Drifte, “Proliferation in Northeast Asia: South Korea’s Dual-Use Technology Imports from Japan,” The Nonproliferation 
Review (1997), Guarav Kampani, “Second Tier Proliferation: The Case of Pakistan and North Korea,” The Nonproliferation Review 
(1997), and Justin V. Hastings, “The Geography of Nuclear Proliferation Networks,” The Nonproliferation Review (2012). 
5 Albert Wohlstetter, “Nuclear Sharing: NATO and the N+1 Country,” Foreign Affairs 39(3) (April 1961) pp. 355-387 and Brad 
Roberts, “Proliferation and Nonproliferation in the 1990s: Looking for the Right Lessons,” The Nonproliferation Review (1999). 
6 William Potter, “India and the New Look of U.S. Nonproliferation Policy,” The Nonproliferation Review (2005). 
7 John R. Walker, “Potential Proliferation Pointers from the Past: Lessons from the British Nuclear Weapons Program, 1952-69,” The 
Nonproliferation Review (2012). 
8 David Karl, “Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers,” International Security, Volume 21, Number 3, Winter 1996/97, 
pp. 87-119 
9 Leonard S. Spector, “Nuclear Proliferation: Who’s Next?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 43(4): 1987 pp. 17-20. 
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As can be clearly seen, what is meant by nuclear proliferation varies widely and although the 
lack of a widely accepted definition of nuclear proliferation may be excused for a number of 
reasons, including that it may reflect differences in professional opinion rather than a misreading 
of history, it does point towards another issue:  that of a lack of concept specification.   
Concept Specification 
 Adcock and Collier (2001) suggest that concept specification and refinement is an 
evolutionary process, yet, thus far, this is not reflected in the literature on nuclear proliferation.19  
To illustrate, Asal and Beardsley (2007) investigate the relationship between nuclear 
proliferation and the characteristics of interstate conflict.20  Although laudable as a research 
question, what the authors fail to clarify is that what they are interested in is not the whole of the 
relationship between “nuclear proliferation” and international crisis behavior per se, but the 
relationship between the possession of nuclear weapons and crisis behavior.  Clearly, nuclear 
proliferation in this case is intended to mean something very specific, but the authors do not 
clarify the particular aspect of the nuclear proliferation phenomenon they are intending to 
investigate.  
 Many scholars of nuclear proliferation attempt to introduce specificity into their analyses 
of the phenomenon by focusing either on the horizontal or vertical phases of nuclear 
proliferation, but again often fail to specify exactly what each of these terms means, or to 
identify the range of actions included and excluded from each phase.  Horizontal proliferation, 
for example, is most commonly defined as the "spread of nuclear technologies to states that 
                                                
19 Adcock, Robert. "Measurement validity: A shared standard for qualitative and quantitative research." In American 
Political Science Association, vol. 95, no. 03, pp. 529-546. Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
20 Asal, Victor, and Kyle Beardsley. "Proliferation and international crisis behavior." Journal of Peace Research 44, 
no. 2 (2007): 139-155. 
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previously did not have such a capability."21  As a general description of a greater process, this 
definition is adequate.  Yet the term is often used to describe virtually any aspect of the 
proliferation phenomenon, as long as it occurs prior to the actual acquisition of nuclear weapons.  
This means that anything from the import and export of both sensitive and civilian nuclear 
technologies to the decision-making process by which states decide to acquire or produce nuclear 
weapons capabilities (eg. Hymans 2009) is horizontal proliferation.   
 The horizontal proliferation literature has largely been subdivided between its causes and 
its effects.  The causes of proliferation literature is by far the more voluminous of the two and is 
traditionally subdivided between the supply side of proliferation and the demand side.  The 
supply side literature focuses on the mechanisms by which states proliferate and includes such 
issues as the export and import of sensitive nuclear technologies (e.g. Fuhrmann 2009a & 2009b; 
Kroenig 2009) and the role of geography in facilitating the exchange of both technologies and 
knowledge (e.g. Braun and Chyba 2004).22  The demand side literature primarily focuses on the 
motivations for states to proliferate, explanations for which include realist narratives focusing 
either on state power and security (including their deterrent benefits), prestige-based arguments, 
which focus on the economic benefits of nuclear weapons development, and those that speak to 
                                                
21 Jo and Gartzke 2007. 
22 Fuhrmann, Matthew. "Taking a Walk on the Supply Side The Determinants of Civilian Nuclear 
Cooperation." Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 2 (2009): 181-208, Fuhrmann, Matthew. "Spreading 
temptation: proliferation and peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements." International Security 34, no. 1 (2009): 7-
41, Kroenig, Matthew. "Importing the bomb: Sensitive nuclear assistance and nuclear proliferation." Journal of 
Conflict Resolution (2009), Braun, Chaim, and Christopher F. Chyba. "Proliferation rings: New challenges to the 
nuclear nonproliferation regime." International Security 29, no. 2 (2004): 5-49. 
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the psychology of proliferation and the ideational attributes of nuclear weapons.23 
 Literature on the effects of horizontal proliferation, or perhaps more accurately nuclear 
weapons development, is largely subsumed within the literature on the effects of nuclear weapons 
possession.  Nuclear domino theory for example, argues that once a state in a particular region 
goes nuclear, then other states will as well.24  The theory is articulated for both the possession 
and development stages, suggesting that states may engage in what is commonly termed 
responsive proliferation, which I define as proliferating in response to, or as an effect of, a 
neighbor’s perceived development of nuclear arms at any point in the proliferation process.25  
Nevertheless, a state that responds to the development, or even suspected development of nuclear 
weapons, may have different motivations than one that responds to the public testing of an intact 
nuclear weapon.  Conversely, the motivations for responding to these actions may be the same or 
similar, yet without treating them independently, their differences and similarities cannot be 
discovered.   
 Treating the development and production of nuclear weapons as distinct phenomena is a 
necessary step forward, but it is only a first step.  It is possible that the various aspects of the 
development process (i.e. the horizontal proliferation phase) have their own theoretical logics, 
including distinct, but potentially interrelated causes and consequences.  For example, the causes 
                                                
23 For examples, see Sagan, Scott D. "How to keep the bomb from Iran." Foreign Affairs (2006): 45-59, Thayer, 
Bradley A. "The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Utility of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime." Security 
Studies 4, no. 3 (1995): 463-519, Waltz 1995, Betts, Richard K. "Wealth, power, and instability: East Asia and the 
United States after the Cold War." International Security (1993): 34-77, Campbell, Kurt M., Robert J. Einhorn, and 
Mitchell Reiss, eds. The nuclear tipping point: Why states reconsider their nuclear choices. Brookings Institution 
Press, 2004, Gertcher, Frank L., and William J. Weida. Beyond deterrence: the political economy of nuclear 
weapons. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990, Lavoy, Peter R. "Nuclear proliferation over the next decade: Causes, 
warning signs, and policy responses." Nonproliferation Review 13, no. 3 (2006): 433-454, Hymans, Jacques. "The 
psychology of nuclear proliferation." Identity, emotions, and foreign policy. New York, USA: Cambridge University 
Press (2006), Solingen, Etel. Nuclear logics: contrasting paths in East Asia and the Middle East. Princeton 
University Press, 2009. 
24 For examples of this literature, see Ladha, Rizwan. "A Regional Arms Race? Testing the Nuclear Domino Theory 
in the Middle East." (2012) or Miller, Nicholas L. "Nuclear Dominoes: A Self-Defeating Prophecy?." Security 
Studies 23, no. 1 (2014): 33-73. 
25 Miller 2014. 
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and consequences of constructing a nuclear reactor capable of producing nuclear weapons-usable 
materials may be different than the actual production of said material.  Unfortunately, the 
existing literature by and large fails to make such a distinction, potentially creating gaps in our 
understanding of the phenomenon.   
 Conceptualizing the various components of the development process as distinct still suffers 
from the aforementioned problem of a lack of specification.  It is logical to conclude that the 
process begins when the decision is first made to produce nuclear weapons and ends when a 
weapon is produced.  Yet, as noted above, there are difficulties in accepting either point as 
universally acceptable delineation criteria.  It is more useful to choose starting and ending points 
on either historical or theoretical grounds.  Fortunately, for virtually every state that has 
developed nuclear weapons, there is a common starting point, that being the construction of a 
nuclear research reactor.  The production of such a facility preceded the decision to produce 
nuclear weapons in virtually every historical case.  The end point of the development process, by 
contrast, has no logical historical basis, other than the public testing of a nuclear weapon, which, 
as Hymans (2011) has argued, may be somewhat arbitrary.  It may, however, be possible to 
identify a logical end point based on theoretical grounds.26   
 As the level of uncertainty in discerning a state’s intentions regarding the production of 
nuclear weapons largely informs not only whether states will respond but also how they will do 
so, once uncertainty in both intent and capabilities is eliminated, the development process 
concludes.  Although there may be exceptions to this rule, in general, uncertainty is eliminated 
when a state either publicly tests a nuclear weapon or publicly communicates their ability to do 
so.   
                                                
26 Hymans, Jacques EC. "Veto players, nuclear energy, and nonproliferation: domestic institutional barriers to a 
Japanese bomb." International Security 36, no. 2 (2011): 154-189. 
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 This dissertation therefore focuses on 1) those activities or behaviors that occur during the 
development phase of nuclear proliferation and 2) how states respond to the occurrence of those 
activities or behavior.  While it is conceivable that a state may respond before or after the actual 
development process occurs, it is 1) more likely that they would do so during the development 
phase and 2) responses that occur before or after this phase have a fundamentally different logic 
than those that occur during said phase.27  It is therefore necessary to review the extant literature 
on responses to the suspected development of nuclear weapons. 
Responses to Nuclear Proliferation 
  Research on responses to nuclear proliferation is largely divided between what are 
commonly referred to as non-proliferation and counter-proliferation.  Although the ideas date to 
the advent of the nuclear age and the failed Baruch Plan, non-proliferation as an articulated 
concept has its roots in the negotiation and entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons (the NPT).  Non-proliferation has been used to refer to both the 
philosophy/goal of the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons and the creation, operation, 
and maintenance of institutions and treaties designed to fulfill that goal.  As such, non-
proliferation generally refers not to specific cases, but to the general prevention of proliferation.    
 Counter-proliferation, on the other hand, refers to specific instances of proliferation 
prevention.  First formally articulated by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin in the 1993 US 
Defense Counter-Proliferation Initiative,28 counter-proliferation has long been viewed as the 
state-based alternative to the institution and treaty-based approaches of non-proliferation.  Owing 
in large part to its defense establishment origins, counter-proliferation has historically been 
associated with military forms of proliferation prevention and/or response.  Research on counter-
                                                
27 Discussed further in Chapter 8 - Conclusions 
28 https://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd18.htm 
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proliferation, by extension, has almost exclusively focused on military forms of response.  This 
literature has paid particular interest to the policy aspects of the phenomenon, addressing either 
the efficacy of its use as either in specific cases or as a general strategy, or the roles of certain 
actors in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.29  Only recently have more systematic 
analyses of the motivations for and the effectiveness of the use of military force in the prevention 
of the spread of nuclear weapons begun to appear.30 
 Other forms of response, including the imposition of economic sanctions, the severing of 
diplomatic ties, or the initiation of negotiations, have largely been treated as independent 
phenomena, separate from either non-proliferation or counter-proliferation.  This research has 
also largely focused on specific cases, such as Iran (e.g. Takeh and Maloney 2011, Torbat 2005, 
Mattair 2010, Carbaugh 2008), Iraq (e.g. Mazaheri 2010, Welch 2002), or North Korea (e.g. 
Haggard and Noland 2010).31  Systematic research on, for example, the effectiveness of 
economic sanctions in preventing proliferation has only appeared as a component of broader 
analyses of sanction effectiveness (Hufbauer et. al. 1990 and Morgan, Bapat, and Krustev 
2009).32  Only recently have scholars attempted to develop theoretical models applicable beyond 
                                                
29 For literature on counterproliferation as a general strategy, see Schneider, Barry R. "Nuclear proliferation and 
counter-proliferation: policy issues and debates." Mershon International Studies Review (1994): 209-234, as a 
specific strategy, see Tira, Ron. "Can Iran Be Deterred?." Policy Review 169 (2011): 39, and for the role of actors, 
see Joseph, Robert G., and John F. Reichart. "The case for nuclear deterrence today." Orbis 42, no. 1 (1999): 7-19 or 
Ellis, Jason D. "The best defense: counterproliferation and US national security." The Washington Quarterly 26, no. 
2 (2003): 115-133. 
30 For example, see Furhmann and Kreps 2010 and Kreps and Fuhrmann 2010. 
31 Takeyh, Ray, and Suzanne Maloney. "The self‐limiting success of Iran sanctions." International Affairs 87, no. 6 
(2011): 1297-1312, Torbat, Akbar E. "Impacts of the US trade and financial sanctions on Iran." The World 
Economy 28, no. 3 (2005): 407-434, Carbaugh, Robert. "Are Economic Sanctions Useful in Discouraging the 
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction?." World Economics 9, no. 4 (2008): 181-200, Mazaheri, Nimah. 
"Iraq and the domestic political effects of economic sanctions." The Middle East Journal 64, no. 2 (2010): 253-268, 
Welch, Michael. "Ordering Iraq: Reflections on power, discourse, & neocolonialism." Critical Criminology 16, no. 
4 (2008): 257-269, Haggard, Stephan, and Marcus Noland. "Sanctioning North Korea: The Political Economy of 
Denuclearization and Proliferation." (2010): 539-568. 
32 Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott. Economic sanctions reconsidered: History 
and current policy. Vol. 1. Peterson Institute, 1990 and Bapat, Navin A., and T. Clifton Morgan. "Multilateral versus 
unilateral sanctions reconsidered: A test using new data." International Studies Quarterly 53, no. 4 (2009): 1075-
1094. 
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a single case (eg. Braut-Hegghammer 2004 and Solingen 2012).33   
 Although the existing research has been beneficial in aiding our understanding of these 
specific forms of response, it fails to reflect what Most and Starr (1984 & 1989) call “foreign-
policy substitutability,” which is the fact that policy makers generally have a range of options 
from which to choose to satisfy any stated foreign policy objective.  Thus, they rarely consider 
any one policy option in isolation, instead adopting what might best be called a “toolkit” 
approach, evaluating a range of options when determining how to deal with any particular 
situation.34  Focusing on one specific form of response, therefore, does not reflect how foreign-
policy-making actually occurs.  It is for this reason that I focus not on forms of response in 
isolation, but instead seek to develop a systematic understanding of the various actions or 
behaviors that states can adopt when choosing to respond to proliferation. 
Information, Uncertainty, and Threat Perception 
 In the international relations literature, threat has historically been defined as a situation 
wherein one actor has the capability and/or willingness to inflict damage or harm on another 
actor.35  Particular attention has been paid to threats against states, or what MacKuen, Erikson, 
and Stimson (1992) refer to as collections of individuals, and identify three primary forms of 
threat: military threats, economic threats, and cultural threats.36  As Rousseau and Garcia-
Retamero (2007) argue, power has often been a component of theories of threat-making and 
                                                
33 Braut-Hegghammer, Maalfrid. "Libya's nuclear turnaround: What lies beneath?."The RUSI Journal 151, no. 6 
(2006): 52-55 or Solingen, Etel, ed. Sanctions, Statecraft, and Nuclear Proliferation. Cambridge University Press, 
2012. 
34 Morgan, T. Clifton, and Glenn Palmer. "A Model of Foreign Policy Substitutability Selecting the Right Tools for 
the Job (s)." Journal of Conflict Resolution 44, no. 1 (2000): 11-32. 
35 Davis, James W. Threats and promises: The pursuit of international influence. JHU Press, 2000. 
36 MacKuen, Michael B., Robert S. Erikson, and James A. Stimson. "Peasants or bankers? The American electorate 
and the US economy." American Political Science Review 86, no. 03 (1992): 597-611. 
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threat-perception, and has been of particular interest to realist-oriented scholars.37  They suggest 
that, because power asymmetry is the leading form of conflict between states (Levine and 
Campbell 1972, Sherif 1967), it is also the primary mechanism behind the perception of threat 
(Doyle 1997).38  This is especially salient for neighbors, who when faced with a power 
asymmetry by a state that is geographically proximate, should respond to said threat in some way 
in order to restore the “balance of power.”39 
 The role of information and uncertainty has been of particular interest to so-called 
defensive realists, including Jervis (1976) and Glaser and Kaufmann (1998), and is the core of 
what Hertz (1950) termed the security dilemma; which suggests that an increase in the military 
capabilities of one state may cause insecurity in another.40  As states are unable to discern 
whether such an increase is offensive or defensive, they must act to in some way prevent the 
expected loss in security caused by the actions of the first state.  The dilemma is that, this will 
often lead the first state to perceive that the actions of the second state will erode their newly 
found military superiority, and must yet again increase its own capabilities.  This is the core of 
what Jervis (1976) terms the “spiral model.” 
 The classic two-player “security dilemma” is often used as an illustration of the dynamics 
underlying arms racing behavior, including the development or acquisition of nuclear weapons.  
In its simplest form, two countries, A and B, react to the actions of the other in a reciprocal 
manner as to maintain the status quo distribution of capabilities.  They do this to mitigate the 
                                                
37 Rousseau, David L., and Rocio Garcia-Retamero. "Identity, Power, and Threat Perception A Cross-National 
Experimental Study." Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, no. 5 (2007): 744-771. 
38 LeVine, Robert A., and Donald T. Campbell. "Ethnocentrism: Theories of conflict, ethnic attitudes, and group 
behavior." (1972), Sherif, Muzafer. Group conflict and co-operation: Their social psychology. London: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, 1967, Doyle, Michael W. "Ways Of War And Peace: Realism, Liberalism, And Socialism Author: 
Michael W. Doyle, Publisher: WW Norton & Company." (1997): 560. 
39 Waltz, Kenneth. "Theory of international relations." Reading, Mass.: Addison-Webley (1979): 111-114. 
40 Glaser, Charles L., and Chairn Kaufmann. "What is the offense-defense balance and how can we measure 
it?." International security 22, no. 4 (1998): 44-82. 
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perceived threat that the other country may obtain superiority in terms of these capabilities and, 
subsequently, launch an attack so as to prevent the other state from increasing their own 
capabilities in kind.  This situation assumes that either 1) both states have nuclear weapons or 2) 
one state has nuclear weapons and the other state has the capability of producing nuclear 
weapons.  In the former case, it is clear to both states that the threat of escalation, in terms of an 
increase in either the quality or quantity of the other state’s nuclear arms, is a real possibility.  In 
fact, the theoretical underpinnings of the security dilemma suggest that states must assume that 
their counterparts are increasing their own capabilities, which should, in turn, lead them to 
increase their own capabilities, regardless of whether the first state was actually increasing their 
capabilities.     
 It is clear, therefore, in this case, that the only rational response to the perceived increase in 
capabilities of another state is for a state to increase its own capabilities.  The latter case is 
similar in dynamic but differs in terms of the starting points of both states.  If country A 
possesses nuclear weapons and perceives that country B, who previously had no nuclear 
weapons, is in the processing of developing this capability, which would erode the superiority 
currently possessed by country A, then country A must act to prevent country B from developing 
such capabilities.  How country A should act to achieve this goal differs according to which 
theoretical framework one believes provides the best course of action.  As discussed, however, 
these theories either fail to provide guidance as to how states should act given specific 
circumstances, or provide contradictory expectations as to how states should act when 
responding to threat more generally.  Furthermore, these theories do not predict when states 
would choose not to act.  
 The difficulty is that with few exceptions, states cannot directly observe and/or 
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conclusively know whether other states are developing nuclear weapons, up until the point that 
the suspected proliferator actually tests a nuclear weapon.  This is attributable to two factors.  
The first is what is widely known as the dual-use problem; with very few exceptions, virtually all 
of the technologies required to produce nuclear weapons, or perhaps more specifically the 
materials required to produce nuclear weapons, may be obtained as a part of or under the guise of 
other processes.  The second is what I call the proliferation paradox, which is the fact that once 
the capability to produce nuclear weapons is developed, there is little that external actors can do 
to prevent their production.  Thus, responses must come before the capability to produce is 
acquired, even if the production of weapons by these states is a small possibility.  This dynamic 
is illustrated by the following examples: 
State (X) develops an extensive civilian nuclear energy program and operates that program, 
peacefully, for an extended period of time.  A security crisis emerges which causes them to 
consider using that capability to develop nuclear weapons.  After much deliberation, the 
leadership of a country orders a small number of nuclear weapons constructed, built in large part 
using existing infrastructure developed for non-weapons purposes. 
 
Alternately, 
 
State (Y) simultaneously constructs a civilian nuclear energy program and a clandestine nuclear 
weapons program.  Y proceeds in their development of each, but a change in its external security 
environment leads to an abandonment of its nuclear weapon ambitions.  
 
In the former case, state (X) did not actually begin producing nuclear weapons until after the 
majority of the requisite infrastructure had been produced and operated peacefully for some time.  
Only after some change in its security environment developed did it choose to begin to use their 
existing capabilities to develop a nuclear weapons program.  Paradoxically, it would seem that 
these capabilities only becomes a threat to others when state X decides to produce nuclear 
weapons.  Because of how quickly nuclear weapons may be constructed given existing 
capabilities, there may be, however, little other states can do to prevent the state from achieving 
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its goal of development.  Japan is often cited as the quintessential example of the “nuclear 
breakout scenario” (Samuels and Schoff 2013), and is often estimated at being able to produce 
nuclear weapons in as little as a few months.41  Nevertheless, it is largely unknowable whether 
such a state, or one with similar levels of capability, will ever have the need to develop nuclear 
weapons.  In addition, even if such a need arises, it is also questionable whether the political will 
to do so will also exist, as there are strong internal and external economic, political, legal, and 
normative reasons to not develop nuclear weapons.   
 For the latter case, which illustrates the inverse of the paradox described previously, state 
Y developed the political will to produce nuclear weapons before or in concert with the 
development of the technical capability to do so.  Yet, as mentioned previously, there are a 
variety of reasons why a state may ultimately abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons, including 
that the political will that led to the initial exploration of nuclear weapons-related technologies 
may not be sufficient or remain substantial enough to sustain what is typically a long, costly 
process of development.   
 The two scenarios previously described illustrate what is, perhaps, the most complex aspect 
of the proliferation phenomenon: the uncertainty in discerning, at any given time, another state’s 
intentions and capabilities. Generally speaking, states cannot know, with absolute certainty, 
whether the nuclear-related activities of other states constitute a threat or whether a state with 
existing capabilities, or one in the process of developing capabilities that appears to be strictly 
for civilian purposes, may become a threat at some point in the future.  This uncertainty remains 
up until the point that the suspected proliferator publicly demonstrates its ability to produce a 
nuclear weapon, typically done by the conduct of a nuclear test.  Even after such a public 
demonstration, there may still be uncertainty as to what a state intends to do with the capability, 
                                                
41 Samuels, Richard J., and James L. Schoff. "Japan’s Nuclear Hedge: Beyond" Allergy" and Breakout." (2013). 
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whether it may be for offensive or defensive purposes, or even as a bargaining chip in future 
diplomatic negotiations.   
 Tajfel (1978) and Tajfel and Turner (1979) articulate an alternate explanation for the 
perception of threat based not on information or power politics/power asymmetries, but on social 
identity and its construction.42  They argue that individuals (and therefore groups) naturally 
engage in a process of separation, designating the “self” as distinct from the “other.”  Groups 
mirror this by designating an “us” that is distinct from a “them.”  This process creates the well-
known “in-group” “out-group” dynamic.43  Differences in shared values, beliefs, and norms 
between “in-groups” and “out-groups” can breed mistrust, and therefore lead to the perception of 
threat.44  This framework has yet to be applied to nuclear realm, but would logically suggest that 
proliferating states would cause both weapons-possessing states and non-possessing states to feel 
threatened because they are attempting to redefine the “in-group” “out-group” distinction. 
IR Theories and Responses to Threat (and Nuclear Proliferation) 
 Whereas Realism and Social Construction Theory both suggest when states should 
perceive threat, I have not yet addressed whether they suggest how states should respond.  I 
therefore review the major theories of international relations, seeking to determine whether they 
suggest both if and how states should respond to threat generally and nuclear proliferation 
specifically.  Of particular interest is whether these theories suggest whether the threat of nuclear 
proliferation should be perceived or addressed in a different manner than other forms of threat 
(i.e. conventional military threat, economic threat, etc.).     
                                                
42 Tajfel, Henri Ed. Differentiation between social groups: Studies in the social psychology of intergroup relations. 
Academic Press, 1978 and Tajfel, Henri, and John C. Turner. "An integrative theory of intergroup conflict."The 
social psychology of intergroup relations 33, no. 47 (1979): 74. 
43 Rousseau, David L. Identifying threats and threatening identities: The social construction of realism and 
liberalism. Stanford University Press, 2006. 
44 Rousseau, David L., and Rocio Garcia-Retamero. "Identity, Power, and Threat Perception A Cross-National 
Experimental Study." Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, no. 5 (2007): 744-771. 
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Realism 
 In a world in which the primary concern of states must be to defend against external 
threats to their security, realists thus suggest that the acquisition of nuclear weapons is a logical 
extension of the development of conventional military power.45  In particular, the development 
of nuclear weapons is key for states in that it provides them a “deterrent” against both 
conventional and nuclear attack from their adversaries (Brodie 1946, 1959, 1978; Waltz 1981, 
1990, 1993, 2003; Jervis 1984, 1988, 1989b).46  
 Although the utility of nuclear weapons in conflict situations clearly dominates the realist 
literature on the subject, other explanations have been given as to why states pursue nuclear 
weapons.  One of the most often cited is that nuclear weapons possession is prestigious, or 
increases the prestige of a state.47  Classical realists have paid particular attention to the increase 
in state prestige often considered to be a result of nuclear weapons possession.  For the most part, 
nuclear weapons are seen as a special case of the prestige gaining nature of increases in military 
power more generally (e.g. Nicholson 1937, Morgenthau 1948, Herz 1951, and Niebuhr 1959).48   
 Realism, therefore, generally suggests that all states that are capable of developing 
nuclear weapons should do so.  Morgenthau (1948; 126-127), however, points out that states 
                                                
45 Hans, Morgenthau. "Politics Among Nations: The struggle for power and peace." New York 51973 (1948). 
46 For examples, see Brodie, Bernard, Frederick Sherwood Dunn, Arnold Wolfers, Percy Ellwood Corbett, and 
William Thornton Rickert Fox. The absolute weapon: Atomic power and world order. New York, Harcourt, 1946, 
Brodie, Bernard, and Rand Corporation. Strategy in the missile age. Vol. 959. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1959, Brodie, Bernard. "The development of nuclear strategy." International Security2, no. 4 (1978): 65-83, Waltz, 
Kenneth N. "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better: Introduction." (1981): 1-1, Waltz, Kenneth N. 
"Nuclear myths and political realities." The American Political Science Review (1990): 731-745, Waltz, Kenneth N. 
"The emerging structure of international politics."International security (1993): 44-79, Scott, Sagan D., and Kenneth 
N. Waltz. "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: a Debate Renewedǁ‖." (2003), Jervis, Robert. The illogic of American 
nuclear strategy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984, Jervis, Robert. "The political effects of nuclear 
weapons: A comment."International Security (1988): 80-90, Jervis, Robert. "Political implications of loss 
aversion." Political psychology (1992): 187-204. 
47 O'Neill, Barry. "Nuclear weapons and national prestige." COWLES FOUNDATION DISCUSSION PAPER 1560 
(2006). 
48 For examples, see Nicolson, Harold. The meaning of prestige. Cambridge University Press, 2014, Morgenthau 
1948, Herz 1951, and Niebuhr, Reinhold. The structure of nations and empires. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959. 
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must act prudently in their development of nuclear weapons.  Once a state has obtained the 
capability to destroy each of its main competitors, further weapons development should cease.  
The stockpiling of arms represents an imprudent action that could potentially invite aggressive 
action on the part of other states.   
 As states must assume that other states will pursue a nuclear weapons production 
capability, those states with the ability to develop nuclear weapons must do so.  Although not 
explicitly stated, realism would suggests that states that already possess nuclear weapons must 
respond to the development of nuclear weapons by other states by either increasing the size of 
their own stockpile, or by taking action such that the nuclear aspirant will be prevented from 
obtaining their desired nuclear capability.  The theory is indeterminate with regards to how a 
state should accomplish this (the assumption being the utilization of military action).   
 Realism is somewhat limited in its predictive or explanatory power in how states that are 
incapable of developing nuclear weapons for themselves should respond to other states that 
develop such a capability.  Davis (1993) suggests that classical realism “provides a complete 
explanation for the causes of nuclear proliferation and international responses to it - 
nonproliferation.”49  It is clear, however, that cooperation between states and the establishment 
of regimes is outside the bounds of traditional classical realism.  He further argues that moving 
away from a strict reliance on military power and incorporating such concepts as economic 
power and security can provide an adequate, realist based explanation for proliferation, but again 
this is outside the scope of classical realism.   
 Realism thus fails to suggest either whether states should respond to the suspected 
development of nuclear weapons by other states or how they should respond if they do.  The 
assumption is that states should take whatever actions necessary to ensure their own survival, or 
                                                
49 Davis, Zachary S. "The realist nuclear regime." Security Studies 2, no. 3-4 (1993): 79-99. 
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to prevent a loss in security.  But for how this should actually be accomplished, realism remains 
silent.   
Neorealism 
 Neorealism, or what Waltz (1979) terms “structural realism,” attempts to apply the core 
concepts of realism (that of an international system made up of states that are security seeking, 
unitary, rational actors) to the development of a theory of international relations.  Waltz (1979) 
argues that the international system is inherently anarchic, in that there is no overarching 
supranational authority that can govern or even regulate the actions of states.  In such a system, 
self-help thus becomes “the principle of action.”50  The result, Waltz argues, is that balances of 
power “tend to form whether some or all states consciously aim to establish and maintain a 
balance, or whether some or all states aim for universal domination.”51   
 One of the defining characteristics of the international system described by neorealists is 
that relative gains are of central importance. Unfortunately, neo-realism is somewhat unspecific 
in specifying the conditions under which states seek to increase their security, or what other 
states will be affected if and when states do seek to increase their security.  To this end, a number 
of extensions of the core of the neorealist theory have been offered. Walt (1987), for example, 
suggests that states increase their security in response to the presence of external threats, whereas 
Mearsheimer (2001) argues that in an anarchic, self-help system, all states seek a preponderance 
of power, with the desired result of becoming the hegemon of their particular system.52  
Defensive realists, on the other hand, such as Jervis (1976), argue that states seek simply to 
survive, and thus pursue the minimal amount of security necessary to ensure survival in an 
                                                
50 Waltz 1979; p. 111. 
51 ibid; p. 119. 
52 Walt, Stephen M. The origins of alliance. Cornell University Press, 1987; Mearsheimer, John J. The tragedy of 
great power politics. WW Norton & Company, 2001. 
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anarchic system.   
 Although neorealism is often praised for its parsimony, it is somewhat difficult to identify 
how states should behave in specific situations based on the theory.  Balancing, either to 
maintain the distribution of power in the international system or against identified threats, for 
example, is said to occur somewhat mechanistically, even as neorealism does not indicate under 
what conditions should states actually adopt a policy of balancing. The benefit of nuclear 
weapons possession by states has long been advocated by neorealist scholars, who generally 
argue that those states whose security would be adversely affected by not having nuclear 
weapons should, in an anarchical, self-help system, acquire such a capability.53  Post-hoc 
analysis, however, indicates that many states that have had the capacity to develop nuclear 
weapons, and had security-related motivations to do so.  Well-known examples of this are 
Taiwan, Japan, and West Germany.  This leads to the skepticism as to neorealism’s predictive 
power with respect to whether a particular state will (or will not) develop nuclear weapons.   
 As with many theoretical frameworks that are faced with evidence that disconfirm their 
core assumptions, neorealism has been adapted or modified to explain these anomalous cases.  
Ogilvie-White (1996) and Solingen (2007) point out that the incorporation of domestic level 
and/or regime specific factors is a frequently used technique by scholars working within the 
neorealist tradition in order to better explain decisions by states who have developed nuclear 
weapons in response to external threat and those who have exercised nuclear restraint.  Such 
scholars, in attempting to “save” neorealism and realism more generally, instead illustrate the 
                                                
53 Examples include May, Ernest R., Richard Rosecrance, and Zara Steiner, eds. History and neorealism. Cambridge 
University Press, 2010; Thayer, Bradley A. "The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Utility of the Nuclear Non-
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difficulty of any one theory, particularly one not explicitly designed to explain nuclear 
proliferation, to accurately explain every case or even a majority of cases.54 
 Although neorealism does explicitly suggest that states that have the ability to develop 
nuclear weapons should do so, it only indirectly suggests how states should respond when a state 
lacks the capability to develop nuclear weapons.  Whether a state seeks to maintain a balance of 
power with a nuclear armed or nuclearizing state, or in Walt’s (1997) terms, wishes to balance 
against the threat of a nuclear armed state, neo-realism implicitly suggests that the formation of 
alliances, including those with nuclear components, may garner the same result: maintaining a 
balance of power or balancing against perceived threats.  This logic, runs somewhat contrary to 
the core of neorealist theory, however; namely the principle of self-help.  As alliances are 
temporally contingent, a state cannot, and according to neo-realist theory should not, rely on the 
protection of another state to ensure its security.  
 The question then becomes whether neorealism suggests any other course of action for 
states faced with a state that is suspected of developing nuclear weapons or a nuclear weapons 
production capability.  Based on balance of power logic, states should adopt any action that 
would preserve the balance.  Yet, from Waltz’s (1979) own admission, neo-realism does not 
prescribe specific courses of action, instead simply arguing that states take actions designed to 
preserve the balance of power.  This is a somewhat unsatisfying conclusion, in that the range of 
actions available to states then becomes unbounded, but wholly indeterminate.  The most likely 
course of action, particularly for the suspected development nuclear weapons, is for other states 
to respond by engaging in direct military action.  Nevertheless, there have only been a few 
isolated cases when this has indeed occurred.   
                                                
54 For example, see Betts (1993) and Buzan, Barry, Charles A. Jones, and Richard Little. The logic of anarchy: 
neorealism to structural realism. Columbia University Press, 1993. 
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Neoliberalism/Institutionalism 
 Neoliberalism, also referred to as institutionalism (hereafter used interchangeably), begins 
with a fundamental question that plagues and often undermines realist and neo-realist analyses: 
why, in an anarchical international system, does cooperation between states ever occur?55  For 
scholars working within this tradition, the answer has been primarily geared towards 
understanding role of international institutions and regimes, which is defined as “a set of rules 
that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and compete with each other.”56  
Borrowing many of the core realist assumptions, including anarchy and rationality, 
institutionalism places increased significance on the role of information and information 
transmission in international institutions and regimes, thus allowing scholars to account for the 
extensive cooperation observed in the international system.57  Much of this work is based on 
mixed-motive games, such as the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, in which it has been demonstrated 
that, given a long enough time horizon, cooperation amongst egoists is likely to occur.58 
 Although not explicit, neoliberalism suggests that states should respond to the occurrence 
of threat by either working through international organizations or establishing organizations that 
may be utilized in the alleviation of the perception of threat.  The theory does not predict either 
when such institutions will be utilized, nor does it explain the observed variance in participation 
in these institutions.  Furthermore, the creation of institutions to address the problem of the 
perceived development of nuclear weapons by another state, such as the bilateral Cooperation 
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Treaty of the Bacia do Prata (1969) between Brazil and Argentina, are rare, isolated events, 
rather than examples of a frequent occurrence. 
 For the non-proliferation treaties that have been created, an example being the Treaty of 
Tlatelolco, which established a convention prohibiting nuclear weapons development of 
possession in Latin America and the Caribbean, also called a nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ), 
there is an ongoing debate as to whether they have affected the likelihood of nuclear weapons 
development by any of its member states.  Furthermore, as is the case with the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), 
these treaties only regulate the behavior of those states that have ratified them.  For those states 
that elect not to accede to these treaties, the question remains, how do states deal with the 
occurrence of nuclear proliferation by states that are not regulated by these institutions or 
regimes?  For example, North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT in 2003 led to the initiation of 
the Six Party Talks, which were intended to persuade North Korea to halt further proliferation-
related activities, yet were unsuccessful in dissuading North Korea from conducting its first 
nuclear weapons test in 2006.  This, in turn, casts doubt on the ability of these institutions or 
regimes to prevent those states that have chosen not to participate from engaging in nuclear 
proliferation.   
 In the North Korean case, the neo-liberal rationale would suggest that North Korea’s 
security would be improved by participating in the NPT and halting their proliferation-related 
activities, yet North Korea continues to engage in such activities.  This situation, as well as those 
of Israel, Pakistan, India, and possibly Iran, point to the inability of neo-liberalism to explain and 
predict both why states engage in nuclear proliferation and whether (and how) states should 
respond to such occurrences. 
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Constructivism  
 The majority of the theories investigated thus far assume that interests and rational utility 
calculations underlie state’s policy preferences, and thus their behavior.   Constructivists instead 
argue that ideas, shared beliefs, and norms shape and inform the policy-making process.59  For 
example, system level constructivists, such as Wendt (1992 & 1999), argue that the power 
politics-based system described by neo-realists and institutionalists, has been socially 
constructed by states to serve their own unique interests.  This system is arbitrary, in that one can 
easily envision an alternate system in which different assumptions, such as a hierarchical 
structure, lead to different rules of behavior.   
 Constructivist logic has been applied to the puzzle of why some states choose to develop 
nuclear weapons, while others choose to show nuclear restraint.  System level theories typically 
focus on international norms.  For example, prior to 1969, the year of the creation and 
widespread ratification of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, states viewed the development of 
nuclear weapons through largely neo-realism colored lenses; that in a anarchic, self-help system, 
every state that is capable of developing nuclear weapons should do so.  After the NPT, however, 
a “nuclear taboo” was created such that states were no longer incentivized to develop nuclear 
weapons, mainly because of the NPT’s “grand bargain,” which stipulated that NPT signatories 
indefinitely refrain from engaging in nuclear proliferation.60  
 Norms also have been applied inwardly when attempting to explain why some states 
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choose to develop nuclear weapons, while others do not.  Sagan (1997), for example, suggests 
that nuclear weapons play a symbolic role for states and can change or even define a state’s 
identity.61  States who choose to engage in nuclear proliferation are thus attempting to either 
reaffirm their role as military and political powers in the international system, such as the case 
with France, or are attempting to change their traditional roles to ones of greater importance, 
such as the case with China.  Long and Grillot (2000), alternately, argue for an ideational model 
of nuclear proliferation and restraint, suggesting that causal beliefs, which Goldstein and 
Keohane (1993) define as “beliefs about the cause-effect relationships which derive authority 
from the shared consensus of recognized elites,” can impact the utility calculations of states, 
informing their policy preferences in a way that can be said to violate traditional neo-realist or 
neo-liberal assumptions about state behavior.62   
 As to how states either should or are most likely to respond to nuclear proliferation, 
constructivism itself is largely unspecific, instead suggesting that states respond in what would 
be considered an acceptable manner, based on the prevailing norms in a specific time and place. 
By applying the underlying logic of constructivism, it is thus possible to predict certain 
behaviors, or, perhaps more accurately, non-behaviors.  It is difficult, however, to observe or 
measure the effect of norms directly.  We cannot know, for example, the extent to which a 
country like Iraq was affected by the nonproliferation norm in the 1980s.  We can assume, based 
on the existence of a covert nuclear weapons program, that it did not have an effect, but this is an 
assumption based on post hoc analysis of their resultant behavior, rather than an actual measure 
of the effect of the prevailing norm.  
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 In the post-NPT world, as Hymans (2006) argues, however, it is difficult to understand, 
according to constructivist logic, why any state would engage in nuclear proliferation, if the 
prevailing view is that nuclear proliferation is “taboo.”63  This points to one of the limitations of 
constructivism more generally, the inability to discern how competing norms or beliefs influence 
state behavior.  For example, if the prevailing view in the post-NPT world suggests that states 
should not engage in nuclear proliferation, but such an event occurs anyway (i.e. a state like 
North Korea violates this norm and develops nuclear weapons), other states may believe that the 
norm is changing, or no longer exists, and thus may adopt the new behavior.  Unfortunately, 
constructivism does not specify when such a situation may occur.  
 The above stated limitation also applies to other forms of response.  For example, when 
deciding if and how to respond to nuclear proliferation by other states, constructivism predicts 
that states will rely on what they perceive are the proper rules of behavior for dealing with 
particular events.  This would suggest that most states would look either to how states have dealt 
with such occurrences in the past or to how other states react to this event, yet does not explain 
why the initially responding state responds in the manner in which it does. 
Conclusion 
 It is clear from a review of the dominant theories of international relations that no single 
theory accurately predicts both when states will respond to proliferation-related activities or 
behavior and how they will do so.  Those that do suggest how states should respond to threat do 
so in contradictory ways; i.e. realism suggests military means while institutionalism suggests the 
establishment of or working through existing institutions.  As such, it becomes necessary to 
develop a more comprehensive, yet nuanced understanding of the phenomenon.  Chapter 3 
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introduces a theoretical framework that attempts to explain not only why some states are more 
likely to respond to nuclear proliferation than others, but also why some states adopt more hostile 
forms of response when electing to respond. 
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Chapter 3: Proliferation Signals and Interpretive Bias 
 As the primary focus of this dissertation is on if, how, and why states respond to 
proliferation, it is necessary at the outset to clarify both the connection between threat perception 
and response, and the role of information in the determination of the former and the occurrence 
of the latter.  While there may be conditions under which this general rule will not hold (to be 
discussed in more detail in the following sections), for the most part, states are increasingly 
likely to respond to proliferation as the threat of proliferation increases.  Furthermore, as the 
threat of proliferation increases, states should also be willing to incur the costs associated with 
the more hostile forms of response, up to and including the launch of military attacks, the 
imposition of harsh economic sanctions, etc., than they would at lower levels of threat.   
 Ideally, states could directly observe and therefore measure both how willing and how 
capable another state is of developing nuclear weapons at any given time and, by extension, 
whether changes in either of these key factors occur.  As will be discussed, in most cases direct 
definitive observation is difficult, if not impossible.  States must therefore make decisions both 
about whether proliferation is occurring and whether and how to respond to proliferation with 
less than perfect information.  
Proliferation Signals - Information & the Problem of Uncertainty 
 
 How do states make determinations as to whether other states are engaging in nuclear 
proliferation?  The most definitive piece of information, the so-called “smoking gun,” is the 
conduct of a publicly observable nuclear test.  Once a test is conducted, as Gartzke and Kroenig 
(2009) suggest, both a state’s intentions and capabilities have been clarified.64  Yet, as Hymans 
(2013) has argued, there are political reasons, both domestic and foreign, why a state may choose 
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not to conduct a test, even if 1) a weapons production capability has been achieved (such as 
Israel post-1968) or 2) weapons have been produced (South Africa during the 1980s).65  Barring 
a nuclear test, states determine whether proliferation is occurring based on information that is 
less than definitive, a direct result of the “dual-use problem.”  This is further complicated by the 
reality that nuclear-related decision making is often highly sensitive and is thus either not made 
public, or is often purposefully obfuscated (Hymans 2009; Sagan 2012).  This creates a situation 
in which determinations about nuclear proliferation must often be made with a great deal of 
uncertainty about both the capabilities of a suspected proliferator and its intent.   
  Potential respondents must look for “signals,” which suggest that the nuclear-related 
activities of suspected proliferators are either directly or indirectly related to the production of 
nuclear weapons.  These signals can vary widely in terms of their strength (in this context the 
extent to which a particular action points towards weapons- or non-weapons-related activities) 
and clarity (how confident a potential respondent can be that the signal is weapons-related).  As 
there are political and technical components to the process by which nuclear weapons are 
acquired, which clarify capabilities and/or intentions, there are also political and technical signals 
that may suggest whether states are likely engaging in the development of nuclear weapons or 
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nuclear weapons production capabilities, or are likely not engaging in said development.66  As 
will be discussed, those signals that most strongly and clearly indicate that proliferation is 
occurring should be those that are most likely to motivate a response. 
Political Signals 
 The information available to external observers about a suspected proliferator’s activities 
that may be classified as political is, for the most part, external reflections of internal decisions.  
Of particular interest are those signals that suggest whether a requisite amount of political will 
exists to develop nuclear weapons.  Alternately, for situations in which the state in question is 
directly or indirectly acquiring some degree of nuclear latency, signals that suggest whether any 
conditions exist that would foster the utilization of this capability to produce nuclear weapons are 
also highly relevant.   
 Unfortunately, the information that would shed the most light on these factors, such as 
leadership directives ordering the develop of nuclear weapons, or budgetary allocations detailing 
the resources dedicated to the production of such capabilities, are typically very secretive and 
therefore difficult, if not impossible, to observe externally.  States must therefore rely on less 
than perfect sources of information regarding a state’s intent to develop nuclear weapons at any 
given time.    
                                                
66 Analysts at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have developed what is generally termed 
“proliferation risk acquisition/diversion pathway analysis (PRADA),” and is similar to what is described here.  It is a 
modeling technique that attempts to identify the possible proliferation risks associated with the various types of 
civilian nuclear facilities that are commonly constructed or procured, with particular attention paid to those facilities 
that are the most conducive to the production of nuclear weapons-usable material.  By identifying how potential 
proliferators may use such facilities to produce nuclear weapons usable materials, either through potential 
repurposing or diversion, IAEA analysts hope to inform both inspections of these facilities and the terms of 
safeguards agreements formed between states and the IAEA.  PRADA also incorporates relevant case-specific 
geopolitical factors in their otherwise technically-based analyses, including location, regime type, possible 
motivations to proliferate, etc., all of which have historically been ignored by the more technologically-oriented 
international non-proliferation institutions (such as the IAEA or CTBTO).  The development of PRADA, and other 
similar analytic approaches, by the IAEA signals, perhaps, a shift away from a focus on verification of compliance 
on the part of states, to one on the detection of proliferation, which has long been the purview of states.  As the 
IAEA does not have an enforcement mechanism, these analyses are still supplementary to what states, themselves, 
determine.  It does, however, point to the relevance of the theoretical framework presented herein. 
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 Perhaps the most directly observable signal suggesting whether the production or 
acquisition of nuclear weapons may be desired is whether a state is a party in good standing to 
nonproliferation related treaties and members of related institutions.  States are motivated to sign 
and ratify treaties primarily to signal their commitment to nonproliferation and their 
renouncement of the development of nuclear weapons, at least for the immediate future.67 The 
difficulty, however, from an observation perspective, is that it is difficult to distinguish between 
those states whose commitment is genuine and those whose intentions are to use treaty 
ratification or institutional membership as cover for or even to enable the development or 
acquisition of nuclear weapons-related technologies.  As seen with other aspects of the 
proliferation phenomenon, it is difficult to distinguish between these two types of states prima 
facie.   
 Conversely, a refusal to sign and ratify existing nonproliferation-related treaties sends 
signals regarding a state’s willingness to adhere to nonproliferation norms prima facie.  Again, 
however, there are multiple reasons that states elect not to sign and ratify such treaties.  The first, 
and perhaps most straightforward, reason is that they intend to develop nuclear weapons.  The 
second is that they want to retain the right to develop nuclear weapons, even if they currently 
have no plans to do so.  The third explanation is that they simply have no incentive to sign and 
ratify such a treaty, largely because they generally do not ever intend to develop nuclear 
weapons, and cannot foresee any change in this position and/or have no desire to develop nuclear 
technologies at all, and thus do not feel pressure to participate in such institutions.68  Again, 
                                                
67 See 2001 special issue of International Organizations for examples of this research.  Also, it is worth noting that 
the well known “supreme national interest” clause of the NPT allows any member state to withdraw from the treaty 
and develop nuclear weapons after a six month waiting period if such a need arises. 
68 A number of Pacific Island countries fall into this category. 
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however, distinguishing these three types of states simply on their refusal to sign and ratify 
existing treaties is difficult.     
 Although refusal to sign any nonproliferation treaty sends a signal about a state’s 
commitment to nonproliferation, important differences exist in the types of nonproliferation 
treaties (and related institutions) that are available for states to sign and ratify, and thus the 
strength of signal they send to other states when choosing whether or not to sign, ratify, and 
fulfill the requirements of treaty.  The first such treaty, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (or NPT), opened for signature in 1968, is a pledge-based institution which 
consists of three “pillars.”69  The first pillar stipulates that the five states who possessed nuclear 
weapons at that time (China, US, UK, USSR, France), would be afforded the right to maintain 
nuclear weapons programs, with the understanding that each would work towards eventual 
nuclear disarmament.  These states would thereafter be designated as nuclear weapon states 
(NWS).  The second pillar states that those states who do did not currently possess nuclear 
weapons would refrain from developing such weapons.  These states would thereafter be 
designated as non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS).  The third pillar, one that ironically 
exacerbates both the dual-use problem and the proliferation paradox, is that each NNWS would 
be entitled to the peaceful use of nuclear technology.  This, in essence, guarantees the right of 
each NNWS to develop and possess the entirety of the nuclear fuel cycle.   
 Regardless of whether a state adheres to the spirit of the NPT, signing and ratifying the 
treaty should have a measurable effect on how other states perceive its nuclear-related activities.  
Its nuclear-related activities should, generally speaking, be viewed as less of a threat than those 
who have not, ceteris paribus.  Thus, other states should be less likely to respond to such 
activities if the state in question has signed and ratified the NPT.   
                                                
69 http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT.shtml 
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 Hypothesis 1: Membership in the NPT decreases the likelihood that other   
 states  will respond to nuclear proliferation 
 
 In addition to the three pillars, which are considered the “core” of the NPT, two clauses, 
in particular, are relevant to the present analysis.   The first, Article X, the so-called “supreme 
national interest” clause, stipulates that any state can withdraw from the treaty, conditional on 
giving three months notice prior to withdrawal.70  The NPT is unclear, however, as to whether a 
withdrawing state can retain possession of the technologies acquired/developed while party to 
the agreement.  This lack of clarity further exacerbates the dual-use problem and proliferation 
paradox described previously.     
 The second, Article III, states that all NNWS must enter into safeguards agreements with 
the IAEA to ensure that all nuclear technologies are being used exclusively for peaceful 
activities.71  Unfortunately, there is no prescribed mechanism, either in the NPT or in the Statute 
of the International Atomic Energy Agency, to ensure states enter into such agreements, nor is 
there a timetable for when states must do so.  Although often mistaken as being a component of 
the NPT itself, IAEA Safeguards Agreements are entirely separate and designed to provide a 
vehicle by which states can “signal” their adherence to the goals of the treaty.  These agreements 
are voluntary, and vary in terms of the items and activities covered, the role that the IAEA plays 
in the fulfillment of the agreements, and how, and to whom, each is applied.  “Item-specific 
safeguards agreements,” for instance, apply only to particular items formally designated as a 
result, in most instances, of the transfer of nuclear technology(ies) between states.  “Voluntary 
offer agreements” are open only to the five recognized NWS, and provide a mechanism by which 
these states can signal their compliance and ongoing support with the nonproliferation goals of 
the IAEA.  The most common of these, however, is the “comprehensive safeguards agreement,” 
                                                
70 Thus far, North Korea has been the only state to exercise the right to withdrawal (in 2003) 
71 http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sv.html 
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which is designed to cover all nuclear-related activities within a state.  Under the terms of such 
an agreement, states agree to allow IAEA representatives, typically in the form of inspectors, to 
verify that all nuclear related activities conducted within the state are for peaceful (i.e. non-
weapons related purposes only).  Under these agreements, states are required to declare any and 
all nuclear-related activities to the IAEA, which will then check, through on-site verification, for 
compliance.  IAEA officials are constrained, to some extent, from verifying the completeness of 
these declarations, as inspections are permitted only for materials and at facilities that the states 
themselves have reported.  Under the terms of the agreements, inspectors may request access to 
undeclared facilities, if they suspect that non-declared activities are taking place, or material 
from declared activities may be being diverted for non-peaceful purposes, but it is up to the 
states themselves to allow inspections to take place.   
 As seen with those states that elect to sign the NPT, a state who enters into such 
agreements send signals regarding its commitment to non-proliferation.  Furthermore, entering 
into a comprehensive safeguards agreement should be a stronger signal of a state’s commitment 
to nonproliferation than simply signing and ratifying the NPT without entering into such an 
agreement.  This is not only because such an agreement allows for the inspection of declared 
nuclear facilities, but also that it demonstrates a state’s compliance with Article III of the treaty, 
as well as its overall spirit.  In turn, states should perceive the nuclear-related activities of states 
who have entered into such agreements as less likely to be related to the development of nuclear 
weapons, than those states that have only signed and ratified the NPT.  They should, therefore, 
be less likely to respond to activities that could be related to the development of nuclear 
weapons.   
 Hypothesis 2: Entering into a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement makes  
 responses to nuclear proliferation less likely than does NPT ratification alone. 
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 Although signing and ratifying the NPT and entering into comprehensive safeguards 
agreements with the IAEA represent substantial steps that states can take to signal their 
compliance with the goals of the NPT, there are still pathways that states can take advantage of if 
the desire to develop nuclear weapons arises.  In particular, the inability of the IAEA to verify 
the completeness of declared activities led to the introduction of an addendum to a state’s 
safeguards agreements, or what are termed “additional protocols.”72  A state that has accepted the 
additional protocol voluntarily elects to allow more intrusive inspections by the IAEA, whose 
goal becomes not only verifying the accuracy of a state’s declared nuclear-related activities, but 
also its completeness.  While not preventing clandestine development, this protocol is designed 
explicitly to make more difficult the diversion of materials from peaceful nuclear activities for 
use in weapons production.  Thus, states that accept the additional protocols send much stronger 
signals regarding their commitment to nonproliferation than other states that fail to do so.  In 
turn, nuclear-related activities conducted by these states should be viewed in a more favorable 
light and thus decrease the likelihood that states will respond to such activities.   
 Hypothesis 3: Signing an Additional Protocols Agreement make responses to  
 nuclear proliferation less likely than when an AP agreement has not been signed. 
 
 Whereas the NPT, the IAEA safeguards agreements, and the additional protocols are 
designed to work in concert, there exists other treaties and institutions to which states can be 
party to that may further signal their commitment to nonproliferation and, in turn, make it less 
likely that other states will perceive their activities as being anything other than non-weapons 
related.  The first is a series of pledge-based treaties establishing what are generally known as 
“nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZ).”  NWFZ’s establish areas wherein the parties to treaty 
agree not to possess or use nuclear weapons.  Further, they stipulate that no foreign entity, 
                                                
72 http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/documents/safeg_system.pdf 
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including the five NWS, may station nuclear weapons on the territories within the area covered 
under the treaty.  Five such treaties currently exist, shown below in Table 3.1.  
Table 3.1 - Nuclear Weapon Free Zones 
Treaty Name Region # States Party to 
Treaty 
Year Entered 
into Force 
Tlatelolco Latin America & 
Caribbean 
33 1969 
Rarotonga South Pacific 13 1986 
Bangkok South East Asia 10 1997 
Semei Central Asia 5 2009 
Pelindaba Africa 53 2009 
 
Membership in any of these treaties should, then, further signal a state’s compliance with 
existing non-proliferation norms.  Thus, states should be less likely to respond to proliferation-
related activities or behavior by these states than those who do not exist in any of the NWFZs.  
Thus, 
Hypothesis 4: States are less likely to respond to nuclear proliferation by   
 states that have ratified NWFZ agreements than those that have not done so. 
 
As these treaties fail to establish any type of verification or compliance mechanisms, they 
produce similar signals regarding their parties’ commitment to nonproliferation, save for one.  
Unique among them is the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which established a mechanism designed to 
ensure that member states comply with the terms of the treaty: the Agency for the Prohibition of 
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, or OPANAL.  Membership in any one of 
these treaties should send a signal regarding a state’s commitment to nonproliferation, which 
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should, in turn, make it less likely that states will view its nuclear-related activities as being 
anything but peaceful. 
 In addition to those discussed previously, there a number of other treaties and institutions 
that are directly or indirectly related to the prevention or discouragement of the development of 
nuclear arms.  One such institution is the Brazilian - Argentine Agency for Accounting and 
Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), which is a bilateral institution created via an agreement 
between Brazil and Argentina, designed to verify each state’s compliance with the goals of the 
NPT.  Similar to what was seen with the additional protocol, membership in this type of 
institution should send a strong signal regarding the party’s commitment to nonproliferation, 
again because such an institution verifies that nuclear-related activities are entirely for peaceful 
purposes.     
 For each of the treaties and institutions described previously, whether a state elects to 
enter into such an agreement sends a signal regarding its commitment to nonproliferation.  
Nevertheless, this is only the first stage in the process.  Equally as important is a state’s 
compliance with the terms of the treaty.  There are only certain instances, such as the inspection 
regime within the comprehensive safeguards agreement, in which mechanisms are in place to 
confirm such compliance, whether comprehensive in scope or not.  When such mechanisms 
exist, a state’s continued compliance with the terms of the treaty sends a strong signal regarding 
its commitment to nonproliferation.   
 A ruling of non-compliance, by contrast, sends one of the strongest negative political 
signals regarding a state’s commitment to nonproliferation.  While a state may be found in non-
compliance for a range of reasons specific to the treaty or institution, it is most likely due to the 
discovery or suspicion of undisclosed nuclear-related activity.  The most well known of these, 
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and the one most likely to lead to a response, is a finding of non-compliance by the Board of 
Governors of the IAEA.  Such a finding indicates that a state has either purposefully concealed 
and/or obfuscated the development of nuclear technologies, has repeatedly failed to fulfill 
reporting requirements, or refused to comply with IAEA weapons inspectors.73   
Hypothesis 5: States are more likely to respond to states that have been found to be in 
non-compliance with the IAEA than those who have not. 
 
 An even stronger signal of intent may be for a state to withdraw from non-proliferation 
treaties or institutions.  While not a definitive indication that weapons are desired or being 
developed, it does signal a change in a state’s commitment to the norm of non-proliferation.  
This is true even for treaties that have formal withdrawal mechanisms, such as the NPT (its 
“Supreme National Interest” clause).  States may view the withdrawal from such treaties and/or 
institutions as a signal of possible weapons development, and may respond accordingly.  Thus, 
 Hypothesis 6: States are more likely to respond to proliferation by states that  
 have withdrawn from non-proliferation-related treaties or institutions than those  
 that have not done so. 
 
 Although non-proliferation related signals are, perhaps, the most influential political 
signal, they are not the only form of political signal.  Other forms of political signals that states 
may look to in determining whether proliferation is or is not occurring are those that signals that 
speak to the potential utility of a nuclear weapons production capability.  One of the signals that 
states may look to is whether a state has entered into a nuclear defense agreement with another 
state, or what is commonly called a “nuclear umbrella” alliance.  States party to such an 
agreement generally have less of a need to develop their own indigenous capabilities, as they 
                                                
73 States found to be in non-compliance with the IAEA are generally referred to the United Nations Security 
Council, who then decide whether to authorize action.  A UNSC resolution authorizing the use of force, while not a 
political signal, is also a factor that could increase the likelihood of a response. 
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gain the benefit of nuclear weapons possession without incurring the costs.  This signals to other 
states that the development of weapons-production capabilities is unlikely.  Thus, 
 Hypothesis 7: States are less likely to respond to nuclear proliferation by states that  
 have entered into nuclear umbrella alliances than those that have not done so. 
 
 Even though political signals can suggest whether a state that is developing nuclear 
technologies may be doing so, directly or indirectly, to produce nuclear weapons, or attain the 
capability to produce nuclear weapons, they are only one side of the story.  At least as important 
are those signals that can be characterized as being technical in nature.  Where there are a limited 
number of externally observable political signals, much information can be gained from an 
analysis of state’s activities regarding their development of nuclear capabilities.  Furthermore, 
political signals are, for the most part, rarely viewed in isolation.74  Instead, they are viewed in 
combination with the technical decisions made by states.  A failure to ratify the NPT may not 
lead to a response by other states, but the development of enrichment capabilities by a state that 
has not ratified the NPT may motivate some form of response.  Political signals are therefore 
supplementary to the technical signals produced by states as nuclear weapons-related 
technologies are being developed. 
Technical Signals 
 As states indigenously produce or procure nuclear-related technologies, they send signals 
that indicate whether they are actively developing nuclear weapons, or seeking the capability to 
produce nuclear weapons.  These signals are produced by both the overall characteristics of their 
respective nuclear programs and the characteristics of the specific technologies they choose to 
procure or produce.  This is similar to the political signals described previously, the 
                                                
74 There is one notable exceptions to this rule, which is for a state to be found in non-compliance with a non-
proliferation related treaty or institution.  Such a finding may motivate a response in its own right. 
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characteristics of both a state’s nuclear program, and the specific technologies they choose to 
produce or procure, are reflections of internal decision-making.   
 For external observers attempting to discern whether the production or procurement of 
nuclear technologies by another state is related to the acquisition of nuclear weapons, it therefore 
becomes necessary to judge both the characteristics of the specific technologies the state 
produces or procures as well as its nuclear program as a whole.  To develop an understanding of 
how states judge whether another state’s nuclear-related activities are weapons related, it is first 
necessary to develop an understanding of the infrastructure requirements for both nuclear power 
and nuclear weapons production, how they overlap, and perhaps even more importantly, how 
they differ.   
 The production of nuclear power requires the mastery of at least some aspects of what is 
termed the “nuclear fuel cycle.” Although certain aspects of the fuel cycle are necessary for the 
production of nuclear power, such as the possession of a nuclear reactor, others are necessary 
only if a state desires to possess each component of the process itself.  It is common for states to 
import or export certain components of the process, such as the import of uranium yellowcake or 
the export of spent nuclear fuel, either because of a lack of availability of the necessary 
indigenous resources (uranium ore, while widely available, is not evenly distributed, 
geographically), a lack of economic incentive to do so (it may be cheaper to import certain 
materials than for a state to produce it themselves), or strong political and/or normative pressures 
against possessing such technologies.  Doing so, however, means that the continued successful 
operation of their nuclear programs is dependent on external actors.  In other words, the more 
components of the nuclear fuel cycle that a state indigenously possesses, the more internally 
reliable the program becomes.   
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 The production of nuclear power is but one factor that influences a state’s decision-
making process in determining whether or not to develop the various components of the nuclear 
fuel cycle.  Another factor is that there are economic incentives for many of the resultant 
components.  Uranium yellowcake, for example, is a widely traded commodity on the 
international market.  The economic incentives alone have led many countries to develop nuclear 
technologies for export. 
 Similarly, the production of nuclear weapons, or the acquisition of the capability to 
produce nuclear weapons, is the end result of a complex process that has few necessary 
components.  To produce a deployable nuclear weapon, states must fulfill the following three 
requirements:   
• Produce or procure a sufficient quantity (SQ) of fissionable, or weapons usable material 
(WUM), typically either weapons grade uranium (uranium enriched to greater than 90% ) 
or weapons grade plutonium (plutonium comprised of greater than 90% Pu239)75 
 
• Produce or procure a nuclear explosive device (NED) 
• Produce or procure a delivery vehicle of some kind.   
By extension, to develop the capability to produce nuclear weapons, states must:   
• Achieve the capability to produce or procure weapons-usable material (WUM) 
• Develop the capability to produce or procure a nuclear explosive device (NED) 
• Develop the capability to produce or procure a delivery vehicle for the nuclear weapon.   
 
 While the production or procurement of a nuclear explosive device and a delivery 
vehicle, or the capability to do so, is an integral component of the nuclear weapons acquisition 
process, perhaps more important is the production or procurement of fissionable material.  It 
represents the greatest technical barrier to the production of nuclear weapons.  It can be 
                                                
75 An additional future concern may be the production of weapons-usable neptunium, which is accumulating in large 
quantities in spent nuclear fuel. 
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accomplished either through the indigenous production of weapons-grade uranium or weapons-
usable plutonium,76 or their procurement by theft or purchase.77  
 The process by which WUM is produced shares many of the same components as the 
nuclear power generation process.  Indeed, other that the fabrication of uranium or plutonium 
pits, the processes, at least on the surface, is identical, thus creating the dual-use problem 
described previously.  Thus, regardless of whether a state is intending to produce nuclear 
weapons, the mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle provides some measure of nuclear latency.  Yet, 
the right to develop the entirety of the nuclear fuel cycle is guaranteed for all NNWS under the 
terms of the NPT, making it insufficient, alone, to explain when other states perceive these 
activities as being potentially weapons-related.  States must therefore analyze not only the 
specific technological choices other states make for markers which may suggest, one way or the 
other, whether they are interested in the development of nuclear weapons, but also in how they 
develop and use them.  For instance, uranium enrichment, a process whereby the percentage of 
fissionable U235 relative to the other uranium isotopes present in the material is increased, is a 
commonly conducted activity in both the production of fuel for nuclear power and for material 
for use in uranium-based nuclear weapons.  Yet, enrichment levels differ between what is 
commonly used in power reactors versus what is typically required for use in nuclear weapons 
(common levels of enrichment are shown in Table 3.2. 
 
 
                                                
76 Commonly known as the two paths to proliferation 
77 While it is possible to develop these two sources of WUM simultaneously, most countries, particularly those with 
limited resources, tend to focus on one or the other. 
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Table 3.2: Enrichment Levels of Uranium 
Categories of Uranium Enrichment Levels 
Depleted Uranium Less Than 0.71 % U235 
Natural Uranium 0.71% U235 
Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) More than 0.71% U235 and Less than 20% U235 
Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) More than 20% U235 
Weapons Grade Uranium (WGU) More than 90% U235 
 
This enriched state can be accomplished in a number of ways, each with their own advantages 
and disadvantages.78  For each of these enrichment methods, the process by which uranium is 
enriched to weapons-grade is the same as it is for lower levels of enrichment.  For example, the 
process by which naturally occurring uranium, with concentrations of the U235 isotope of 
approximately .7%, is enriched to the level commonly used to power commercial power reactors 
(typically between 3-5% U235), is the same as the process by which weapons grade uranium 
(above 90% U235) is produced.  It is, in most cases, an extension of the process, typically through 
repetition, or by the use of additional “stages” of enrichment.   
 The choice of enrichment method is largely a question of feasibility; states generally 
choose the method that is going to provide the most reliable, effective means of enrichment 
given the resources and technology available to a country.  This can lead many states to develop 
technologies that may not seem the most logical (in terms of effectiveness and reliability) to 
outside observers.  For example, Iraq’s development of EMIS enrichment technologies and 
South Africa’s development of aerodynamic “vortex” enrichment were both surprising when 
                                                
78 For a more detailed technical discussion of the various enrichment methods, see either 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/intro/u-enrichment.htm  or Krass, Boskma, Elzen, and Smit (1983), “Uranium 
Enrichment and Nulcear Weapon Proliferation,” http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=286 
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discovered, given that both of these technologies had been investigated by the United States and 
others and found to be less reliable, less effective, and more costly than other modern enrichment 
methods.  Nevertheless, each country judged these techniques to be the most viable, based on the 
available technologies and resources available to the respective country at the time of their 
development.  Thus, a state’s choice of a particular enrichment method is not a good indicator of 
whether the capability to produce weapons-usable material is desired.  That being said, the 
acquisition or development of any form of enrichment facility does signal at least an increase in 
capabilities over previous ones, or, in a comparative sense, makes a state more nuclear weapons-
capable (latent) than a state who has no such capability.  Thus, states should be more likely to 
respond to states that have enrichment capabilities than those who do not. 
Hypothesis 8: States are more likely to respond to the construction or operation of 
enrichment facilities by other states than to states with no such capability. 
 
 Plutonium, by contrast, is an entirely man-made element that is created in all nuclear 
power reactors as a result of the irradiation of uranium.79  Thus, the production of plutonium is 
not the end result of a distinct path of development, as is the case with HEU or WGU production, 
but rather a byproduct of nuclear reactor use that may or may not be intended for weapons 
construction.  This greatly complicates the identification of overt proliferation-related activity, 
particularly when virtually all isotopes of plutonium are usable in nuclear weapons.  On the 
surface, these two factors make distinguishing weapons-related activity from non-weapons 
related activity extremely difficult, yet certain isotopes of plutonium are more conducive to the 
creation of effective and reliable nuclear explosive devices.  In addition, certain types of reactors 
                                                
79 Although plutonium, did, at one time, exist naturally in the earth’s crust, only trace amounts remain. 
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are more effective at generating these isotopes, the creation of which may indicate that 
proliferation-related activity may be occurring.80   
 Of the various isotopes of plutonium (Pu238, Pu239, Pu240, Pu241, & Pu242), Pu239 and Pu241 
are the most likely to undergo fissioning, and only Pu239 and Pu241 are considered to be "fissile" 
material, that is fissionable by thermal neutrons.81  Although it is possible to construct a 
plutonium-based nuclear weapon using any isotope of plutonium, Pu239 is considered to be the 
most “appealing” for weapons production, because of its reliability (in terms of producing the 
desired explosive yield) and the relatively minor radiation emitted.  The presence of the even 
numbered isotopes of plutonium, particularly Pu240, is of particular concern to plutonium-based 
weapons designers, as these isotopes are both readily fissioned by fast neutrons and are subject to 
spontaneous fissioning; this can result in the premature initiation of a nuclear chain reaction.  
This leads to what is known as a “fizzle yield,” a reduction in the overall magnitude of the 
explosive blast formed as a result of the chain reaction.82  With this consideration in mind, the 
following distinctions are commonly made with respect to the concentration of Pu240 and their 
relation to the distribution of isotopes found within a concentration of plutonium: 
• Super-grade plutonium (SGP) - containing less than 3% Pu240. 
• Weapons-grade plutonium (WGP) - containing less than 7% Pu240. 
• Fuel-grade plutonium (FGP) - containing from 7% to 18% Pu240. 
• Reactor-grade plutonium (RGP) - containing over 18% Pu240. 
  
 Although Pu239 represents the most “appealing” isotope for weapons production, as was 
demonstrated by the United States in an underground nuclear test conducted at the Nevada Test 
Site in 1962, it is possible to construct a nuclear explosive device with any isotope of plutonium 
                                                
80 For the purposes of this analysis, therefore, it is logical to assume that a potential proliferator will pursue the 
simplest and most reliable method of weapon construction. 
81 Albright, Berkhout, and Walker (1996) pg. 18. 
82 ibid pg. 19 
59 
 
with a reasonable expectation of yield.83  The difficulty, therefore, in identifying proliferation-
related behavior on the plutonium production path is that virtually every nuclear reactor produces 
weapons-usable plutonium of some quantity and quality.  States are therefore forced to recognize 
that the construction of any nuclear reactor by another state increases its nuclear latency.  Yet, 
there may be indicators in both the form and function of reactors that may suggest whether 
weapons production capabilities are desired.  
 Nuclear reactors may be distinguished by a number of factors, but are most often 
characterized according to their primary function, as shown in Table 3.3:84 
Table 3.3: Nuclear Reactor Types 
Reactor Type Primary Function 
Research Reactors  Provides neutrons for research and educational purposes 
Test Reactors Develop new reactor technologies or new operational characteristics 
Prototype or Demonstration 
Reactors 
Demonstrate or test new reactor types 
Military/Production Reactors Produce materials for use in nuclear weapons 
Power Reactors Energy production 
Naval Reactors Naval propulsion 
Space Reactors Space propulsion 
 
While each of these reactor types may be utilized to produce nuclear weapons-usable material, 
their utility in the production of weapons-usable material varies widely.  Reactors designated for 
commercial or civilian power use, for example, typically have high “burn-up” rates, with the 
most common type, the pressurized water reactor (PWR), usually operating between 30,000 - 
                                                
83 Albright, Berkhout and Walker pg. 19. 
84http://wiki.ornl.gov/sites/gnstd/gssec/meeting1/Shared%20Documents/2_4_Nuclear%20Reactors%20and%20Proli
feration%20Risk.pdf 
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50,000 MWd/t.85 On the other hand, production reactors, which are operated to maximize the 
production of Pu239, typically have low “burn-up” rates, typically on the order of 400 MWd/t.86  
It is technically possible to operate a power reactor in a manner similar to a military production 
reactor, by removing the fuel elements after a brief period of irradiation, but this is costly in 
terms of a loss in power generation and also easy to detect.  Thus, even though any of these 
reactor types can be employed for the purposes of producing materials for weapons use, there are 
two, in particular, that have been the focus of weapons developers: research reactors and military 
production reactors.   
   A research reactor is a type of nuclear reactor designed primarily for the production of 
neutrons.  Such reactors are generally used for research and educational purposes, and are 
particularly useful for states in the early stages of nuclear development (either for weapons 
production, power generation, or both).  They are relatively small in scale (most research 
reactors have outputs less than 100MW compared to power reactors, which have an output often 
greater than 3000MW),87 have minimal fuel requirements, and are relatively low producers of 
toxic waste (leading to small infrastructure requirements).  Small scale research reactors, those 
that have an operating capacity of less than 1MW, typically do not pose direct proliferation risks, 
as the plutonium production rate is too small to support a functioning nuclear weapons 
development program.  Small-scale research reactors do, however, provide essential knowledge 
of the construction and operation of nuclear reactors.  Because of their widespread use, and the 
relative ease with which they may be acquired, research reactors generally send weak signals 
regarding both technical capability and political will.  They do, however, often provide the 
groundwork for the subsequent construction and operation of larger reactors, which may be more 
                                                
85 ibid pg. 21. 
86 Alrbight, Berkhout, and Walker pg. 21. 
87 http://world-nuclear.org/info/inf61.html; Here MW refers to megawatts thermal, rather than electrical. 
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effective in aiding in the development of nuclear weapons production capabilities, particularly 
those that are dedicated military/production reactors, or large scale research reactors that have 
either been converted to production reactors (an example being South Africa’s Safari reactor), or 
fulfill both functions simultaneously (an example being North Korea’s Yongbyon reactor).  
 Military/production reactors, on the other hand, are those that are specifically designed 
and operated to produce plutonium of sufficient quality and quantity for use in a nuclear weapon, 
or to support a nuclear weapons production program.  These reactors are typically located on 
military installations, and are often heavily fortified against potential attack.  They also have 
generally higher operating capacities than research reactors, typically sufficient to supply 
material in enough quantity to support the production of at least one nuclear weapon per year.  
Thus, a nuclear reactor constructed on a military installation, or one that is heavily fortified 
against attack, sends a much stronger signal than one without such fortifications.  Thus, 
 In addition to the perceived purpose of any given reactor, states also take into 
consideration the design of reactors when discerning proliferation risk or intent.  Those 
moderated by heavy water, for example, pose the greatest proliferation risk of the various reactor 
types, as the fuel required to power the reactor does not need to undergo enrichment before use.  
This allows potential proliferators to avoid the costly and easily identifiable step of uranium 
enrichment.88 In addition, heavy water moderated reactors (HWRs) produce more plutonium and 
tritium than other forms of reactors.8990  HWRs are not the only type of reactor conducive for the 
                                                
88 Heavy water moderated reactors instead require the construction of specialized heavy water production facilities.  
While heavy water is an internationally traded commodity, and thus available for import for potential use in the 
plutonium based WUM process, it is widely assumed that, to obtain a sustainable nuclear weapons production 
program, as opposed to constructing a single weapon, the indigenous capability to produce heavy water would be 
desired. 
89 Although outside of the scope of this project, heavy water byproducts can also be used in the production of 
boosted fission or advanced fusion weapons and are a strong signal of the development of what are largely 
considered to be “modern” nuclear weapons. 
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production of Pu239 in sufficient quantities for use in nuclear weapons.  As noted above, any 
nuclear reactor may be employed in the production of plutonium for weapons use.  Historically, 
two reactor designs have been more often used in the production of weapons-grade plutonium: 
the light-water-cooled, graphite moderated reactor (LWGR) and the carbon-dioxide cooled 
graphite-moderated reactor (the GCR, or more commonly named Magnox reactor). 91  Other 
reactor types, including light water moderated, pool or tank type reactors (LWRs), pressurized 
water reactors (PWRs), or boiling-water reactors (BWRs), are less conducive, on their own, to 
producing Pu239 of sufficient quality and quantity for use in a nuclear weapons production 
program.  Accordingly, they are typically seen as less of a proliferation risk than graphite 
moderated or heavy water reactors. 
 Signal strength for reactors, therefore, is largely determined by three factors: reactor 
function, reactor composition, and thermal capacity (shown below in Figure 3.2).   The more 
conducive a reactor is for the production of weapons-usable material, the stronger the signal it 
sends to other states regarding a state’s intentions regarding the development, or potential 
development, of nuclear weapons.  Thus, the stronger the signal produced, the more likely it is 
that states will respond to its construction and/or operation. 
                                                                                                                                                       
90 Although heavy water reactors are considered to be the most appealing reactor design to potential proliferators, 
and are thought to have been used, for example, by India and Israel for this purpose, of the heavy water reactors 
currently in operation (twelve as of January, 2012), most are of Canadian design and origin (the CANDU reactor), 
which suggests that the construction and operation of such reactors does not necessarily lead to the development of 
nuclear weapons. 
91 The former has been used, although not exclusively, by the USA, the former Soviet Union, and China in their 
weapons-related plutonium production efforts and the latter by the UK, France, and North Korea. 
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Figure 3.1: Signal Strength of Reactors 
 
This thus gives rise to the following: 
 
Hypothesis 9:  The stronger the indication of proliferation intent of a particular nuclear 
reactor, the more likely that a response will occur to its construction or operation 
 
 Somewhat complicating Pu WUM production is that the irradiation process also produces 
a number of transuranic elements, other than Pu, and fission products from which the plutonium 
must be removed before it can be fabricated into a form usable in nuclear weapons.  This process 
is commonly known as “reprocessing” for commercial or civilian applications and simply 
“plutonium separation” for military applications (although the actual processes are virtually 
64 
 
identical).92  Although this step is critical for weapons-production purposes, it is much less so for 
civilian or commercial applications.93      
 A number of alternatives to the standard separation process have been investigated over 
the years, electrochemical separation.  Only one, Purex, has been used on an industrial scale.  
Developed by the United States in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the Purex (plutonium-uranium 
extraction) process is a chemical based process whereby plutonium isotopes are separated from 
the remaining uranium and other transuranics found in the spent nuclear fuel.   Purex facilities 
must be heavily shielded with concrete, which can make external discernment of proliferation 
intent difficult.  In addition, potential criticality concerns necessitate exacting engineering 
standards, which further increase the costs associated with the construction and operation of such 
facilities, increasing the barrier of entry for all but a handful of the wealthiest, technologically 
advanced states.94  The construction of such a facility can be observed, through either aerial or 
satellite surveillance.   
 A number of alternative approaches to separating or reprocessing plutonium exist, but the 
most widely used is the mixed-oxide (MOX) production process: reprocessed plutonium is 
blended with either natural, enriched, or depleted uranium to produce reactor fuel.  The MOX 
process renders the reprocessed plutonium useless in nuclear weapons.  Facilities such as Japan’s 
Rokkasho reprocessing facility, utilize this process for the majority of its reprocessed plutonium, 
thus signaling that proliferation is likely not occurring.  Even in facilities where the MOX 
                                                
92 ibid pg. 21. 
93 Today, for most commercial or civilian reactor programs, spent nuclear fuel is typically stored without undergoing 
reprocessing, although this was done more frequently in previous decades when it was believed that reprocessed 
plutonium might serve as a viable alternate to uranium as reactor fuel.  While a few countries do currently operate 
such reactors (India for example), or are currently exploring this technology (China, for example), the overwhelming 
majority of nuclear reactors currently in operation or in development continue to use uranium as their primary fuel 
source. 
94 There are exceptions to this, obviously, as North Korea was able to utilize this process on a small scale to produce 
reprocessed plutonium for their 2006 and 2009 nuclear tests. 
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process is universally employed, however, it would be technically possible to either not use the 
MOX process on some amount of reprocessed plutonium if weapons-usable material was 
desired, or divert reprocessed plutonium away from the MOX stage.  Thus, proliferation cannot 
be ruled out.  Therefore, the construction and/or operation of any facility capable of producing 
separated/reprocessed plutonium is likely to increase the likelihood of a response.  Thus, 
Hypothesis 10: States are more likely to respond to the construction or operation of 
separation/reprocessing facilities by other states than to states with no such capability. 
 
 The construction and operation of nuclear reactors and plutonium reprocessing facilities 
in a manner that suggests that nuclear weapons capabilities are desired still does not definitively 
indicate that such a capability is actually being developed.  An aspect of the weapons usable 
plutonium production process that does not overlap with the nuclear fuel cycle development 
process, and thus may be an indicator that weaponization may be occurring, is the production of 
plutonium pits.  The identification of facilities designed to meet the requirements of pit 
production thus sends a strong signal regarding a state’s intentions.  Unfortunately, the 
identification of such facilities is difficult, as there are few externally identifiable characteristics 
that allows states to conclude that a facility was either designed or employed to meet the 
requirements of pit production.95 
 The various signals identified herein represent only a sample of those that may affect the 
perception of the likelihood of proliferation by other states.  Others, such as whether states have 
advanced delivery capabilities, are also often taken into consideration.  Although many have 
independent effects, such as whether a state chooses to sign and ratify the NPT, they are rarely, if 
ever, viewed in isolation.  Rather, states judge the entirety of other state’s decisions when 
                                                
95 Radiation shielding is, perhaps, the most technically demanding characteristic of both plutonium and uranium pit 
production facilities (they have similar requirements), yet is also used for a number of both commercial and military 
reasons.  Thus, definitive external identification is difficult.  In addition, dedicated pit production facilities have only 
been constructed, in the majority of cases, after initial weapons testing. 
66 
 
making determinations as to both whether proliferation is occurring and the extent to which it 
constitutes a threat.  That being said, certain signals have a much greater affect than others.  
Thus, developing an understanding of the strength of signals, and its effect on both the likelihood 
and form of response becomes necessary. 
Signal Strength 
Incorporating a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of the proliferation 
process and the signals (potentially) produced therein allows us to further refine the relationship 
presented previously between the perception of threat and the occurrence and hostility of 
responses.  Instead of suggesting that states will be more likely to respond if and when the threat 
of proliferation increases, it is more accurate to say that states will be more likely to respond as 
the signals suggesting that proliferation is occurring become stronger; i.e. negative signals.   
 Although developing an understanding of how and what kinds of signals are produced by 
states that develop nuclear technologies is important, it is only the first step in a broader process.  
As there is no independent authority, even in the case of the IAEA, whose role it is to 
definitively identify when “proliferation” is occurring, states must largely rely on themselves, 
perhaps in consultation with their allies, to determine whether the nuclear-related activities of 
other states are more or less likely to be related to the production of nuclear weapons or the 
development of a nuclear breakout capability.  Thus, although the production of signals, and 
information more generally, is important for understanding how states make determinations as to 
whether the activities of their neighbors constitute a threat, it is perhaps more important to 
develop an understanding of how this information is interpreted, and whether any factors exist 
that may affect this interpretation.   
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Information, Threat Perception, and Interpretive Bias 
 In July of 1976, the Soviet Union detected the possible production of highly enriched 
uranium by South Africa at their Valindaba nuclear facility (aka the “Y-plant”).96  Concerned 
that this capability intended to be used for the production of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union 
requested that the United States independently investigate both the accuracy of the intelligence 
and the likelihood that a weapons production capability was being pursued.  The Soviet 
leadership also suggested that the United States cooperate to halt any further development by the 
South Africans.  A range of options was considered to accomplish this objective, up to and 
including the conduct of military strikes (Fuhrmann and Kreps 2012, Kreps and Fuhrmann 
2012).  Much to the surprise and consternation of Soviet decision-makers, the United States 
came to a different conclusion regarding both South Africa’s capabilities and its nuclear 
weapons-related intentions, leading to a denial of the Soviet request for cooperation.97  
 The South African case illustrates that states may have access to the same information, 
yet arrive at fundamentally different conclusions regarding both the capabilities and intentions of 
a suspected proliferator.  The question arises, therefore, as to what accounts for these differences.  
As there is no non-state actor, whether it be a supranational authority or international 
organization, charged and/or capable of either detecting proliferation in all cases or making 
judgments as to whether proliferation is occurring, it is up to states to make determinations as to 
whether proliferation is likely occurring.  As such, states judge the validity and reliability of the 
information produced by their neighbor’s actions or behavior based not on either objective or 
universally agreed upon criteria, but according to their own internally developed standards, 
                                                
96 http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/south-africa/nuclear/ 
97 ibid. 
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which may vary widely state to state.98  One state may, for example, view the enrichment of 
uranium beyond the 20% LEU/HEU threshold as an indication of weapons-related development, 
while another may consider the enrichment of uranium beyond which that country currently has 
the need for as a signal of weapons development.  Differences in criteria between states can 
produce different judgments on whether proliferation is occurring for a specific case, or for 
nuclear development generally.   
 This variance may be compounded by states contextualizing the information they receive 
based on their particular relationship with the information-producing state.  The enrichment of 
uranium to the LEU/HEU threshold (20%), for instance, by Iran, may be perceived to be highly 
threatening by a state such as Israel, as evidenced by their repeated threatening of military action 
against Iran, whereas a similar action by Turkey would not be considered threatening.  Although 
the information provided by these two states may be similar, its interpretation may be 
significantly different.  The interpretation of information is not objective, but subjective, and thus 
subject to relational-driven interpretive bias. 
Dissonance Theory and Interpretive Bias 
 Jervis (1976; 118) observed that, as policy makers, “we tend to believe that countries we 
like do things we like, support goals we favor, and oppose countries that we oppose. We tend to 
think that countries that are our enemies make proposals that would harm us, work against the 
interests of our friends, and aid our opponents.”  He further argues that once policy-makers make 
decisions, because of what he calls cognitive dissonance, any discrepant evidence that later 
comes to light that would seem to disconfirm their initial decision was prone to being discounted.  
In addition, evidence that comes to light that is ultimately supportive of the decision will be 
                                                
98 It is important to note that there may be widespread disagreement even within states, as there may be a variety of 
domestic political reasons that one group may argue that proliferation may be occurring, while others may disagree. 
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highlighted and, perhaps, subject to exaggeration.  The theory of cognitive dissonance therefore 
suggests that policy-makers are biased in their interpretation of evidence that arises after an 
initial decision has been made.   
 An analysis of the South African case suggests that policy-makers may be biased in their 
interpretation of information prior to the initial decision-making phase, which may lead to them 
arriving at a fundamentally different conclusion regarding the potential development of nuclear 
weapons than 1) if it possessed no preconceived notions about another state’s intentions or 
capabilities, or 2) if another state had been faced with the same decision.  In this case, U.S. 
policy makers drew a fundamentally different conclusion regarding both South Africa’s 
capabilities and their intentions than did its Soviet counterparts.  The principle difference, in this 
case, was that the Soviet Union had a historically conflictual relationship with South Africa, 
while the United States’ relationship with the Republic could be characterized as largely 
cooperative.  The characteristics of their respective relationships with South Africa informed 
both their perceptions of their capabilities and intentions, and their willingness to employ 
measures to prevent or deter future or continued development.  The Soviet Union concluded that 
the threat posed by South Africa proliferation was such that it required military action, while the 
United States was reticent to even engage South Africa diplomatically, at least in 1976. 
 An analysis of the historical record shows that South Africa was indeed in the beginning 
stages of the production of uranium for use in the production of an atomic bomb.99  It is largely 
unknowable whether the imposition of economic sanctions or the initiation of diplomatically 
oriented engagement measures would have prevented further South African proliferation.  
Although it is naive and somewhat unfair to conclude that states would correctly estimate the 
potential threat for every situation that arises, the disparity of the conclusions drawn by these two 
                                                
99 http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/south-africa/ 
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states points towards the reality that some unknown factor caused the discrepancy.  I suggest that 
it is because of differences in relational characteristics. 
  One of the key theoretical and empirical findings of the past few decades is that past 
interactions between pairs of states (i.e. dyads) can greatly influence the manner in which they 
behave towards each other both in the present and in the future.  Dyads with a history of 
conflictual interactions, for example, have been shown to be much more likely to engage in 
conflictual interactions in the future than those whose interactions have been more cooperative in 
orientation.100  Generally speaking, the more conflictual the relations between states have been in 
the past, the more likely they are to be in the future.  Conversely, the more cooperative states 
have been in the past, the more likely they are to be in the future. 
 The aforementioned pattern of behavior is the result of a number of factors, each of 
which serves to distinguish both conflictual dyads from cooperative ones.  States in conflictual 
dyads, for example, often have divergent foreign policy preferences, whereas the foreign policy 
preferences of states in cooperative dyads typically converge.  The internal domestic preferences 
and characteristics for states in cooperative dyads also typically align, whereas those for states in 
conflictual dyads are often at odds.   
 Although these characteristics generally reflect how states are likely to behave during 
disputes, they also have an effect on how actions are perceived at the pre-dispute stage.  As 
Jervis (1976) argues, states with historically conflictual relations are more likely to view the 
actions of the other as threatening than those with more cooperative relations, regardless of 
whether these actions are directed towards the observing state.  For example, states in highly 
                                                
100 For examples of this research, see Goertz, Gary, and Paul F. Diehl. "Taking “enduring” out of enduring rivalry: 
The rivalry approach to war and peace." International Interactions 21, no. 3 (1995): 291-308; Hensel, Paul R., Gary 
Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl. "The democratic peace and rivalries." Journal of Politics 62, no. 4 (2000): 1173-1188; 
Colaresi, Michael, Karen Rasler, and William R. Thompson. Strategic rivalries in world politics. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
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conflictual dyads are more likely to perceive the development of a new form of missile as 
threatening (i.e. developed for use against them, either directly or indirectly) than either those in 
cooperative dyads or those with moderately conflictual relationships.  This may seem rather 
intuitive, as an increase in the military capabilities of a state are generally not perceived by its 
allies as threatening,101 and prudent, as states with historically conflictual relationships should 
view increases in capabilities to be more threatening than those in cooperative relationships, yet 
creates an environment wherein threats may be either over- or under-estimated.  States with 
historically cooperative relationships with potential proliferators are not only less likely to 
perceive said proliferator’s actions as threatening, or to under-estimate the level of threat, than 
those with historically conflictual relationships, but also more likely to ignore or minimize 
evidence suggesting that weapons development is actually occurring.  States with historically 
conflictual relationships with suspected proliferators, on the other hand, are more likely to 
perceive said proliferator’s actions as threatening, and/or to over-estimate the level of threat, than 
those with cooperative relationships, even with a lack of confirming evidence.  Thus, regardless 
of the nature or strength of the signal produced, conflictual states are more likely to respond than 
those with more neutral relationships.  Thus,  
 Hypothesis 11a:  The more conflictual the relationship between a potential  
 respondent and suspected proliferator, the more likely a response, regardless of  the 
signal. 
 
Conversely, states with more cooperative/peaceful relationships should be less likely to respond, 
regardless of the nature or strength of the signal produced.  Thus, 
 Hypothesis 12a: The more cooperative/peaceful the relationship between a 
 potential respondent and suspected proliferator, the less likely the response, 
 regardless of the signal. 
 
                                                
101 It might even be viewed as a positive; leading to an increase, by proxy, in a state’s own capabilities 
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 The perception of threat, informed by relational characteristics, not only affects whether 
states will be motivated to respond, but how willing they are to adopt forms of response that may 
be perceived as hostile or aggressive by the targeted state (in this case the suspected proliferator).  
Highly threatened states will be more willing to incur the potential costs (both foreign and 
domestic) of adopting the more hostile forms of response than those that are less threatened.  
Thus, 
Hypothesis 11b:  The more conflictual the relationship between proliferator and 
respondent, the more hostile the response, regardless of the signal. 
 
And, 
 
 Hypothesis 12b: The more cooperative/peaceful the relationship between  proliferator 
and respondent, the less hostile the response, regardless of the  signal.  
 
Conclusion    
 In making determinations as to whether and how to respond to proliferation, states must 
rely on the collection and interpretation of information that may signal, one way or another, 
whether proliferation is likely and how threatening it may be.  Most signals can be characterized 
as either political or technical.  The expected effect of the signals presented herein on both the 
likelihood and hostility of responses is given in Table 3.4 below. 
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Table 3.4: Summary of Expectations of Signals102 
Signal 
Occurrence of Response Hostility of Response 
Expected Effect Expected Effect 
NPT ê ê 
CSA ê ê 
AP ê ê 
NWFZ ê ê 
IAEA Noncompliance é é 
Umbrella Alliance ê ê 
U Enrichment é é 
Reactor Strength é é 
Pu Separation é é 
 
However, the introduction of potential bias, informed by relational characteristics, on the 
interpretation of information by states in the decision-making process of whether and how to 
respond to proliferation, produces the following expectations, shown in Table 3.5: 
Table 3.5: Summary of Expectations of Interpretive Bias 
Signal Relationship Type 
Response Occurrence Response Hostility 
Expected Effect Expected Effect 
Compared to States with Neutral Relationships 
NPT Peaceful ê ê Conflictual é é 
CSA Peaceful ê ê Conflictual é é 
AP Agreements Peaceful ê ê Conflictual é é 
NWFZ Peaceful ê ê Conflictual é é 
IAEA 
Noncompliance 
Peaceful ê ê 
Conflictual é é 
Umbrella 
Alliance 
Peaceful ê ê 
Conflictual é é 
U Enrichment Peaceful ê ê Conflictual é é 
Reactor Strength Peaceful ê ê Conflictual é é 
Pu Separation Peaceful ê ê Conflictual é é 
 
                                                
102 (ê)s denote an expected decrease compared to neutral states, (é)s denote an expected increase compared to 
neutral states 
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As indicated, when compared with states that have more neutral relationships with 
suspected/potential proliferators, states with historically peaceful relationships with such states 
are both less likely to respond and, when they do respond, do so in less hostile ways.  
Conversely, conflictual states are likely to respond more often and in more hostile ways, than 
those with more neutral relationships, regardless of the strength of the signal produced by the 
actions/behavior of the suspected proliferator. 
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Chapter 4: Response Typology 
 
 Before investigating both the effect(s) of the signals and the effect of relational-driven 
bias on the interpretation of those signals on both the likelihood of the occurrence and hostility of 
responses to proliferation, it is first necessary to formally define what is meant by a “response to 
proliferation,” which is defined as: 
 Any action or behavior adopted for the purposes of reducing the perceived threat  of 
proliferation of another state.103 
 
As there may be numerous actions that satisfy this definition, I thus endeavor to develop a 
typology of potential proliferation responses, categorized by their primary mechanism of 
response, whether it be nuclear, military, economic, or diplomatic.  This typology and a 
discussion of the various forms of response comprising said typology, are presented below. 
Table 4.1: Responses to Proliferation – A Typology 
Nuclear Military Economic Diplomatic 
Nuclear 
Preemptive/Preventative 
Attack 
Use of Force (conventional, 
or unconventional) 
Imposition of 
Economic Sanctions 
Cessation of Formal 
Diplomatic Ties (chargé 
d'affaires) 
Treat of Nuclear 
Preemptive/Preventative 
Attack 
Threat of the Use of Force 
(conventional, or 
unconventional) 
Threat of Imposition of 
Economic Sanctions 
Formal protest 
(demarche)  
Responsive Proliferation Conventional Arms Increase Decrease in Trade 
Relationship 
Initiation of or 
Participation in 
Negotiations 
Nuclear Umbrella Alliance 
Formation 
Conventional Alliance 
Formation of Reaffirmation 
 Offer of Incentives 
 
 
                                                
103 As I am interested in responses that are intended to in some way reduce the perception of threat of another state’s 
nuclear-weapons related activities, rather some other possible motivation, I restrict my discussion only to those 
activities/behaviors that may be adopted to achieve this objective.   
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Nuclear Response Category 
 The first category of responses has as its primary mechanism the use of nuclear 
technologies.  This can be either the use of nuclear weapons themselves or the development of 
nuclear technologies.  As such, these responses can vary greatly in both their associated costs 
and perceived hostility.  The first response in the nuclear category is the use or threat of use of 
nuclear weapons to either preempt or prevent the development of nuclear weapons by another 
state.  States may use or threaten the use of nuclear weapons in any number of ways, including 
targeting suspected nuclear facilities, against conventional military targets, or even civilian 
population centers.  States that employ such a response do so in spite of the possible risk of 
incurring enormous costs, both domestically and internationally.  
 The next response in the nuclear category is the development or acquisition of the 
capacity to produce nuclear weapons, or what I term responsive proliferation.  The decision to 
engage in responsive proliferation as a response to a neighbor’s suspected development of 
nuclear weapons-related capabilities is conditioned by a number of factors.  Perhaps the most 
well known example of this would be Argentina’s purported development of nuclear weapons-
related technologies during the 1970’s and 1980’s in direct response to what they believed to be 
nuclear weapons-related development by neighboring Brazil.104 
 The ability to launch a nuclear weapons development program is only available for those 
states that have or are able to obtain the technical knowledge and/or resources to do so.  Without 
sufficient resources, both monetary and physical, the ability to develop nuclear weapons, or 
nuclear weapon production capabilities, even if the will to do so exists, is not likely to occur.  
That being said, states do not necessarily have to “launch” a nuclear weapons development 
program, in the common sense of the term, to responsively proliferate.  As Sagan (2011) has 
                                                
104 http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/argentina/ 
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recently argued, proliferation should not be thought of as dichotomous, either developing nuclear 
weapons or not, or as a series of stages, such as Singh and Way’s (2004) explore, pursue, acquire 
framework, but rather as a continuum that includes both the development phase of nuclear 
weapons, whether it be direct or indirect, and those activities that both occur prior to and after 
this phase.105  This becomes particularly important when analyzing proliferation as a response to 
other instances of proliferation.  While a state that has never possessed nuclear technologies that 
begins to develop such technologies after observing the development of similar technologies by a 
neighbor may be attributable to said neighbor’s activities, for one that already possesses nuclear 
technologies, attributing their development to their neighbor, either in whole or in part, may, on 
the surface, be difficult.  However, what is perhaps more useful is to consider qualitative changes 
in the nuclear weapons production capabilities of states.  A state, for example, that has an 
existing nuclear research reactor and observes a neighbor constructing a uranium enrichment 
facility may respond by beginning to construct one of their own.   
 Responsive proliferation does not, however, require the construction or acquisition of the 
same types of facilities, however, nor does it require that the states possess the similar levels of 
capability.  A state, for example, that already possesses a significant nuclear infrastructure may, 
as a response to the suspected proliferation-related activities or behavior of a neighbor, elect to 
produce nuclear weapons-related materials or even conduct a nuclear test.  Conversely, a state 
that has little or no existing nuclear infrastructure may begin to develop small-scale nuclear 
technologies, which may or may not be done so with the explicit intent of developing nuclear 
weapons or weapons-related technologies.  For example, a state may respond to the observed 
                                                
105 Sagan, Scott D. "The causes of nuclear weapons proliferation." Annual Review of Political Science 14 (2011): 
225-244. 
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construction or acquisition by a neighbor of a plutonium reprocessing facility with the 
construction or acquisition of a small-scale research reactor.   
 Also known as a positive security assurance, the third nuclear-related response type 
associated with a mitigating strategy would be for the respondent to enter into a nuclear alliance 
either with a third part, or for those who are already in such relationships, for the alliance to be 
reaffirmed.  A “nuclear umbrella” alliance is formed through what Russett (1963) terms the 
“mentor-protégé” relationship.106  The mentor, a nuclear weapon states, guarantees nuclear 
retaliation for any direct nuclear attack on their “protégé,” thus affording the protégé a nuclear 
deterrent, without actually having to develop their own nuclear capabilities.  An example of this 
would be the nuclear umbrella extended over Japan and Taiwan, in response to China’s 
development of nuclear weapons.  For responding states already under existing nuclear 
umbrellas, the mentor may wish to reaffirm their commitment to the defense of the protégé by 
issuing a public statement directly threatening retaliation for any use of the proliferating state’s 
newfound capabilities against the protégé.  Thus, while the actual response may come from 
another state, not necessarily threatened by the proliferating state’s capabilities, it is, in a sense, a 
response by proxy on the part of the responding (protégé) state.   
 Entering into or reaffirming a nuclear umbrella relationship is conditioned by a number 
of factors.  First, there must be a willing mentor for the relationship to exist.  While any state 
with nuclear weapons may, technically speaking, serve as a mentor, historically, only four states 
have done so (USA, USSR/Russia, United Kingdom, and China).  By entering into such a 
relationship, the mentor agrees to incur substantial risks, including being potentially drawn into a 
conflict that they themselves did not initiate or may otherwise be unwilling to join.  It is for this 
                                                
106 Russett, Bruce M. "The calculus of deterrence." Journal of Conflict Resolution (1963): 97-109. 
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reason that mentor states often condition the terms of the agreement with the protégé, which 
often involves prohibiting any development of military-related nuclear technologies.  
Military Response Category 
 The second category of responses has as its primary mechanism either the use or the 
threat of the use of military force or the acquisition/development of conventional military 
capabilities.  As will be discussed, these responses can vary widely in terms of their scale, scope, 
associated costs and their coerciveness.  Perhaps the most often discussed form of response in 
both academic research and public discourse is the use of conventional force to attack a 
suspected proliferator’s nuclear facilities.  An example of such a response is Israel’s attack on 
Syria’s al-Kibar nuclear facility in 2007 (codenamed Operation Orchard).107  Military attacks 
also do not necessarily have to be “conventional;” the use of traditional military power (guns, 
bombs, and manpower).  Instead, states may employ unconventional means, such as cyber attack 
or to achieve threat reduction, the most well known example of which may be the use of cyber 
attacks by the United States and Israel against Iranian nuclear facilities during the mid- to late-
2000s.108   
 States may also threaten the use of force.  Threats largely correspond to the actual use of 
force in terms of their scope.  States might, for example, threaten targeted strikes against 
suspected nuclear facilities or, conversely, they might threaten invasion and regime change.  
Threats of the use of force may be formally or informally communicated and, borrowing 
classical deterrence theory, be immediate or general.  The threat of the use of force is 
conditioned by the fact that, while any state may threaten the use of military force as a response 
                                                
107 http://www.nti.org/facilities/461/ 
108 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against-
iran.html?pagewanted=all&module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Ar%2C%7B%221%22%3A%22RI%3A5%22
%7D&_r=0 
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strategy, the credibility of this threat is largely conditioned by the perceived willingness of the 
threatening state to follow through. 
 While any state may that has the military capability to do so may launch an attack on 
another state, or threaten to do so, the likelihood that this would be a viable foreign policy option 
for any given state is conditioned by a number of factors.  First, any attack risks the possibility 
that the target may respond with an attack of its own.  This may lead to further escalation up to 
and including full-scale war.  Second, the conduct of military attacks does not guarantee that the 
target state will either give up their weapons ambitions, or will affect their ability to further 
proliferate.  Third, as was the case with the Israeli attack on the Iraqi Osiraq reactor, the use of 
military force may, in fact, incentivize states to proliferate.  Fourth, there are potential domestic 
and international political costs associated with the use of military force which, when done so 
without international authorization, may lead to widespread condemnation or a loss of domestic 
support.  
 Those states that are incapable or unwilling to engage in nuclear proliferation as a form 
of response may, instead, increase their conventional arms.  This can be a one-time increase or a 
sustained increase in military expenditures over several years, or what has been traditionally 
termed arms racing behavior.109  While a one-time increase is not to be overlooked, states that 
are likely to engage in the latter are those that are more likely doing so to mitigate a perceived 
loss in security.  
 The final form of response that states may adopt to mitigate the perceived increase in 
insecurity of a neighbor’s proliferation is to enter into a conventional alliance or have an existing 
                                                
109 For examples of this research, see Rider, Toby J. "Understanding arms race onset: Rivalry, threat, and territorial 
competition." The Journal of Politics 71, no. 02 (2009): 693-703; Rider, Toby J. "Uncertainty, salient stakes, and the 
causes of conventional arms races." International Studies Quarterly 57, no. 3 (2013): 580-591; Rider, Toby J., 
Michael G. Findley, and Paul F. Diehl. "Just part of the game? Arms races, rivalry, and war." Journal of Peace 
Research 48, no. 1 (2011): 85-100. 
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alliance commitment formally, or perhaps more accurately publicly re-affirmed.  Similar to what 
was seen with a nuclear alliance, states that enter into conventional alliances do so to mitigate or 
balance against a perceived decrease in security.  Again, because of the low costs of engaging in 
such alliances, it is likely that only those states that are moderately threatened by nuclear 
proliferation would engage in such behavior. 
Economic Response Category 
 Responses in the next category have, as their central mechanism, the use of economic 
punishment, either through formal or informal sanctions, to affect a proliferator’s ability and/or 
willingness to engage in further proliferation.  These responses vary widely in terms of their 
severity, ranging from a marked reduction in trade volume to the implementation of broad, 
potentially crippling economic sanctions.  The least severe of these, a reduction in trade volume, 
is, perhaps, the least effective in terms of a reduction in threat, particularly if done so in isolation.  
Yet, for some states with limited means of response, a reduction in trade volume directly or 
indirectly attributable to the proliferation-related activities or behavior of their neighbor may 
send a strong signal regarding their disapproval of the state’s activities.  A reduction in trade 
volume may be costly for both the respondent and the proliferator, particularly if the good is 
something that the responding state cannot acquire elsewhere, either at all or as efficiently.   
 For those states wishing to send a stronger signal regarding their disapproval of a 
neighbor’s proliferation-related activities or behavior, they may threaten to implement economic 
sanctions against the proliferating state.  Similar to what was sense with the threat of the use of 
force, threatening economic sanctions may vary widely by degree, from mild to severe.  And, 
also in a similar manner to the threat of the use of force, threatening the placement or 
implementation of economic sanctions have few political costs, certainly when compared to the 
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actual implementation of sanctions.  Yet, states must be willing or at least signal their 
willingness to carry through with their threats for them to have any chance at success. 
 The use of economics as a form of response is conditioned by a number of factors.  First, 
doing so requires that a state share some form of economic tie, whether it be direct or indirect, 
with a suspected proliferator.110  Those that lack such ties simply lack the capability to impose 
responses in this category.  Second, states that choose this form of response accept the potential 
costs, both to the sender and the target state, of doing so, which, as argued by Allen (2008) and 
Farmer (2000) may be extensive.111  
Diplomatic Response Category 
 Responses falling into the final directed response category are those that have as their 
principle mechanism the use or attempted use of diplomatic leverage and/or coercion to reduce 
the perceived threat of proliferation by a neighbor.  The most straightforward of such responses 
is a chargé d'affaires, or the severing of formal diplomatic ties between a respondent and the 
suspected proliferator.  States that adopt such a strategy do so both to punish previous activities 
or behavior they perceived to be related to the development of nuclear weapons or nuclear 
weapons production capabilities, and to coerce the suspected proliferator into halting any future 
related activities.  To engage in a chargé d'affaires, the respondent state must, by definition, have 
current diplomatic ties with the suspected proliferator.  When compared with other forms of 
response, such as the engagement in responsive proliferation or the launching of targeted strikes 
against suspected nuclear weapons facilities, states that respond to proliferation-related activities 
                                                
110 A direct tie would be something like trade, whereas an indirect tie would be shared membership in an 
international financial institution. 
111 Allen, Susan Hannah. "The domestic political costs of economic sanctions."Journal of Conflict Resolution 52, no. 
6 (2008): 916-944; Farmer, Richard D. "Costs of economic sanctions to the sender." The World Economy 23, no. 1 
(2000): 93-117. 
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or behavior by severing diplomatic ties pay very few internal or external costs, beside potentially 
incentivizing the target state to further proliferate. 
 Alternately, a state may choose to issue a formal protest regarding another states 
proliferation-related activities or behavior, or what is known as a demarche.  Demarches are 
officially communicated to the government of the target state by a responding state in order to 
both signal the state’s concern regarding the proliferating states activities.  They are also often 
used as a way of informally signaling the threat of future responses, if the identified behavior 
continues.   
 The third response falling within the diplomatic response category is the initiation of or 
participation in negotiations with the suspected proliferator.  Negotiations may take a number of 
forms, including bilateral, multilateral, and vary widely in terms of scope, whether it be on the 
cessation of specific activities or behavior, or the complete abandonment of a state’s nuclear-
related infrastructure.  Virtually any state can attempt to initiate negotiations with a suspected 
proliferator, but, for the most part, it is reserved to those states that can either provide some 
incentive for the suspected proliferator to abandon their activities, or exert some amount of 
leverage over the state.  While the initiation of or participation in negotiations do not, by 
themselves, require states to incur or face the potential of incurring any domestic or international 
political costs, the inability to reach agreement with the suspected proliferator, signaling the 
failure of said negotiations, can lead to both internal and external criticism. 
 Finally, states may offer incentives, independent of other forms of response, such as the 
participation in negotiations, to the suspected proliferator with the goal of incentivizing the target 
state to slowing or halting its nuclear weapons-related activities.  These offered incentives can 
take any number of forms and can be communicated either formally or informally.  There are 
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very few conceivable costs, other than the cost of the incentive itself, for choosing such a method 
of response. 
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Chapter 5: Research Design 
 
 This chapter lays out a research design to test the expectations of the theoretical 
framework presented in Chapter 3.  As this theory has multiple somewhat disparate components, 
it is necessary to employ a number of different techniques to accomplish this objective.  
Common to each of these, however, is the dual focus on proliferation and responses to 
proliferation.  I thus begin by operationalizing these two concepts, in light of the information 
presented in Chapter 3.  I then discuss how the effect of both signals and relational context will 
be investigated.  I then conclude by presenting the statistical models derived from each of these 
components, the results of which will be presented in Chapters 6 & 7.    
Operationalizing Nuclear Proliferation 
 As discussed in Chapter 2, proliferation can be conceptualized as either a process with 
interrelated components or as a series of distinct, yet interrelated actions, events, and/or 
behaviors.  The hypotheses presented in Chapter 3 actually require that both conceptualizations 
be employed.  This is advantageous as each has its own benefits and drawbacks.  Using both 
allows for the leveraging of one against the other, to provide a more thorough understanding of 
the phenomenon.  
 Previous attempts at operationalizing the process-based conceptualization of proliferation 
have largely focused on measures of nuclear latency.112  These measures, of which there are 
several variations, combine, in some fashion, externally observable requirements for the 
production of nuclear weapons, such as the successful operation of a nuclear reactor for some 
period of time, with proxy variables for those components that are generally difficult to 
                                                
112 For examples, see Meyer, Stephen M. The dynamics of nuclear proliferation. University of Chicago Press, 1986; 
Stoll, JR. “World production of latent nuclear capacity.” 1996 http://es.rice.edu:80/projects/Poli378/ 
Nuclear/Proliferation/proliferation.html; Jo, Dong-Joon, and Erik Gartzke. "Determinants of nuclear weapons 
proliferation." Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, no. 1 (2007): 167-194. 
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externally observe or wholly un-observable, an example being the use of a variable indicating 
whether the state produces automobiles as a proxy for advanced electronic production capability.  
The various components of these measures, as Sagan (2012) has argued, do not actually reflect 
whether a state is actually capable of producing nuclear weapons at any given time, nor do they 
represent whether a state is moving closer to or further away from attaining the ability to do so.  
They therefore measure production potential, rather than production capacity.  This is an 
important distinction to make, as what I am primarily interested in, both from a theoretical and 
empirical perspective, is whether states are increasing, or perhaps more accurately, moving 
closer to achieving the ability to produce nuclear weapons.  Thus, the latency approach to 
operationalizing nuclear proliferation is not appropriate for the present analysis. 
 Instead, I operationalize the process-based conceptualization of nuclear proliferation as 
the period of time in which signals suggesting whether proliferation may or may not be occurring 
may be produced.  In other words, it is the period of time in which production capacity, in 
probabilistic terms, is both non-zero and less than one.  It is also the period of time wherein 
uncertainty regarding intent is both non-zero and less than one.  Although it is clear that the 
development of a production capacity reaches its conclusion when a state demonstrates their 
ability to produce nuclear weapons (represented as one in the aforementioned probabilistic 
measurement), the point at which the development of capacity begins is less so.  Although 
differences in starting points exist, virtually every state that has gone on to produce nuclear 
weapons has, at some point, constructed or procured an initial nuclear reactor.  This universally 
shared event thus represents a logical starting point with which to begin the given analysis.  
 Adopting this approach also has an empirical justification, in that including states who 
have never constructed a nuclear reactor, and therefore have either never been subject to 
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responses by other states, nor is there any real possibility that this might actually occur, 
introduces null observations that may bias the results of the present analysis.  In this way, 
focusing only on those states that have constructed a nuclear reactor allows for the construction 
of a pool of potential proliferators, for all of whom there is a non-zero likelihood that other states 
will respond to their activities at any given point in time.  As a rule, therefore, states are coded as 
being in this pool for as long as they have at least one nuclear reactor in operation in any given 
year.  In total, 68 countries have thus operated a nuclear reactor at some point in time since their 
inception in 1942 (shown in Table 5.1).113 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
113 It is important to note that this is not the only way to operationalize nuclear proliferation.  As an alternate method 
of specification, one may, instead, choose the acquisition of the ability to produce actual weapons-usable material as 
a starting point.  To investigate whether choosing such a starting point affects the results found using the reactor 
starting point, I construct a second pool (the WUM pool) and conduct the same analysis.  The results of this analysis 
are shown in Appendix II. 
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Table 5.1: Pool of Potential Proliferators - Nuclear Reactor 
(In Alphabetical Order)* 
Country Name Entry Date 
(1st Reactor Construction) 
Exit Date 
(All Reactors Offline or Nuclear 
Weapons Obtained) 
Algeria 1987  
Argentina 1957  
Armenia 1991  
Australia 1956  
Austria 1958  
Bangladesh 1981  
Belgium 1954  
Brazil 1957  
Bulgaria 1961  
Canada 1947  
Chile 1970  
China 1955 1964 
Colombia 1964  
Czech Republic (Czechoslovakia) 1985  
Democratic Republic of the Congo 1960 2004 
Denmark 1957 2000 
Egypt 1958  
Finland 1960  
France 1948 1961 
Germany 1956  
Ghana 1994  
Greece 1959  
Hungary 1956  
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Table 5.1 cont. 
India 1955 1998 
Indonesia 1961  
Iran 1960  
Iraq 1962 1992 
Israel 1952 1968 
Italy 1957  
Jamaica 1982  
Japan 1957  
Kazakhstan** 1995  
Latvia** 1992 1998 
Libya 1980  
Lithuania** 1991 2009 
Malaysia 1982  
Mexico 1964  
Morocco 2004  
Netherlands 1959  
Nigeria 1999  
North Korea 1952 2006 
Norway 1955  
Pakistan 1963 1998 
Peru 1980  
Philippines 1960 1988 
Poland 1955  
Portugal 1959  
Romania 1956  
Russia/USSR 1946 1949 
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Table 5.1 cont. 
Serbia (Yugoslavia) 1956 1984 
Slovakia 1993  
Slovenia*** 1992  
South Africa 1961  
South Korea 1959  
Spain 1957  
Sweden 1954  
Switzerland 1956  
Syria 2001 2007 
Taiwan 1956  
Thailand 1961  
Turkey 1959  
Ukraine** 1995  
United Kingdom 1946 1952 
United States 1942 1945 
Uruguay 1975 1998 
Uzbekistan** 1991  
Venezuela 1956 1994 
Vietnam 1960  
* Data on nuclear reactors obtained from http://www.iaea.org, http://www.world-nuclear.org, and http://www.nti.org 
** Kazakshtan, Belarus, and Ukraine inherited nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union after its dissolution.  All weapons were 
repatriated by 1995, thus leaving each country with only a modest nuclear infrastructure, but enough to justify inclusion in this pool.  
Their respective entry points are thus coded as thus being 1995. 
*** Slovenia is coded as beginning independent operation of their reactor after the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1991 
 
Unit of Analysis - The Directed Response-Year  
 Once a state becomes a potential proliferator, either by the construction of a nuclear 
reactor or a WUM production facility, for each year thereafter there is a non-zero probability that 
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other states will seek to respond in some way, a probability that is directly informed by those 
factors introduced in the previous chapter.  With this in mind, I thus introduce the directed 
response-year as my unit of analysis, constructed similarly to what is seen with the directed 
dyad-year in the literature on interstate conflict onset and escalation.  For each year that a state 
operates a nuclear reactor or a WUM production facility, therefore, there is a set of 
corresponding directed response-years for each state that may potentially respond (the pool of 
potential respondents).   
 Although it is technically possible for any state to respond to any occurrence of 
proliferation at any given time, it is somewhat more likely that some states are more likely to 
respond than others.  It is important to recognize, however, that eliminating states from any pool 
of potential respondents may, in fact, introduce bias into the estimation of the effects of the 
factors discussed in Chapter 3.  That being said, interstate war scholars have established a similar 
precedent by focusing only on those states for which there is a non-zero likelihood of conflict 
initiation or, in dyadic terms, conflict between them.  As I am primarily concerned with those 
states that are most likely to perceive the nuclear-related activities or behavior of another states 
as threatening, with some non-zero probability, including all potential respondents is therefore 
inappropriate.  Instead, I select those states that are most likely to be affected, either directly or 
indirectly, by the proliferation-related activities or behavior of a suspected proliferator.  Also in a 
similar vein to what is seen with studies of interstate war, I identify the set of states that are the 
most relevant to the region and states at hand, which are those states that are geographically 
proximate to the proliferating state and the major powers in the international system for a given 
year.  I therefore identify and code an additional pool of potential respondents, those that are 
“politically relevant,” using the concept of the “politically relevant dyad,” which is the group of 
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states that a state is most likely to engage in conflict.114  Although there are arguments against 
the use of politically relevant dyads as a delineating mechanism, its commonality and relevance 
to the underlying logic of the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 3, particularly its 
inclusion of both geographical proximity and geopolitical interest as a key component, makes it a 
useful tool with which to narrow the list of potential respondents. I thus employ this concept to 
create a new dataset comprised of “politically relevant potential response-years” (1942-2007).  
Dependent Variables 
 The primary dependent variable of interest is a “response” to proliferation, which was 
previously defined as any action, event, and/or behavior (referred to collectively as actions) 
either wholly or partially attributable to the proliferation-related actions and/or behavior of 
another state.  Uniting each of these is the concept of attribution.  If an action can be attributed, 
either from primary or secondary sources, to the proliferation activities of another state, it is 
therefore a response.  Attribution, therefore, is the primary criteria by which proliferation 
responses are identified, and is coded accordingly.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
114 See Lemke, Douglas, and William Reed. "The relevance of politically relevant dyads." Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 45, no. 1 (2001): 126-144; Benson, Michelle A. "The relevance of politically relevant dyads in the study 
of interdependence and dyadic disputes." Conflict Management and Peace Science 22, no. 2 (2005): 113-133. 
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Table 5.2: Summary of Responses115 
Direct Responses Un-Directed Responses 
Use or the Threat of Use of Force Responsive Proliferation 
Use or the Threat of Use of Sanctions Nuclear Umbrella Alliance 
Decrease in Trade Relationship Conventional Arms Increase 
Cessation of Formal Diplomatic Ties Conventional Alliance Formation 
Formal Protest  
Initiation or Participation in Negotiations  
  
For each action and/or behavior identified in the Table above, I review the historical record to 
determine 1) whether any such action occurred and 2) whether it can be wholly or partially 
attributed to the actions and/or behavior of another state.  I code these occurrences in two ways.  
The first is a dichotomous variable that identifies whether, in any given year, there was any 
attributable response (1 for yes, 0 for no).116  Years where states actively engaged in a response I 
term positive response-years, whereas years where no observable response occurred are referred 
to as negative response-years.117118  The second is the overall severity of an observed response in 
                                                
115 A detailed description, coding rules, and sources for each form of response identified and discussed herein can be 
found in Appendix I. 
116 The details of the coding decisions for each specific form of response, as well as the sources of the data used, can 
be found in Appendix I. 
117 Because of data limitations, I treat all forms of response equivalently, regardless of whether they are multi-year 
or single-year events.  Responsive proliferation, for example, is, in virtually every case, a multi-year event.  I 
therefore record a positive response-year for each year in which a state is actively engaging in responsive 
proliferation.  The conduct of military strikes, however, has generally been an isolated event.  Once a facility is 
destroyed, such as the Israeli strikes on Iraq’s Osiraq reactor in 1981, no further strikes may need to be conducted, 
thus eliminating the possibility of further responses.  It is recognized that doing so may introduce potential bias into 
the results presented in the following Chapters, as it violates the assumption of the independence of observations.  
However, the only other approach would be to focus the onset of responses, which would similarly fail to capture 
multi-year events.  It would also fail to reflect the fact that the primary unit of analysis is the response-year, rather 
than the proliferation-related activities or behavior.  Thus, it is more appropriate to say that I am interested in the 
effect of the independent variables on both the likelihood and hostility of years in which responses either began or 
were ongoing.  
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a given year.  For this, I introduce two indices that attempt to measure the hostility of response-
years.  The first is what I term the Response Hostility Index.  Constructing this index must, by 
necessity, begin with a discussion of the difficulty in measuring hostility.  I begin with an 
example to illustrate.  A responding state, x, may choose to respond to the activities of state y by 
adopting either economic sanctions or the launching of cyber attacks against targeted nuclear 
facilities.  State x may judge that sanctions are a less aggressive act than cyber attacks.  Informed 
by the factors discussed in Chapter 4, state x elects to imposes what it perceives to be the less 
aggressive of its two possible forms of responses, that being economic sanctions.  Whether state 
y, however, judges economic sanctions to be an aggressive form of response in general, or more 
or less hostile than any other form of response that state x could have adopted, is a separate 
question.  It is conceivable that state x’s and state y’s perceptions of the aggressiveness or 
hostility of the chosen form of response could differ.  Furthermore, differences in the perception 
of how hostile a particular response may be might not only differ between the sender and target, 
but between senders and targets more generally.  For example, if two states independently 
perceive that a third state is engaging in proliferation, and each decide to respond in a moderately 
hostile or aggressive manner, one state might choose to impose economic sanctions over the 
issuance of a chargé d'affaires, viewing economic sanctions to be a more hostile act, while the 
second might judge a chargé d'affaires to be more hostile than the imposition of economic 
sanctions, and thus will choose accordingly.  Because of the inherent subjectivity in the 
perception of hostility, constructing a general measure of hostility will be necessarily imperfect, 
                                                                                                                                                       
118 It is also necessary to note that I afford every state the same opportunity to respond in all of the identified ways 
for every year in which they are identified as politically relevant to a state that is developing or possess nuclear 
weapons-related technologies.  This is because identifying a unique list of possible responses for each state in the 
dataset is both difficult, from a data availability standpoint, and laborious, from a collection standpoint.  This also 
has the potential of biasing the results shown in the following chapters, but is ideally less detrimental than 
eliminating the responses that are easier to eliminate as possibilities, such as nuclear weapons states not having the 
ability to responsively proliferate (according to the given definition), than those that are difficult, such as identifying 
whether any given state has the capacity to launch cyber attacks on another state for a given year.   
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especially when evaluated against any specific instance of response.  Yet, it may be possible to 
make assumptions about whether certain forms of response are generally more hostile than 
others, so that a measure can be constructed that can be used in the conduct of statistical 
analyses. 
 For each form of response identified herein, there may be immediate, short term, and/or 
long-term ramifications.  For example, the imposition of economic sanctions designed to cut off 
a state from money held abroad might have little immediate impact in terms of the damage done 
to the state’s economy.  In the short and especially long terms, however, these sanctions may 
have serious affects on the state’s economic well being.  By contrast, a cyber attack on a target’s 
nuclear facilities may cause immediate damage to a target’s infrastructure, but may have little 
short term or long-term effect on a state’s ability to proliferate (assuming that they could 
reconstruct or reacquire the damaged capability).  While there may exceptions based on the 
scope of the sanctions applied and the cyber attack conducted, because of the potential damage 
of economic sanctions, in general they will be perceived as more hostile than cyber attacks.  
Perhaps more importantly, from a measurement standpoint, economic sanctions have the 
potential of being more damaging than cyber attacks. 
 It is for this reason that it is necessary to focus not just on the immediate effect of a 
chosen response, but also its short and long term potential effects.  I therefore rank each form of 
response according to their potential immediate, short term, and long term effects (shown below 
in Table 5.3). 
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Table 5.3: Response Hostility 
 Immediate Short Term Long Term 
Nuclear Preemptive Attack High High High 
Responsive Proliferation Medium to High High High 
Conventional Military Attack High Medium to High Medium to High 
Imposition of Economic Sanctions Low to High Low to High Low to High 
Unconventional Military Attack  Low to High Low to High Low to Medium 
Threat of Attack Low to High Low to Medium Low to Medium 
Chargé d'affaires Low to Medium Low to Medium Low to Medium 
Demarche Low to Medium Low to Medium Low to Medium 
Threat of Economic Sanctions Low to Medium Low to Medium Low to Medium 
Nuclear Umbrella Alliance Low Low to Medium Low to Medium 
Conventional Alliance Formation Low Low Low 
Conventional Arms Increase Minimal to Low Low Low 
Reduction in Trade Volume Minimal to Low Minimal to Low Minimal to Low 
Initiation of or Participation in Negotiations Minimal Minimal Minimal 
Offer of Incentives Minimal Minimal Minimal 
 
 
I then combine each score to create an ordered list of response hostility (shown below in Table 
5.4). 
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Table 5.4: Response Hostility 
13 Nuclear Preemptive Attack/Threat of Nuclear Attack Most 
Hostile 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
| 
Least 
Hostile 
12 Responsive Proliferation 
11 Conventional Military Attack 
10 Imposition of Economic Sanctions 
9 Unconventional Military Attack (Cyber, Assassination)  
8 Threat of Attack 
7 Chargé d'affaires, Demarche, Threat of Sanctions 
6 Nuclear Umbrella Alliance 
5 Conventional Alliance Formation 
4 Conventional Arms Increase 
3 Reduction in Trade Volume 
2 Initiation Of or Participation in Negotiations 
1 Offer of Incentives 
0 No Response 
 
 
This thus creates a fourteen-point scale of response hostility that can used in the evaluation of the 
aforementioned hypothesis. 
 As an alternate method of specification, I construct a second scale that groups responses 
by their primary mechanism, whether it is nuclear, conventional military, economic, or 
diplomatic.  The adoption of this scale, which I term the categorical response hostility index, 
although less specific than the response hostility index presented above, provides two primary 
benefits.  The first is that it provides a way to test the robustness of the results found using the 
response hostility index.  Second, and perhaps more importantly, focusing on the primary 
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mechanisms by which states may or may not respond, as opposed to specific forms of response 
allows for the investigation of the factors that may affect the adoption of more or less hostile 
forms of response without concern for whether any given state has the capability, at any given 
time, to freely choose among all of the responses presented in the response hostility index.119  
For example, while a state may not have the ability to respond to proliferation by severing formal 
diplomatic ties with another state because of the absence of such ties to begin with, they may, 
instead, adopt other forms of diplomatically oriented responses, such as the issuance of a 
demarche or the initiation of negotiations. 
 Again, although there may be conceivable scenarios or isolated instances whereby the 
order of these categories may not hold, in a general sense, the perceived aggressiveness or 
hostility of the general categories mentioned previously can be ordered as follows (in ascending 
order of perceived hostility):   
Categorical Response Hostility Scale 
0. No Response 
1. Diplomatic 
2. Economic 
3. Military (Conventional) 
4. Nuclear 
 
Independent (Explanatory) Variables 
Signals 
 Chapter 3 argues that signals alone are insufficient to explain both whether and how 
states will respond to proliferation.  Instead, signals must be viewed in the context of the 
relationship between a potential respondent and a suspected proliferator.  As there are two 
components of this explanation, signals and relational characteristics, I proceed in two parts.  I 
                                                
119 As will be discussed in Chapter 7, identifying the forms of response that each individual state has available to 
them for every instance of proliferation is outside the scope of this analysis.  It is, however, a necessary next step in 
researching this subject. 
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first discuss how both signals and relational characteristics are operationalized.  I then discuss 
how these components will be integrated to construct a measure of signals in context. 
 Signals, and information more generally, vary in terms of their constitution and expected 
effect.  Many of the signals discussed in Chapter 4 are intended to, either directly or indirectly, 
independently reduce the likelihood that a response will occur.  Others may have the opposite 
effect, increasing the likelihood of a response.  The first set of signals, corresponding to 
hypotheses 1-10, is shown below in Table 5.5. 
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Table 5.5: Signals and their Expected Effects  
Signal 
(Hypothesis) 
Variable 
Name 
Expected Effect Coding 
NPT Membership 
(H1) 
NPT Decrease in the likelihood of 
both responses and hostility of 
responses 
Coded 1 for years where a state has 
signed and ratified the NPT, 0 alternately 
Comprehensive 
Safeguards 
Agreement (H2) 
CSA Decrease in likelihood and 
hostility of response over both 
NPT membership and NPT non-
membership 
Coded 1 for years where a state has 
entered into a CSA, 0 alternately 
Additional Protocols 
(H3) 
AP Decrease in likelihood and 
hostility of response over CSA, 
NPT membership, and NPT non-
membership 
Coded 1 for years where a state has 
entered into an AP, 0 alternately 
NWFZs (H4) NWFZ Decrease in likelihood and 
hostility of response over non-
NWFZ membership 
Coded 1 for years where a state is a 
member of a NWFZ, 0 alternately 
IAEA Non-
Compliance (H5) 
Noncomp Increase in the likelihood and 
hostility of response over no 
such finding 
Coded 1 for years where a state is found 
to be in non-compliance, 0 alternately 
Treaty Withdrawal 
(H6) 
Withdr Increase in the likelihood and 
hostility of response over non-
withdrawal 
Coded 1 for years after withdrawal, 
coded 0 either for never having signed 
said Treaty and for years in which the 
state is a party to the Treaty 
Nuclear Umbrella 
(H7) 
Umb Decrease in the likelihood and 
hostility of response over no 
umbrella 
Coded 1 for years under umbrella, 0 
alternately 
Enrichment (H8) Enrich Increase in likelihood and 
hostility of response over no 
such capability 
Coded 1 for year of construction and all 
subsequent years facility is in operation 
Reactor (H9) Reactor Increase in likelihood and 
hostility of positive response-
year the stronger the signal of 
proliferation capability 
See below 
Separated Pu 
Capability (H10) 
Separ Increase in likelihood and 
hostility of response over no 
such capability 
Coded 1 for first year of production and 
all subsequent years facility is in 
operation 
 
For hypothesis 9, reactor strength, the presented hypothesis investigates whether states 
are more likely to respond as the indication of proliferation intent increases.  This is directly 
related to the appropriateness and usability of any specific reactor as a means of material 
production.  It is thus necessary to construct an index combining the various signals discussed in 
Chapter 3.  For each of the three characteristics that primarily inform whether a reactor is usable 
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for the production of weapons-usable material, I assign a score based on whether the 
construction and/or operation of a specific type of reactor is more or less conducive to and/or 
indicative of a weapons-usable material purpose, with the resultant score ranging from 3 points 
(least conducive) to 9 points (most conducive).  The resultant index is thus coded according to 
the following (Table 5.6): 
Table 5.6: Signal Strength of Nuclear Reactor 
 Reactor Function Reactor Type Thermal Capacity 
1 Point Power Reactor PWR, LWR, BWR <1MW 
2 Points Research Reactor HWR 1MW-10MW 
3 Points Production Reactor GCR, LWGMR >10MW 
  
Relational Characteristics and Interpretive Bias 
To investigate the effect of differences in the characteristics of the relationships between 
suspected proliferators and potential respondents on the likelihood that a respondent will respond 
to the activities or behavior of a suspected proliferator, and how hostile those responses are likely 
to be (hypotheses 11 & 12), it is necessary to develop an understanding of what distinguishes a 
conflictual relationship from a cooperative one.  In addition, for those states with conflictual 
relationships, it is necessary to determine what makes some of these relationships more hostile 
than others.  Conversely, for cooperative relationships, it is necessary to determine the 
characteristics that make some of these relationships more cooperative than others. 
 Although there are a number of ways that relational characteristics can and have been 
operationalized, including through the use of UN voting patterns as a reflection of how similar or 
different any two state’s interests are, only one identifies whether any two states’ historical 
interactions are more conflictual or cooperative in nature and measures how conflictual and/or 
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cooperative they are: the peace scale (Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2008).  The peace scale research 
program builds on earlier research on the causes and consequences of interstate rivalry and treats 
peace not as the absence of conflict, but an outcome in and of itself.  In a similar manner as the 
identification of the factors that often lead to war, the peace scale thus identifies those factors 
that lead to lasting peace between countries.  Although the identification of peace-inducing 
factors is certainly not unique to the peace scale research program, it is unique in that it utilizes 
the insights obtained from both peace research and the rivalry program to construct a combined 
scale usable for both theorization and statistical analysis. 
 The peace scale is constructed using indicators that are considered to be relevant to the 
characterization of any given interstate relationship as more or less peaceful, or what the authors 
term the “state of peace or rivalry between countries” (70).  
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Table 5.7 – The Peace Scale 
 
Peace Scale Indicators 
 RIVALRY NEGATIVE PEACE POSITIVE PEACE 
Indicator Rivalry Low-Level 
Conflict 
Negative Peace Positive Peace Pluralistic 
Security 
Community 
 1.0 0.75 0.50 0.25 0.0 
Conflict 
1. War Plans Present Present 
Absent 
Absent Joint War 
Planning 
2. Conflicts Frequent MIDs: Variety of 
Hostility Levels 
Isolated/MIDs; 
Thompson 
rivalries; ICB 
crises 
No plausible 
counterfactual war 
scenarios 
No plausible 
counterfactual 
war scenarios 
Communication & Issues 
3. Main issues in 
conflict 
Unresolved Unresolved Mitigated; Some 
resolved; Some low 
salience 
Resolved Resolved 
4. Communications Absent Absent Intergovernmental Intergovernmental 
and highly 
developed 
transnational ties 
Institutionalized 
mechanisms 
Agreements, Institutions, and & Diplomacy 
5. Diplomacy No recognition; Diplomatic 
hostility 
No recognition; 
or Diplomatic 
hostility 
Diplomatic 
recognition; 
Statements 
suggesting conflict 
Diplomatic relations Diplomatic 
coordination 
6. 
Area/Level/Number 
Agreement 
None None Peace negotiations 
&/or agreements 
Nascent functional 
agreements; nascent 
integration 
Extensive 
institutionalized 
functional 
agreements 
 
I therefore employ this scale in the operationalization of my main variable of interest: relational 
characteristics.  I treat the Negative Peace (.5) level of the scale as a baseline against which to 
compare whether any given relationship is more peaceful (i.e. at either the .25 or 0.0 levels) or 
more conflictual (i.e. at either the .75 or 1.0 levels) in nature.120121  As I am interested in 
determining not whether relational characteristics explain the occurrence and overall severity of 
responses directly, although this also may be the case, but whether signals in context affect either 
the likelihood of positive response-years or the observed hostility level of those years, I 
introduce interactive terms for each of the aforementioned signals. 
 
                                                
120 The Peace Scale dataset contains data up to 2006.  As I am analyzing response-years during the 1945-2007 
timeframe, I using each dyads 2006 score as a proxy for their 2007 score, recognizing that this may be an inaccurate 
representation of certain cases, if the characteristics of the relationships of those dyads changed over the course of 
those two years. 
121 For dyads where no score is given in the PeaceScale dataset, I assign the baseline value of .5. 
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Table 5.8: Interactive Terms  
 
 Hypothesis Variable 
Name 
Independent Effect Interactive Terms Substantive 
Interpretation 
NPT Membership 
(H1) 
NPT Decrease in the 
likelihood of both 
responses and hostility 
of responses 
NPT*PluralComm 
NPT*PosPeace 
NPT*NegPeace 
NPT*LowLevCon 
NPT*Rivalry 
Effect of NPT 
membership at 
different levels 
of peace scale 
Comprehensive 
Safeguards 
Agreement (H2) 
CSA Decrease in likelihood 
and hostility of response 
over both NPT 
membership and NPT 
non-membership 
CSA*PluralComm 
CSA*PosPeace 
CSA*NegPeace 
CSA*LowLevCon 
CSA*Rivalry 
Effect of CSA at 
different levels 
of peace scale 
Additional 
Protocols (H3) 
AP Decrease in likelihood 
and hostility of response 
over CSA, NPT 
membership, and NPT 
non-membership 
AP*PluralComm 
AP*PosPeace 
AP*NegPeace 
AP*LowLevCon 
AP*Rivalry 
Effect of AP at 
different levels 
of peace scale 
NWFZs (H4) NWFZ Decrease in likelihood 
and hostility of response 
over non-NWFZ 
membership 
NWFZ*PluralComm 
NWFZ*PosPeace 
NWFZ*NegPeace 
NWFZ*LowLevCon 
NWFZ*Rivalry 
Effect of NWFZ 
at different 
levels of peace 
scale 
Treaty Withdrawal 
(H5) 
Withdr Increase in the 
likelihood and hostility 
of response over no 
withdrawal 
Withdr*PluralComm 
Withdr*PosPeace 
Withdr*NegPeace 
Withdr*LowLevCon 
Withdr*Rivalry 
Effect of Withdr 
at different 
levels of peace 
scale 
IAEA Non-
Compliance (H6) 
Noncomp Increase in the 
likelihood and hostility 
of response over no such 
finding 
Noncomp*PluralComm 
Noncomp*PosPeace 
Noncomp*NegPeace 
Noncomp*LowLevCon 
Noncomp*Rivalry 
Effect of 
Noncomp at 
different levels 
of peace scale 
Nuclear Umbrella 
(H7) 
Umb Decrease in the 
likelihood and hostility 
of response over no 
umbrella 
Umb*PluralComm 
Umb*PosPeace 
Umb*NegPeace 
Umb*LowLevCon 
Umb*Rivalry 
Effect of Umb 
at different 
levels of peace 
scale 
Enrichment (H8) Enrich Increase in likelihood 
and hostility of response 
over no such capability 
Enrich*PluralComm 
Enrich*PosPeace 
Enrich*NegPeace 
Enrich*LowLevCon 
Enrich*Rivalry 
Effect of Enrich 
at different 
levels of peace 
scale 
Separation (H9) Separ Increase in likelihood 
and hostility of response 
over no such capability 
Separ*PluralComm 
Separ*PosPeace 
Separ*NegPeace 
Separ*LowLevCon 
Separ*Rivalry 
Effect of Separ 
at different 
levels of peace 
scale 
Reactor (H10) Reactor Increase in likelihood 
and hostility of response 
as increase in strength of 
reactor signals 
Reactor*PluralComm 
Reactor*PosPeace 
Reactor*NegPeace 
Reactor*LowLevCon 
Reactor*Rivalry 
Effect of 
Reactor at 
different levels 
of peace scale 
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Control Variables 
 
 Identifying relevant controls must necessarily begin with the identification of possible 
alternate explanations for both the occurrence and hostility of responses to proliferation.  For the 
former, rather than being motivated by the perception of threat, states may in fact be motivated to 
respond because of other factors.  Two such explanations exist. The first is that states are 
economically motivated to prevent the acquisition of nuclear technologies by other states, in that 
the acquisition of said technologies might affect a responding state’s ability to profit from the 
export of both sensitive and non-sensitive technologies.  One group, in particular, may be so 
motivated: members of the nuclear suppliers group (NSG).  These states have gone through a 
process of becoming “officially” recognized as nuclear technology exporters, and enjoy a 
relative monopoly in this position, and may thus be motivated to prevent other states from 
enjoying the same privilege.  I thus introduce a dummy variable coded 1 for states who are 
members of the NSG and 0 for states who are not.122 
 A second alternative explanation is that states are motivated to respond to proliferation 
primarily on normative grounds.  These states are what might be called “non-proliferation 
advocates,” in that they actively act to discourage, if not prevent the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons and related technologies by other states.  Although only formally existing since 2010, 
the twelve member-states of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), Australia, 
Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, the Philippines, Poland, Turkey 
and the United Arab Emirates, are those that are most likely to respond on normative grounds, 
and most likely to have done so in the past.  Membership in the NPDI, indeed, reflects not only a 
state’s commitment to the norm of non-proliferation and the success of the NPT specifically as 
                                                
122 Joining/coding dates are shown in Appendix I. 
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of its creation, but sustained, vocal support over many years.  I thus code a dummy variable for 
membership in the NPDI (1 for yes, 2 for no), for the 1942-2007 time-period.   
 For the hostility or aggressiveness of responses, one alternative explanation exists.  
Rather than being informed by the nature of the relationship between the sender and target, 
whether more or less conflictual/cooperative, is, instead, primarily informed by the relative 
power of the two states.  Sender states that enjoy a military superiority over the target state are 
more likely to adopt hostile forms of response than those whose military capabilities are roughly 
equivalent or even less than the target.  The greater the power imbalance between the sender and 
the target, with the target being the more capable of the two, the more likely that the observed 
response will be non-hostile.  I thus control for relative power, using the Correlates of War 
military capabilities index (Diff Cap).   
Model Selection 
 
 Selecting a statistical model to be used in the investigation of the relationships presented 
previously is done so in large part because of the form of the dependent variable of interest.  The 
first of the two dependent variables identified herein is the occurrence of a response, of any kind, 
for a given year.  This dichotomous categorical variable motivates the choice of logistic 
regression, which takes the form: 
F(x) = β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 + β3x3 + ….. 
As I am initially interested in investigating the independent effect of the cited explanatory 
variables on the occurrence of responses to proliferation, rather than determining which of the 
signals has the greatest effect or how they interact, I first investigate them independently.  An 
example, hypothesis 3, thus takes the form: 
F(x) = β0 + NPT + PeaceScale + NPT*PeaceScale + NSG + NonprolAdv 
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I then investigate the compounding variables presented previously, an example of which is given 
by: 
F(x) = β0 + Nonprol + WUMFac + PeaceScale + NPT*WUMFac*PeaceScale + NSG + 
NonprolAdv 
 
For the second dependent variable of interest, the level of hostility of observed responses, there 
are two possible avenues of investigation.  The first is to treat the various categories as both 
ordered and significant and thus employ a probit model to investigate the effect of the various 
independent variables. The second possibility would be to employ ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression and treat the scale as a continuum, thereby focusing not on the individual categories 
per se, but the general pattern of hostility.  Although the logic of adopting specific forms is 
certainly of interest, it is somewhat beyond the scope of this analysis.  I therefore employ OLS as 
the method of investigation, which takes the form: 
Y = α + β1X1 + β2X2 + … 
An example of which is given by the following (for hypothesis 3): 
Y = α + NPT + PeaceScale + NPT*PeaceScale + MilCap 
Conclusion 
 
 This Chapter presents a research design to first test the relationship between signals and 
the occurrence and hostility of responses to proliferation.  It then offers an approach to 
investigate the effect of relational context on the interpretation of those signals.  Chapter 6 
presents part one of the results of that inquiry, whereas Chapter 7 presents part two.   
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Chapter 6: Statistical Analysis and Findings I 
 
 This chapter presents results of an investigation of the effect of both signals and signals 
in context on the likelihood of the occurrence of positive response-years.  The following Chapter 
then presents the results of analysis of the hostility of observed response-years.  The Chapter is 
organized by the individual signal, whether it is membership in the NPT, a finding of non-
compliance by the IAEA, or the acquisition of the capability to produce enriched uranium, etc.  
Each individual analysis thus shows the effect of the particular signal on the likelihood of 
positive response-years.123  It also presents results of the incorporation of relational context on 
the effect of these signals.124  
Signatory of the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 
 The first signal of interest is being a signatory of the NPT.  Ratification of this treaty is 
expected to decrease the likelihood that other states will perceive nuclear technology 
development as being weapons-related and thus decrease the likelihood that all other states will 
respond.  This expectation, I argue, is affected by the relationship between proliferators and 
respondents.  According to the framework presented previously, states on the positive side of the 
peace scale (those at the 0.0 or .25 levels) are even further less likely to respond than those at the 
baseline level, whereas those on the conflictual side of the scale (the .75 or 1.0 levels) should be 
more likely to respond.  The results of an investigation of this relationship are presented below. 
                                                
123 The reader will note that two signals are missing from this analysis.  The first is an investigation of the effect of 
signing an Additional Protocols agreement.  This is because there have been no instances where positive response-
years have occurred for states who have signed AP agreements.  As will be discussed in Chapter 7, this may suggest 
that signing such agreements is the strongest signal of non-proliferation compliance, yet such a conclusion cannot be 
conclusively made based on the inability to conduct statistical analysis.  The second is the effect of withdrawal from 
non-proliferation related treaties or institutions.  As there has been only one case where this has occurred, North 
Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT in 2003, there is insufficient data with which to conduct an unbiased analysis of 
its effect.  Possible future avenues of investigation are therefore presented in Chapter 8.  
124 To test the robustness of the results presented in this Chapter, I also employ King and Zeng’s (2001) Rare Event 
Logit for each of the signals analyzed herein (the results for which can be found in Appendix III).  I note in the text 
that follows only when the results substantially differ from what is found using ordinary logistic regression. 
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Table 6.1 – Logistic Regression of Responses to Proliferation 
(All Categories, Negative Peace as Baseline) 
  Model I Model II Model III 
  Coeff.  
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
(Intercept)  -3.86*** 
(.07) 
-4.33*** 
(.10) 
-4.811*** 
(.114)*** 
NPT  -1.08*** 
(.40) 
-2.04*** 
(.21) 
-2.96 
(.217) 
Plural. Comm. (0.0)  - -15.4 
(1097) 
-14.78 
(1097) 
Pos. Peace (.25)  - -.16 
(.46) 
-.375 
(.466) 
Low Lev. Con. (.75)  - .80* 
(.32) 
1.14*** 
(.326) 
Rivalry (1.0)  - 1.93*** 
(.15) 
2.28*** 
(.159) 
N.S.G.  - - 2.05*** 
(.131) 
N.P.D.I.  - - .14 
(.253) 
NPT*PluralCom  - 2.04 
(1154) 
1.24 
(1151) 
NPT*PosPeace  - -13.36 
(393) 
-13.81 
(380) 
NPT*LowLevCon  - 2.17*** 
(.47) 
2.004*** 
(.478) 
NPT*Rivalry  - 2.28*** 
(.26) 
2.493*** 
(.264) 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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Table 6.2 – Logistic Regression of Responses to Proliferation 
(Collapsed Categories as Baseline)125 
  Model I Model II Model III 
  Coeff.  
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
(Intercept)  -3.86*** 
(.07) 
-4.33*** 
(.10) 
-4.81*** 
(.11) 
NPT  -1.08*** 
(.11) 
-2.13*** 
(.21) 
-3.10*** 
(.22) 
Low Lev. Con. (.75)  - .80* 
(.32) 
1.15*** 
(.33) 
Rivalry (1.0)  - 1.93*** 
(.15) 
2.28*** 
(.16) 
N.S.G.  - - 2.06*** 
(.13) 
N.P.D.I.  - - .15 
(.25) 
NPT*LowLevCon  - 2.25*** 
(.47) 
2.11*** 
(.48) 
NPT*Rivalry  - 2.36*** 
(.26) 
2.62*** 
(.26) 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
In both sets of results, the expectation that membership in the NPT should have a 
statistically significant negative effect on the likelihood of the occurrence of positive response-
years is confirmed.  NPT membership makes it .34 times less likely that positive response-years 
will occur.  Incorporating relational context, however, suggests that membership may only have 
an effect on states at either the 0.0, .25, or .50 levels, although the scarcity of cases, illustrated by 
the high standard errors, casts doubts on the accuracy of the estimates.  Those states that are, 
perhaps, the most likely to respond, those on the conflictual side of the peace scale, are, in fact, 
more likely to respond to nuclear-related development by signatories of the NPT than by those 
that are not.  For states at the .75 level of the peace scale, NPT membership makes the 
occurrence of positive response-years 8.76 times more likely compared to those at the baseline 
.50 level, and 9.49 times more likely than when compared to states in the collapsed category.  
Rivals are even more likely to respond; some 9.77 times more than the baseline .50 category and 
                                                
125 The collapsed categories consist of those at the 0.0, .25, and .50 levels of the peace scale 
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10.59 more times when compared to the collapsed category.  This explains, perhaps, why, for 
example, both Israel and Iran responded to the acquisition of nuclear-related technologies in the 
1980s by Iraq, with whom they were both rivals, even though Iraq was a signatory of the NPT, 
while the other non-rival states in the region, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, did not 
respond in any measurable way.  
These results hold even when including the relevant controls discussed in the previous 
chapter.  Although normatively-motivated states do not seem to respond more or less often than 
states without such motivations, economically motivated states, evidenced by membership in the 
Nuclear Supplier’s Group, are 7.76 times more likely to respond than non-members.  As will be 
shown, membership in the NSG remains a statistically significant predictor of the occurrence of 
positive response-years, pointing towards the need for further investigation of the motivations of 
these states.126 
IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements 
 The second signal of interest is being party to an IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards 
Agreement.  The expectation, similarly to membership in the NPT, is that it will reduce the 
likelihood of positive response-years when compared to states that are only members of the 
NPT.127  Incorporating relational context should further decrease the likelihood of the occurrence 
of positive response-years for states on the cooperative/peaceful side of the peace scale (the 0.0 
and .25 levels).  Conversely, states on the conflictual side of the peace scale should be more 
likely to respond than states at the baseline .5 level or in the collapsed category, even when 
taking CSAs into consideration.  
 
                                                
126 To be discussed further in Chapter 7. 
127 To test for this relationship, I therefore control for membership in the NPT. 
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Table 6.3 – Logistic Regression of Responses to Proliferation 
(All Categories, Negative Peace as Baseline) 
  Model I Model II Model III 
  Coeff. (Std. Error) Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
(Intercept)  -3.86*** 
(.25) 
-4.37*** 
(.10) 
-4.87 
(.11) 
NPT  0.75 . 
(.41) 
-.52** 
(.16) 
-1.56*** 
(.18) 
CSA  -.47 
(.55) 
-2.70*** 
(.41) 
-2.51*** 
(.41) 
Plural. Comm. (0.0)  - -14.86 
(609) 
-14.46 
(589) 
Pos. Peace (.25)  - -.33 
(.46) 
-.21 
(.46) 
Low Lev. Con. (.75)  - 1.01*** 
(.28) 
1.27*** 
(.28) 
Rivalry (1.0)  - 2.05*** 
(.14) 
2.47*** 
(.15) 
N.S.G.  - - 2.05*** 
(.14) 
N.P.D.I.  - - .15 
(714) 
CSA*PluralCom  - 2.88 
(734) 
1.95 
(714) 
CSA*PosPeace  - -11.67 
(570) 
-12.23 
(554) 
CSA*LowLevCon  - 3.10*** 
(.59) 
3.22*** 
(.60) 
CSA*Rivalry  - 3.50*** 
(.42) 
3.50*** 
(.42) 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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Table 6.4 – Logistic Regression of Responses to Proliferation 
(Collapsed Categories as Baseline) 
  Model I Model II Model III 
  Coeff. (Std. Error) Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
(Intercept)  -3.86*** 
(.25) 
-4.40*** 
(.10) 
-4.89*** 
(.11) 
NPT  0.75 . 
(.41) 
-.55*** 
(.16) 
-1.59*** 
(.18) 
CSA  -.47 
(.55) 
-2.71*** 
(.41) 
-2.59*** 
(.41) 
Low Lev. Con. (.75)  - 1.04*** 
(.28) 
1.30*** 
(.28) 
Rivalry (1.0)  - 2.08*** 
(.14) 
2.49*** 
(.15) 
N.S.G.  - - 2.06*** 
(.14) 
N.P.D.I.  - - .14 
(.25) 
CSA*LowLevCon  - 3.14*** 
(.59) 
3.32*** 
(.60) 
CSA*Rivalry  - 3.50*** 
(.42) 
2.60*** 
(.42) 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
 
In contrast to what was found with the NPT, Model I suggests that being under a CSA is not a 
statistically significant predictor of the occurrence, or more accurately lack thereof, of positive 
response-years, when taking NPT membership into consideration.  Models II and III suggest 
otherwise, which may indicate that relational context informs, to a great extent, the impact of the 
CSA more so than it does the NPT.  More specifically, the results of incorporating relational 
context suggests that states on the conflictual side of the peace scale are more likely to respond 
to states that develop nuclear technologies while under CSA agreements than either those at the 
baseline level or on the peaceful side of the scale.  Those at the .75 level are some 22 times more 
likely to respond than those at the baseline level and 33 times more likely than those in the 
collapsed category (again consisting of those states at the .5, .25, and 0.0 levels of the peace 
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scale).128  This is, perhaps, why Israel and the United States, both rivals of Iran, engaged in 
responses against their perceived development of nuclear weapons during the 2000s, whereas no 
other states in the region responded in any observable way. 
Nuclear Weapon Free Zones 
 The logic of being a party to a treaty establishing a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone is largely 
the same as being a member state of the NPT or being in a CSA with the IAEA, in that it should 
signal to other states that proliferation is less likely when compared to equivalent actions taken 
by states who are not party to such treaties.  This should be evidenced in a decrease likelihood of 
positive response-years for states in NWFZs.  Relational context, however, is expected to inform 
whether this relationship holds.  For those states on the conflictual side of the scale, NWFZ 
Treaty membership should be viewed with skepticism, and when compared to states with more 
neutral relationships with potential proliferators, who are more likely to view it in a less biased 
way, are more likely to respond.  Conversely, states on the peaceful side of the scale should 
NWFZ Treaty membership as an even stronger signal of non-proliferation norm compliance than 
those at the .5 baseline level, leading to a comparatively smaller likelihood of response.  An 
investigation of this relationship is thus given below. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
128 Conversely, the high standard errors and lack of significance of the 0.0 and .25 level interactive terms suggests 
that, although it is likely that states at these levels may view CSA membership in a similar way as those at the 
baseline .5 level, the lack of cases makes it difficult to definitively conclude that this is, in fact, the case.   
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Table 6.5 – Logistic Regression of Responses to Proliferation 
(Plural Comm. Excluded, Negative Peace as Baseline)129130 
  Basic Model Full Model w/o Controls Full Model with Controls 
  Coeff. (Std. Error) Coeff.  
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
(Intercept)  -3.82*** 
(.07) 
-4.75*** 
(.11) 
-5.25*** 
(.12) 
NWFZ  -.80** 
(.25) 
-1.48*** 
(.51) 
-1.97*** 
(.51) 
NPT  -1.05*** 
(.11) 
-.63*** 
(.11) 
-1.62*** 
(.14) 
PluralCom (0.0)  - -14.26 
(340) 
-14.58 
(331) 
Pos. Peace (.25)  - -1.73 . 
(1.00) 
-1.84 . 
(1.00) 
Low Lev. Con. (.75)  - 1.17*** 
(.28) 
1.37*** 
(.29) 
Rivalry (1.0)  - 2.82*** 
(.12) 
3.20*** 
(.13) 
N.S.G.  - - 2.24*** 
(.15) 
N.P.D.I.  - - -.05 
(.84) 
NWFZ* 
PosPeace 
 - 5.09*** 
(1.23) 
5.19*** 
(1.24) 
NWFZ* 
LowLevCon 
 - 3.19*** 
(.68) 
4.19*** 
(.69) 
NWFZ* 
Rivalry 
 - -15.64 
(939) 
-14.50 
(908) 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
129 As there are no recorded instances where a state was in a pluralistic security community with a state that is a 
signatory of a NWFZ treaty, this category is excluded from this analysis. 
130 I introduce membership in the NPT as a control for this model, as I am interested in determining whether 
membership in a NWFZ treaty has any independent effect if membership in the NPT is taken into consideration.   
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Table 6.6 – Logistic Regression of Responses to Proliferation 
(Collapsed Categories as Baseline) 
  Model I Model II Model III 
  Coeff. (Std. Error) Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
(Intercept)  -3.82*** 
(.07) 
-4.81*** 
(.11) 
-5.31*** 
(.12) 
NWFZ  -.80** 
(.25) 
-.74* 
(.36) 
-1.22*** 
(.37) 
NPT  -1.05*** 
(.11) 
-.65*** 
(.11) 
-1.66*** 
(.14) 
Low Lev. Con.  - 1.23*** 
(.28) 
1.45*** 
(.29) 
Rivalry  - 2.88*** 
(.12) 
3.28*** 
(.13) 
N.S.G.  - - 2.24*** 
(.15) 
N.P.D.I.  - - -.07 
(.25) 
NWFZ 
*LowLevCon 
 - 2.46*** 
(.58) 
3.43*** 
(.59) 
NWFZ 
*Rivalry 
 - -13.37 
(209) 
-13.23 
(334) 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
 
The results shown above suggest that, as expected, membership in a NWFZ Treaty does have a 
statistically significant effect on the likelihood of the occurrence of positive response-years 
(some .44 times less likely), even when controlling for membership in the NPT.  Incorporating 
relational context gives a somewhat different picture of its effect.  Although states at the low 
level conflict position of the peace scale (the .75 level) are, as expected, more likely to respond 
to the occurrence of proliferation than those at the baseline level, the results indicate that 
respondents at the rivalry position of the peace scale do not respond with any greater frequency 
than those at the baseline .5 level.  This result is in direct contradiction of the expectations of the 
theoretical framework.  Also incongruous with the expectations of the framework is that 
respondents at the .25 position on the peace scale (the positive peace level) are some 179 times 
more likely to respond to states that possess nuclear technologies while members of NWFZ 
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Treaties than those at the baseline .5 level.  An investigation of this result indicates that it may be 
an artifact of data limitations, as the only known case where a state at the Positive Peace position 
of the peace scale responded was Argentina’s imposition of economic sanctions against Brazil  
IAEA Non-Compliance 
 
 Of the various signals under consideration, the one that is often considered to be the 
strongest indicator of the occurrence of proliferation is a finding of non-compliance by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency.  The expectation is that such a finding should significantly 
increase the likelihood of the occurrence of positive response-years for all states.  The 
anticipated effect of the relational-driven interpretive bias framework, however, is that this either 
may only be the case for those states on the conflictual side of the peace scale, those at the .75 or 
1.0 levels, or becomes increasingly less likely when moving from the conflictual side to the 
peaceful side.  When compared to the .5 baseline level, therefore, states on the peaceful side of 
the scale should be less likely to respond, while those on the conflictual side should be more 
likely to respond.  The results of an investigation of this relationship are given below.  
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Table 6.7 – Logistic Regression of Responses to Proliferation 
(Collapsed Categories as Baseline)131 
  Model I Model II Model III 
  Coeff. (Std. Error) Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
(Intercept)  -3.86*** 
(.07) 
-4.33*** 
(.10) 
-4.81*** 
(.11) 
Noncomp  -1.08*** 
(.11) 
-2.13*** 
(.21) 
-3.10*** 
(.22) 
Low Lev. Con. (.75)  - .80* 
(.32) 
1.15*** 
(.33) 
Rivalry (1.0)  - 1.93*** 
(.15) 
2.28*** 
(.16) 
N.S.G.  - - 2.06*** 
(.13) 
N.P.D.I.  - - .15 
(.25) 
Noncomp 
*LowLevCon 
 - 2.25*** 
(.47) 
2.11*** 
(.48) 
Noncomp 
*Rivalry 
 - 2.36*** 
(.26) 
2.62*** 
(.26) 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Contrary to expectations, a finding of non-compliance by the IAEA decreases the likelihood of 
positive response-years (a statistically significant result), when not considering relational 
context.  Doing so, however, suggests that such a finding does, in fact, increase the likelihood of 
the occurrence of positive response-years for those states on the conflictual side of the peace 
scale, when compared to those at the .5, .25, or 0.0 levels.  A finding of non-compliance makes 
positive response-years ~9.5 times more likely for states at the .75 level of the peace scale and 
~10.5 times more likely for rivals.  This is illustrated in virtually every case where a finding of 
non-compliance has been leveled: Iraq (1991), Romania (1992), North Korea (1993), Libya 
(2004), and Iran (2006).  In each case, only states in either rivalries (the 1.0 level) or at the .75 
level responded to these states in any measurable way.  Libya, although not included in the 
sample because of the elimination of the entirety of their nuclear capabilities in 2002, was 
                                                
131 As there are no cases where a state found in non-compliance by the IAEA was in a pluralistic security community 
and only one case, Romania, where a state was in a Positive Peace relationship with other states, I present results 
only for a comparison of the conflictual side of the peace scale against the collapsed category.   
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subject to sanctioning by a number of states, including the United States, all of whom were at 
either the .75 or 1.0 level with the state under the Qaddafi regime. 
Umbrella Alliances 
 
 States who enter into alliances with either implicit or explicit nuclear components do so 
for a number of reasons, including that it signals to other states that the utility of acquiring one’s 
capability may be decreased.  The expectation, therefore, is that, when compared to states that 
are not in such relationships, the likelihood of the occurrence of positive response-years should 
be less.  Taking relational context into consideration, however, may affect this relationship.  
When compared to states that enjoy a more neutral relationship with potential proliferators, states 
that have more cooperative/peaceful relations should again be more likely to trust that nuclear 
weapons are not be attained, whereas those on the conflictual side should view such alliances 
with skepticism and therefore be more likely to respond.  The results of a test of these 
expectations are given below. 
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Table 6.8 – Logistic Regression of Responses to Proliferation 
(All Categories, Negative Peace as Baseline) 
  Model I Model II Model III 
  Coeff. (Std. Error) Coeff.  
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
(Intercept)  -4.01*** 
(.06) 
-5.06*** 
(.11) 
-5.83*** 
(-.15) 
Umbrella  -1.20*** 
(.13) 
-.38* 
(.17) 
-.19 
(.18) 
Plural Comm. (0.0)  - -14.51 
(629) 
-14.61 
(613) 
Pos. Peace (.25)  - 1.17* 
(.47) 
.93* 
(.47) 
Low Lev. Con. (.75)  - 1.73*** 
(.27) 
2.16*** 
(.28) 
Rivalry (1.0)  - 3.09*** 
(.14) 
3.62*** 
(.16) 
N.S.G.  - - 1.4*** 
(.12) 
N.P.D.I.  - - -.21 
(.25) 
Umbrella 
*PluralComm 
 - .38 
(748) 
-.05 
(731) 
Umbrella 
*PosPeace 
 - -15.30 
(374) 
-15.24 
(364) 
Umbrella 
*LowLevCon 
 - -.07 
(.51) 
-.50 
(.52) 
Umbrella 
*Rivalry 
 - -1.02*** 
(.29) 
-1.39*** 
(.30) 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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Table 6.9 – Logistic Regression of Responses to Proliferation 
(Collapsed Categories as Baseline) 
  Model I Model II Model III 
  Coeff. (Std. Error) Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
(Intercept)  -4.01*** 
(.06) 
-5.04*** 
(.11) 
-5.79*** 
(.14) 
Umbrella  -1.20*** 
(.13) 
-.51** 
(.17) 
-.36* 
(.17) 
Low Lev. Con. (.75)  - 1.71*** 
(.27) 
2.14*** 
(.28) 
Rivalry (1.0)  - 3.07*** 
(.14) 
3.60*** 
(.15) 
N.S.G.  - - 1.37*** 
(.12) 
N.P.D.I.  - - 1.37 
(.51) 
Umbrella 
*LowLevCon 
 - .06 
(.51) 
-.32 
(.51) 
Umbrella 
*Rivalry 
 - -.89** 
(.29) 
-1.2*** 
(.29) 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
As expected, being in a nuclear umbrella alliance decreases the likelihood of the occurrence of 
positive response-years (~.30 times) for all states.  Investigating how states at different points 
along the peace scale view such relationships yields interesting results.  Contradicting the 
expectations of the theoretical framework, positive response-years are less likely to occur for 
states on the conflictual side of the peace scale than those at either the .5 baseline level (shown in 
Table 5.9) or in the collapsed category (shown in Table 5.10).  This suggests that these states 
view such alliances to be a more significant signal of non-proliferation than do those at neutral or 
peaceful side of the scale.  This is not entirely inconsistent with the underlying logic of the 
presented theoretical framework.  As states are primarily concerned with the perception and 
evaluation of threat, actions that speak directly to threat dynamics, such as entering into an 
alliance with a nuclear state, to whom the potential proliferator would most likely also have to 
demonstrate compliance, would be a comparatively stronger signal for those states most often 
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motivated by the perception of threat (those on the conflictual side of the scale) than either other 
signals or for states at other positions on the scale. 
Uranium Enrichment 
 Of the many signals introduced in the previous chapters, the two that are, perhaps, of the 
most interest to policy-makers are the development and/or acquisition of the capability to 
produce nuclear weapons usable material.  In each case, the expectation is that positive response-
years should be more likely, regardless of the relationship between the respondent and 
proliferator.  I argue, however, that this is an unrealistic expectation.  Relational context should 
affect, to a great extent, whether positive response-years are observed.  When compared to the .5 
baseline level, states with more cooperative/peaceful relations with states that develop such 
capabilities should see these activities as more benign, whereas those on the conflictual side 
should see them as strong indicators of proliferation intent, and therefore respond accordingly.  
Results of an investigation of this relationship for the uranium production path are shown below. 
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Table 6.10 – Logistic Regression of Responses to Proliferation 
(All Categories, Negative Peace as Baseline) 
  Model I Model II Model III 
  Coeff. (Std. Error) Coeff.  
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
(Intercept)  -4.66*** 
(.07) 
-5.48*** 
(.12) 
-6.22*** 
(.15) 
Enrich  .55*** 
(.11) 
.61*** 
(.17) 
.84*** 
(.17) 
Plural Comm. (0.0)  - -14.08 
(376) 
-13.28 
(368) 
Pos. Peace (.25)  - -14.08 
(364) 
-14.12 
(354) 
Low Lev. Con. (.75)  - 1.96*** 
(.28) 
2.18*** 
(.28) 
Rivalry (1.0)  - 2.82*** 
(.16) 
3.27*** 
(.17) 
N.S.G.  - - 1.38*** 
(.12) 
N.P.D.I.  - - -.18 
(.25) 
Enrich 
*PluralComm 
 - -.61 
(883) 
-1.26 
(880) 
Enrich 
*PosPeace 
 - 15.28 
(364) 
14.87 
(354) 
Enrich 
*LowLevCon 
 - -.38 
(.49) 
-.23 
(.50) 
Enrich 
*Rivalry 
 - .92*** 
(.24) 
.67** 
(.24) 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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Table 6.11 – Logistic Regression of Responses to Proliferation 
(Collapsed Categories as Baseline) 
  Model I Model II Model III 
  Coeff. (Std. Error) Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
(Intercept)  -4.66*** 
(.07) 
-5.58*** 
(.12) 
-6.32*** 
(.15) 
Enrich  .55 . 
(.31) 
.74*** 
(.17) 
.94*** 
(.17) 
Low Lev. Con. (.75)  - 2.05*** 
(.28) 
2.29*** 
(.28) 
Rivalry (1.0)  - 2.92*** 
(.16) 
3.38*** 
(.17) 
N.S.G.  - - 1.35*** 
(.12) 
N.P.D.I.  - - -.18 
(.25) 
Enrich 
*LowLevCon 
 - -.51 
(.49) 
-.34 
(.49) 
Enrich 
*Rivalry 
 - .80*** 
(.24) 
.57* 
(.24) 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Although the ability to enrich uranium does impact the likelihood of the occurrence of 
positive response-years, as evidenced by the results shown in Model I in both Tables 5.11 and 
5.12, it only makes such occurrences ~1.7 times more likely.  This is a somewhat surprising 
result given the focus on the ability to produce such materials by both academics and policy-
makers.  Incorporating relational context into this evaluation yields similar results.  Although 
positive response-years are more likely to occur in the case of rivals, it has a smaller substantive 
effect than what was anticipated.   States at the .75 level of the scale do not seem to respond to 
states that have acquired the capability to enrich uranium in any greater frequency than those at 
the .5 baseline level or in the collapsed category.  This is illustrative of the South African case 
discussed in Chapter 3.  The Soviet Union, engaged in a rivalry with South Africa, threatened the 
use of force against South Africa after their ability to enriched uranium had been confirmed.  The 
United States, by contrast, thought that a response was unnecessary.132  Those in pluralistic 
                                                
132 The United States is coded as being in a .75 (low level conflict) relationship with South Africa at the time. 
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security communities may be less likely to respond to states at the baseline level, but the 
coefficient, although in the anticipated direction, is statistically insignificant, thus casting doubts 
as to the veracity of the presented results.  Taken as a whole, these results only marginally 
confirm the expectations of the theoretical framework, and point towards the need for further 
inquiry as to the perception of the acquisition and/or possession of the capability to produce 
enriched uranium. 
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Plutonium Separation 
Table 6.12 – Logistic Regression of Responses to Proliferation 
(All Categories, Negative Peace as Baseline) 
  Model I Model II Model III 
  Coeff. (Std. Error) Coeff.  
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
(Intercept)  -4.97*** 
(.07) 
-5.81*** 
(.12) 
-6.65*** 
(.15) 
Separ  1.94*** 
(.11) 
2.08 
(.17) 
2.31*** 
(.17) 
Plural Comm. (0.0)  - -13.76 
(356) 
-13.13 
(347) 
Pos. Peace (.25)  - .54 
(.47) 
.33 
(.47) 
Low Lev. Con. (.75)  - 2.36*** 
(.26) 
2.63*** 
(.26) 
Rivalry (1.0)  - 2.99*** 
(.16) 
3.42*** 
(.17) 
N.S.G.  - - 1.61*** 
(.13) 
N.P.D.I.  - - -.20 
(.25) 
Separ 
*PluralComm 
 - -2.08 
(1219) 
-2.36 
(1198) 
Separ 
*PosPeace 
 - -16.37 
(1064) 
-16.21 
(1023) 
Separ 
*LowLevCon 
 - -2.14*** 
(.58) 
-2.17*** 
(.59) 
Separ 
*Rivalry 
 - -.20 
(.24) 
-.20 
(.24) 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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Table 6.13 – Logistic Regression of Responses to Proliferation 
(Collapsed Categories as Baseline) 
  Model I Model II Model III 
  Coeff. (Std. Error) Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
(Intercept)  -3.86*** 
(.07) 
-5.82*** 
(.12) 
-6.66*** 
(.15) 
Separ  -1.08*** 
(.11) 
2.02*** 
(.17) 
2.25*** 
(.17) 
Low Lev. Con. (.75)  - 2.37*** 
(.26) 
2.66*** 
(.26) 
Rivalry (1.0)  - 3.00*** 
(.16) 
3.44*** 
(.17) 
N.S.G.  - - 1.58*** 
(.13) 
N.P.D.I.  - - -.28 
(.25) 
Separ 
*LowLevCon 
 - -2.08*** 
(.58) 
-2.11*** 
(.59) 
Separ 
*Rivalry 
 - -.15 
(.24) 
-.15 
(.24) 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
 
Consistent with what was found analyzing the effect of the acquisition and/or possession 
of enrichment technologies, the development and/or acquisition of the capability to produce 
reprocesses or separated plutonium increases the likelihood of the occurrence of positive 
response-years (~7 times more likely), confirming the previously presented expectations.  The 
ability to produce reprocesses plutonium, however, seems to diverge from the ability to enrich 
uranium when considering relational context.  While rivalry is more likely to lead to the 
occurrence of positive response years for states that have the ability to produce enriched 
uranium, suggesting that they view such a capability differently than states at other positions of 
the peace scale, the results shown in both Tables 6.12 and 6.13 suggest that this is not the case 
for separated/reprocessed plutonium.  However, states at the .75 level do seem to view this 
capability differently, but in the opposite direction of what was anticipated.  Being at this level 
makes it ~.11 times less likely that positive response-years will occur.  Why it is that such a 
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relationship exists is unclear, but seems to bring the applicability of the interpretive bias 
framework into question, at least in the case of a separated/reprocessed plutonium production 
capability. 
Reactor Strength 
 
 The final signal under investigation is the effect of nuclear reactor form and function on 
the likelihood of the occurrence of positive response-years.  The expectation is that the more 
capable a state’s most capable nuclear reactor is of supporting a nuclear weapons production 
program, the more likely it is that positive response-years will occur.  This relationship, however, 
is subject to interpretive bias such that states with more conflictual relationships will view the 
acquisition and/or operation of such facilities as a stronger signal of potential weapons 
development than those at the baseline .5 level of the peace scale.  Conversely, those with more 
cooperative/peaceful relations should be less likely to see said reactor as threatening, making the 
likelihood of the occurrence of positive response-years decrease.  An investigation of these 
expectations is thus given below. 
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Table 6.14 – Logistic Regression of Responses to Proliferation 
(All Categories, Negative Peace as Baseline) 
  Model I Model II Model III 
  Coeff. (Std. Error) Coeff.  
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
(Intercept)  -7.97*** 
(.33) 
-9.34*** 
(.59) 
-10.93*** 
(.61) 
Reactor  .49*** 
(.04) 
.57*** 
(.08) 
.69*** 
(.08) 
Plural Comm. (0.0)  - -9.23 
(1078) 
-9.55 
(1660) 
Pos. Peace (.25)  - .93 
(2.44) 
1.35 
(2.51) 
Low Lev. Con. (.75)  - 4.51*** 
(1.17) 
5.03*** 
(1.23) 
Rivalry (1.0)  - 3.81*** 
(.70) 
4.98*** 
(.72) 
N.S.G.  - - 1.50*** 
(.12) 
N.P.D.I.  - - -.18 
(.25) 
Reactor 
*PluralComm 
 - -.57 
(161) 
-.73 
(248) 
Reactor 
*PosPeace 
 - 0.09 
(.35) 
-.18 
(.36) 
Reactor 
*LowLevCon 
 - -.37 
(.16) 
-.41* 
(.16) 
Reactor 
*Rivalry 
 - -.10 
(.09) 
-.21* 
(.09) 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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Table 6.15 – Logistic Regression of Responses to Proliferation 
(Collapsed Categories as Baseline) 
  Model I Model II Model III 
  Coeff. (Std. Error) Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
(Intercept)  -7.97*** 
(.33) 
-9.36*** 
(.57) 
-10.94*** 
(.60) 
Reactor  .49*** 
(.04) 
.57*** 
(.07) 
.69*** 
(.08) 
Low Lev. Con. (.75)  - 4.53*** 
(1.16) 
5.06*** 
(1.22) 
Rivalry (1.0)  - 3.83*** 
(.68) 
5.00*** 
(.71) 
N.S.G.  - - 1.47*** 
(.12) 
N.P.D.I.  - - -.18 
(.25) 
Reactor 
*LowLevCon 
 - -.37* 
(.15) 
-.41* 
(.16) 
Reactor 
*Rivalry 
 - -.10 
(.09) 
-.21* 
(.09) 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
 
As expected, the results indicate that the more useful a state’s most useful reactor is to 
sustaining a nuclear weapons production program, the more likely it is that positive response-
years will occur (a one unit increase in the strength of the signal produced by the reactor in 
question makes it approximately 1.6 times more likely that positive response-years will occur).  
Disconfirming expectations, however, is the fact that relational context only seems to have an 
effect on the likelihood of the occurrence of positive response-years for those states on the 
conflictual side of the peace scale; albeit in the opposite direction of what was expected.  This 
effect, both small and only weakly significant, suggests that reactor construction and operation is 
either not subject to the kind of bias seen for things like NPT membership, or is not a good 
indicator of either the perception of the threat of a state’s nuclear capability or its intentions to 
proliferate (in either direction).  Either way, these results point to the need for further 
investigation of the role of reactor construction and operation on the occurrence of responses. 
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Conclusion 
 With a few notable exceptions, including the effect of being in an umbrella alliance of the 
likelihood of the occurrence of positive response-years, the results presented above largely 
conform to the theoretical expectations presented in the previous Chapters.  This is particularly 
the case for differences in perception between states on the conflictual side of the peace scale and 
those either on the cooperative/peaceful side or at the neutral .5 level.  What remains unclear is 
whether states on the cooperative/peaceful end of the peace scale view proliferation-related 
signals differently than those at the .5 baseline level.  By investigating whether relational context 
effects the hostility of responses, if and when they do occur, the results of which are presented in 
the following Chapter, it is hoped that this relationship can be better established than what was 
found by just focusing on the occurrence of positive response-years. 
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Chapter 7: Statistical Analysis and Findings II 
 
 This Chapter presents the results of the second part of the analysis presented in Chapter 5.  
It investigates the relationship between signals and relational context on the hostility level of 
response-years.  Similar to the previous Chapter, it is organized by the individual signal.  It 
begins by investigating the effect of various methods of signaling compliance with the norm of 
non-proliferation on the hostility of responses to proliferation. 
Membership in the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 
 Extending the logic presented in the previous Chapter regarding the effect of being a 
party to the NPT, the expectation is that positive response-years are not only less likely to occur, 
but less hostile.  Incorporating relational context may affect this relationship in a similar fashion 
as seen with the occurrence of positive response-years.  The presented theoretical framework 
predicts that, when compared to states at the .5 level with potential proliferators, response-years 
should generally be less hostile for states on the peaceful side of the peace scale (the .25 and 0.0 
levels) and more hostile for the conflictual side of the peace scale (the .75 and 1.0 levels).  A test 
of this relationship produces the results shown in Table 7.1. 
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As expected, the results indicate that being a party to the NPT generally reduces the hostility of 
response-years, when compared to states that have not signed the treaty.  Investigating the effect 
of relational context on this effect produces somewhat mixed results.  Using the Response 
Hostility Index as the dependent variable, the results suggest that, with the exception of rivals, all 
states view NPT membership equivalently with respect to the hostility level of their chosen 
forms of response.  Responses adopted by rivals are marginally more hostile than those adopted 
                                                
133 The control variable, Difference in Military Capabilities, is insignificant for all of the presented results and has a 
very small substantive impact on the results.  Thus, only Models I and II are shown. 
Table 7.1 – OLS Regression of Response Hostility 
(Negative Peace as Baseline)133 
Response Hostility Index 
 
Categorical Hostility Index 
 Model I Model II Model I Model II 
 Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
(Intercept) .21*** 
(.01) 
.12*** 
(.001) 
.06*** 
(.003) 
-.03*** 
(.003) 
NPT -.14*** 
(.01) 
-.01*** 
(.001) 
-.04*** 
(.004) 
-.03*** 
(.004) 
PluralComm - -.12 
(.11) 
- -.03 
(.003) 
PosPeace - .006 
(.006) 
- .003* 
(.02) 
LowLevCon - .22*** 
(.006) 
- .09*** 
(.02) 
Rivalry - .80*** 
(.004) 
- .27*** 
(.001) 
NPT*PluralComm - .01 
(.12) 
- .03 
(.03) 
NPT*PosPeace - -.08 
(.07) 
- -.36 . 
(.02) 
NPT*LowLevCon - .12 
(.08) 
- 0.24 
(.22) 
NPT*Rivalry - .03*** 
(.005) 
- -.01 
(.01) 
 r-squared - .0034 
F-stat – 104.5 on 1 and 
30352DF, p-value < 2.2e-
16 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 
0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 
‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
r-squared - .05 
F-stat – 161.9 on 9 and 
30434DF, p-value < 
2.2e-16 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 
0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 
0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
r-squared - .004 
F-stat – 133 on 1 and 
30442DF, p-value < 
2.2e-16 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 
0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 
0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
r-squared - .05 
F-stat – 163.3 on 10 
and 30352DF, p-value 
< 2.2e-16 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 
0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 
0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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by states at the baseline .5 level.  This result, however, is not found using the Categorical 
Hostility Scale, raising concerns about its validity. 
IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements 
 Entering into an IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement is not only expected to 
decrease the likelihood of the occurrence of positive response-years, it should also generally 
decrease the hostility of response-years.  The influence of interpretive bias is expected to affect 
this relationship, such that response-years are likely to be more hostile for states on the 
conflictual side of the peace scale and less hostile on the peaceful side, when compared to states 
in a more neutral type relationship (the baseline .5 level).  A test of this relationship is given as 
follows: 
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The results shown in Table 7.2 indicate that, contrary to expectations, entering into an IAEA 
Safeguards Agreement has no significant effect on the hostility level of response-years.  That 
being party to the NPT continues to be both in the expected direction and statistically significant 
(for both operationalizations of hostility) suggests that being in a CSA does not provide any 
further benefit than does being a party to the NPT, at least when it comes to reducing the 
hostility of response-years.  
Table 7.2 – OLS Regression of Response Hostility 
(Negative Peace as Baseline) 
Response Hostility Index 
 
Categorical Hostility Index 
 Model I Model II Model I Model II 
 Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
(Intercept) .20*** 
(.01) 
.12*** 
(.002) 
.06*** 
(.003) 
/03*** 
(.003) 
NPT -.13 
(.02) 
-.008*** 
(.02) 
-.04*** 
(.005) 
-.03*** 
(.005) 
CSA -.02 
(.02) 
-.003 . 
(.02) 
-.003 
(.005) 
-.003 
(.005) 
PluralComm - .006 
(.06) 
- -.01 
(.02) 
PosPeace - .001 
(.04) 
- .01 
(.01) 
LowLevCon - .24*** 
(.05) 
- .08*** 
(.01) 
Rivalry - .78*** 
(.03) 
- .25*** 
(.009) 
CSA*PluralComm - .006 
(.07) 
- .01 
(.02) 
CSA*PosPeace - -.002 
(.07) 
- -.01 
(.02) 
CSA*LowLevCon - .009 
(.09) 
- -.02 
(.02) 
CSA*Rivalry - .41*** 
(.05) 
- .05*** 
(.01) 
 r-squared - .0034 
F-stat – 52.64 on 2 and 
30352DF, p-value < 2.2e-
16 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 
0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 
‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
r-squared - .051 
F-stat – 148 on 11 and 
30342DF, p-value < 
2.2e-16 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 
0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 
‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
r-squared - .004 
F-stat – 66.89 on 2 and 
30352DF, p-value < 
2.2e-16 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 
0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 
‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
r-squared - .05 
F-stat – 164.2 on 10 
and 30352DF, p-value 
< 2.2e-16 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 
0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 
‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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 Viewed in the context of differences in relational characteristics, the results indicate that 
rivals are likely to adopt more hostile forms of response to states suspected of proliferating while 
under CSAs than states at the .5 baseline level.  This is consistent with the expectations of the 
theoretical framework.  Indicative of this result is the adoption of unconventional attacks (both 
cyber and suspected assassination of nuclear scientists) by Israel against Iran in 2011.  Israel is 
coded as being in a rivalry with Iran during this time.  This is in contrast to the economic 
sanctions adopted by the member states of the European Union during the same timeframe, the 
majority of whom are coded as being at the .5 baseline level with Iran. 
Nuclear Weapon Free Zones 
 Entering into a NWFZ Treaty is intended to be a strong signal of compliance with the 
norm of non-proliferation.  States that develop nuclear technologies while party to such treaties 
should be viewed less skeptically than those not in such treaties.  This should thus make 
responses to the development of nuclear-related technologies for these states less frequent, but 
less hostile when they do occur.  The relational-driven interpretive bias framework suggests that 
this effect may depend, to a great extent, on the relationship between a nuclear technology 
developer and potential respondents.  When contrasted against states with a neutral relationship, 
a .5 on the peace scale, those in on the peaceful side of the peace scale should adopt less hostile 
forms of respond when they do respond, while those on the conflictual side should adopt more 
hostile forms of response.  A test of these expectations is given below. 
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Even when controlling for membership in the NPT, being in a NWFZ Treaty decreases the 
hostility of response-years, albeit only marginally.  Incorporating relational context, however, 
yields results entirely contrary to what was expected.  When compared to the .5 baseline level, 
states at the .25 and .75 levels are likely to adopt more hostile forms of response.  Rivals, 
however, are likely to adopt less hostile forms of response to states that are party to NWFZ 
treaties, contradicting the expectations of the interpretive bias framework.  This is a particularly 
curious result considering that rivals are generally more likely to adopt hostile forms of response, 
as evidenced by the strong statistically significant positive coefficient on the rivalry variable).  
Table 7.3 – OLS Regression of Response Hostility 
(Negative Peace as Baseline) 
Response Hostility Index 
 
Categorical Hostility Index 
 Model I Model II Model I Model II 
 Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
(Intercept) .21*** 
(.01) 
.10*** 
(.01) 
.06*** 
(.003) 
.03*** 
(.003) 
NPT -.14*** 
(.01) 
-.08*** 
(.01) 
-.04*** 
(.003) 
-.03*** 
(.004) 
NWFZ -.05* 
(.02) 
-.02 
(.02) 
-.01 . 
(.005) 
-.005 
(.006) 
PosPeace - -.04 
(.04) 
- -.008 
(.010) 
LowLevCon - .15*** 
(.04) 
- .03** 
(.01) 
Rivalry - 1.02*** 
(.03) 
- .28*** 
(.007) 
NWFZ*PosPeace - .44*** 
(.11) 
- .15*** 
(.03) 
NWFZ*LowLevCon - 1.10*** 
(.13) 
- .40*** 
(.03) 
NWFZ*Rivalry - -1.03*** 
(.10) 
- -.28*** 
(.03) 
 r-squared - .003 
F-stat – 58.28 on 1 and 
30441DF, p-value < 2.2e-
16 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 
0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 
‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
r-squared - .06 
F-stat – 201.5 on 9 and 
30434DF, p-value < 
2.2e-16 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 
0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 
0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
r-squared - .004 
F-stat – 133 on 1 and 
30442DF, p-value < 
2.2e-16 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 
0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 
0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
r-squared - .06 
F-stat – 212.3 on 9 and 
30352DF, p-value < 
2.2e-16 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 
0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 
0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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This points towards the need for further investigation of the effect of NWFZ Treaty membership 
on the perceptions of rivals. 
IAEA Non-Compliance 
 
 Of the politically oriented signals discussed herein, perhaps none is expected to have a 
greater effect on both the occurrence and hostility of responses than a finding of non-compliance 
by the IAEA.  For the latter, such a finding is expected to increase the hostility of responses 
adopted by all states, irrespective of the characteristics of their relationship with the suspected 
proliferator.  The theoretical framework presented previously suggests otherwise.  It suggests 
that, when compared to states with more neutral relationships, cooperative/peaceful states are 
likely to adopt less hostile forms of response, whereas conflictual states are likely to adopt more 
hostile forms of response.  A test of this relationship is thus presented: 
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 Investigating the effect of a finding of non-compliance on the observed level of hostility 
of response-years confirms the expectation that it generally increases the level of hostility of 
those years.  Incorporating relational context further suggests that the finding is contingent on the 
relationship between the proliferator and respondent.  When compared to the baseline .5 level, 
cooperative states are likely to adopt less hostile forms of response, whereas conflictual states are 
likely to adopt more hostile forms of response.  Furthermore, states at the 1.0 rivalry level are 
likely to adopt more hostile forms of response than even those at the .75 level.  Both of these 
results confirm the expectations of the interpretive bias framework.   
Table 7.4 – OLS Regression of Response Hostility 
(Negative Peace as Baseline) 
Response Hostility Index 
 
Categorical Hostility Index 
 Model I Model II Model I Model II 
 Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
(Intercept) .10*** 
(.006) 
.37*** 
(.007) 
.03*** 
(.002) 
.009*** 
(.002) 
Noncomp 1.23*** 
(.06) 
.83*** 
(.06) 
.26*** 
(.02) 
.19*** 
(.02) 
PosPeace - .02 
(.03) 
- .01 
(.009) 
LowLevCon - .26*** 
(.04) 
- .07*** 
(.01) 
Rivalry - .89*** 
(.02) 
- .25*** 
(.007) 
Noncomp 
*PosPeace 
- -.89*** 
(.20) 
- -.21*** 
(.06) 
Noncomp 
*LowLevCon 
- 1.18*** 
(.30) 
- .19* 
(.08) 
Noncomp 
*Rivalry 
- 3.19*** 
(.18) 
- .57*** 
(.05) 
 r-squared - .01 
F-stat – 453.2 on 1 
and 30352DF, p-
value < 2.2e-16 
Signif. codes:  0 
‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 
0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ 
’ 1 
r-squared - .07 
F-stat – 106.9 on 9 and 
30434DF, p-value < 
2.2e-16 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 
0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 
‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
r-squared - .004 
F-stat – 133 on 1 and 
30442DF, p-value < 
2.2e-16 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 
0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 
‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
r-squared - .06 
F-stat – 249.8 on 8 and 
30352DF, p-value < 
2.2e-16 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 
0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 
‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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 An example illustrative of this result is the IAEA’s finding of non-compliance for North 
Korea in 1993.  Japan, coded as being in a relationship characterized by low-level conflict with 
North Korea (the .75 level of the peace scale), responded by threatening the imposition of 
economic sanctions.134  South Korea and the United States, by contrast, both engaged in rivalries 
with North Korea, responded by both imposing economic sanctions and threatening military 
attack. 
Umbrella Alliances 
 
 Entering into an umbrella alliance with a nuclear weapons state, while done primarily for 
security reasons, also can signal to other states that nuclear technology development is neither 
directly or indirectly weapons related.  The expectation is that positive response-years will be 
both less likely to occur and less hostile when they do.  Whether this logic holds when viewing 
them in the context of interstate relations is a question that has not been investigated.  The 
presented theoretical framework suggests that, when compared to states at the neutral baseline 
level (.5 on the peace scale), cooperative states are likely to adopt less hostile forms of response, 
whereas states on the conflictual side are likely to adopt more hostile forms of response. An 
investigation of this relationship is presented below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
134 Although they also carried through with the imposition of sanctions the following of year, concurrent with their 
move from being in a .75 relationship with North Korea to a 1.0. 
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The results presented in Table 7.5 indicate that, confirming the expectations of the logic 
underlying umbrella alliances, they are, in fact, likely to reduce the level of hostility of response-
years.  They also suggest that being in a nuclear umbrella alliance decreases the observed 
hostility of response-years for states whose relationships with potential proliferators are at the 
moderately conflictual or cooperative positions on the peace scale (when compared to the 
baseline .5 level).  This effect is even more pronounced for rivals, who are even less likely to 
adopt hostile forms of response than either of the aforementioned category.  This, along with the 
results presented in Chapter 5, suggests that umbrella alliances, more so than the other signals 
Table 7.5 – OLS Regression of Response Hostility 
(Negative Peace as Baseline) 
Response Hostility Index 
 
Categorical Hostility Index 
 Model I Model II Model I Model II 
 Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
(Intercept) .19*** 
(.009) 
.06*** 
(.010) 
.05*** 
(.002) 
.01*** 
(-.003) 
Umbrella -.14*** 
(.01) 
-.03* 
(.01) 
-.04*** 
(.003) 
-.007 . 
(.004) 
PluralComm - -.06 
(.06) 
- -.01 
(.02) 
PosPeace - .18** 
(.07) 
- .07*** 
(.02) 
LowLevCon - .33*** 
(.05) 
- .10*** 
(.01) 
Rivalry - 1.30*** 
(.03) 
- .37*** 
(.008) 
Umbrella 
*PluralComm 
- .03 
(.08) 
- .007 
(.02) 
Umbrella 
*PosPeace 
- -.21** 
(.08) 
- -.07*** 
(.02) 
Umbrella 
*LowLevCon 
- -.14 . 
(.08) 
- -.06** 
(.02) 
Umbrella 
*Rivalry 
- -1.01*** 
(.05) 
- -.31*** 
(.01) 
 r-squared - .0034 
F-stat – 104.5 on 1 and 
30352DF, p-value < 2.2e-
16 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 
0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 
0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
r-squared - .06 
F-stat – 222.9 on 9 and 
30418DF, p-value < 
2.2e-16 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 
0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 
‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
r-squared - .004 
F-stat – 133 on 1 and 
30442DF, p-value < 
2.2e-16 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 
0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 
‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
r-squared - .06 
F-stat – 236.4 on 9 and 
30418DF, p-value < 
2.2e-16 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 
0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 
‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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investigated thus far, speak directly to the threat perception dynamics underlying the given 
theoretical framework.  Again, such states may view these alliances as a comparatively stronger 
signal of proliferation intent, or the lack thereof, than, for example, membership in the NPT.   
Uranium Enrichment 
 The development or acquisition of the capability to produce weapons usable material, 
either by the enrichment of uranium or the production of separated/reprocessed plutonium is 
expected to not only increase the likelihood of positive response-years, but increase the hostility 
of responses, when compared to states that have no capability.  I argue, however, that this effect 
is conditioned by the characteristics of the relationship between proliferators and respondents.  
An investigation of whether relational context affects these results in similar ways as those 
signals discussed previously is thus presented: 
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The results presented in Table 7.6 suggest that the acquisition and/or possession of the capability 
to produce enriched uranium increases the hostility of response-years, when compared to 
response-years to states that have no such capability.  This effect is marginal (.08 on the Hostility 
Index scale and .02 on the Categorical Scale), but is statistically significant.  Analyzing the effect 
of being at various points along the peace scale provides somewhat mixed results.  For both 
operationalizations of hostility, the effect of being in a rivalry with a state that has attained or 
possesses the capability to produce enriched uranium is as expected, in that it increases the 
hostility of response-years.  States at the .75 level are similarly likely, albeit less so than for 
Table 7.6 – OLS Regression of Response Hostility 
(Negative Peace as Baseline) 
Response Hostility Index 
 
Categorical Hostility Index 
 Model I Model II Model I Model II 
 Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
(Intercept) .09*** 
(.008) 
.03*** 
(.008) 
.02*** 
(.002) 
.008*** 
(.002) 
Enrich .08*** 
(.01) 
.04** 
(.01) 
.02*** 
(.004) 
.010** 
(.004) 
PluralComm - -.03 
(.04) 
- -.008 
(.01) 
PosPeace - -.03 
(.04) 
- -.008 
(.01) 
LowLevCon - .26*** 
(.05) 
- .06*** 
(.01) 
Rivalry - .66*** 
(.03) 
- .17*** 
(.007) 
Enrich*PluralComm - -.04 
(.08) 
- -.010 
(.02) 
Enrich*PosPeace - .26** 
(.08) 
- .09*** 
(.02) 
Enrich*LowLevCon - .09 
(.09) 
- .06* 
(.02) 
Enrich*Rivalry - 2.05*** 
(.07) 
- .63*** 
(.02) 
 r-squared - .001 
F-stat – 32.57 and 
30442DF, p-value < 2.2e-
16 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 
0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 
‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
r-squared - .08 
F-stat – 293.7 on 9 and 
30434DF, p-value < 
2.2e-16 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 
0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 
0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
r-squared - .001 
F-stat – 43.81 on 1 and 
30442DF, p-value < 
2.2e-16 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 
0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 
0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
r-squared - .09 
F-stat – 325.5 on 9 and 
30434DF, p-value < 
2.2e-16 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 
0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 
0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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rivals, of adopting increasingly hostile forms of response.  Both of these results confirm the 
expectations of the theoretical framework.  States at the .25 level of the peace scale, however, are 
likely to adopt more hostile forms of response than those at the .5 level, a result found using both 
operationalizations.  This is a result in contradiction of what was expected by the interpretive 
bias framework.  It is unclear why these states would view such a capability in a statistically 
different way than states at the .5 level.  This points towards the need for further investigation. 
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Plutonium Separation 
   
 As expected, response-years for states that have attained or possess the capability to 
produce separated/reprocessed plutonium are generally more hostile than those where no such 
capability is possessed.  This result is consistent across both operationalizations of hostility.  
Investigating the effect of relational characteristics on this relationship shows that rivals, in 
particular, respond to the acquisition of such a capability in much more hostile ways than states 
at the .5 baseline level, a result consistent with the expectations of the theoretical framework.  
Also consistent with the expectations of the framework, states at the .25 Positive Peace level are 
Table 7.7 – OLS Regression of Response Hostility 
(Negative Peace as Baseline) 
Response Hostility Index 
 
Categorical Hostility Index 
 Model I Model II Model I Model II 
 Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
(Intercept) .07*** 
(.01) 
.03*** 
(.01) 
.02*** 
(.002) 
.01*** 
(.002) 
Separ .37*** 
(.02) 
.15*** 
(.02) 
.10*** 
(.01) 
.04*** 
(.01) 
PluralComm - -.03 
(.04) 
- -.01 
(.01) 
PosPeace - .03 
(.03) 
- .01 
(.01) 
LowLevCon - .31*** 
(.04) 
- .09*** 
(.01) 
Rivalry - .58*** 
(.03) 
- .15*** 
(.01) 
Separ* 
PluralComm 
- -.15 
(.12) 
- -.04 
(.03) 
Separ* 
PosPeace 
- -.22 . 
(.11) 
- -.06 . 
(.03) 
Separ* 
LowLevCon 
- -.20* 
(.10) 
- -.08** 
(.03) 
Separ* 
Rivalry 
- 2.32*** 
(.07) 
- .70*** 
(.02) 
 r-squared - .004 
F-stat – 133 on 1 and 
30442DF, p-value < 2.2e-
16 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 
0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 
0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
r-squared - .09 
F-stat – 357.9 on 9 and 
30434DF, p-value < 
2.2e-16 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 
0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 
‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
r-squared - .01 
F-stat – 361 on 1 and 
30442DF, p-value < 
2.2e-16 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 
0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 
‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
r-squared - .10 
F-stat – 391.9 on 9 and 
30434DF, p-value < 
2.2e-16 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 
0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 
‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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somewhat less likely to adopt hostile forms of response than those at the baseline .5 level (yet the 
results are only weakly significant for both operationalizations of hostility).  States at the .75 
level of the peace scale, conversely, seem to be marginally less likely to adopt less hostile forms 
of response than those at the baseline .5 level, a result inconsistent with previously described 
expectations.  It is unclear why states at this particular level of the peace scale, an example being 
Israel-Iran during the 1980s, respond in generally less hostile ways than those at the .5 level of 
the peace scale.  This suggests that further investigation is required. 
Reactor Strength 
 
 The expected relationship between reactor strength and the hostility of response-years is 
that the more conducive to the sustainment of a nuclear weapons-production program is, the 
more states should be willing to incur the costs associated with the more hostile forms of 
response identified in Chapter 4.  This relationship, however, may be affected by bias informed 
by the relationship between the reactor possessing state and potential respondents.  It is expected 
that, when compared to states at the .5 baseline level, states on the cooperative/peaceful side of 
the peace scale are likely to adopt less hostile forms of response, whereas those on the conflictual 
side should adopt more hostile forms of response.  An investigation of these expectations is 
presented in Table 7.8. 
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The results indicate that, although statistically significant, how conducive a country’s most 
conducive reactor is to supporting a nuclear weapons production program only leads to a 
marginal increase in the hostility of responses.  This would suggest that reactor form and 
function is only a weak signal of proliferation intent/capability, when considering how states in 
general view their relevance.  The results of incorporating relational context, however, suggests 
that, although this is the case for the majority of states, rivals do, in fact, view it as at least a 
moderate indication of proliferation intent/capability.  This is evidenced by an increase in the 
general hostility of responses adopted by these states, corresponding to increases in reactor signal 
Table 7.8 – OLS Regression of Response Hostility 
(Negative Peace as Baseline) 
Response Hostility Index 
 
Categorical Hostility Index 
 Model I Model II Model I Model II 
 Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
(Intercept) -.19*** 
(.03) 
-.08** 
(.03) 
-.05*** 
(.01) 
-.02* 
(.01) 
Reactor .05*** 
(.004) 
.02*** 
(.004) 
.01*** 
(.001) 
.004*** 
(.001) 
PluralComm - .08 
(.18) 
- .02 
(.05) 
PosPeace - -.03 
(.16) 
- -.02 
(.04) 
LowLevCon - .04 
(.17) 
- .03 
(.05) 
Rivalry - -1.68*** 
(.10) 
- -.53*** 
(.03) 
Reactor 
*PluralComm 
- -.02 
(.03) 
- -.004 
(.007) 
Reactor 
*PosPeace 
- .009 
(.03) 
- .005 
(.007) 
Reactor 
*LowLevCon 
- .04 
(.02) 
- .007 
(.007) 
Reactor 
*Rivalry 
- .42*** 
(.01) 
- .13*** 
(.004) 
 r-squared - .004 
F-stat – 125.5 on 1 and 
30442DF, p-value < 2.2e-
16 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 
0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 
0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
r-squared - .08 
F-stat – 285.2 on 9 and 
30434DF, p-value < 
2.2e-16 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 
0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 
‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
r-squared - .004 
F-stat – 133 on 1 and 
30442DF, p-value < 
2.2e-16 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 
0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 
‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
r-squared - .08 
F-stat – 305.2 on 9 and 
30434DF, p-value < 
2.2e-16 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 
0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 
‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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strength.  Perhaps the best example of this would be Israel’s destruction of Syria’s al-Kibar 
reactor in 2007, whose design, expected operational capacity, and purpose made it highly 
conducive to the production of weapons-usable material. 
Conclusion 
  The results of the analysis presented in this Chapter largely confirm the expectations of 
theoretical framework.  For the majority of signals, relational context does have an effect, in that 
there are measurable differences in how states at various positions on the peace scale respond to 
the same information.  Rivals, in particular, are consistently likely to respond in more hostile 
ways than states at other levels of the peace scale, regardless of the strength of the signal 
produced by the proliferating state.  There are a few exceptions, such as the acquisition of 
uranium enrichment technologies, which do not conform to expectations.  These exceptions 
suggest avenues for further investigation. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
 What effect do political and technical signals have on both the likelihood of the 
occurrence and hostility of responses to the development of nuclear weapons-related technology?  
Those that are intended to signal compliance with the norm of non-proliferation, such as signing 
and ratifying the NPT, should have the effect of reducing the likelihood that other states will 
view their development of nuclear technologies as being either directly or indirectly weapons-
related.  This should, in turn, decrease the likelihood that other states will view their activities as 
threatening and be less likely to act, in some way, to prevent or deter future development (what I 
generally refer to as a response).  This should also make the responses that do occur less hostile.  
Investigating the veracity of this relationship for each of the signals presented herein produces 
the following results (shown in Table 8.1) 
Table 8.1 – Effect of Proliferation Signals135 
Signal 
Occurrence of Positive  
Response-Years 
Hostility of  
Response-Years 
Expected  
Effect 
Actual  
Effect 
Expected  
Effect 
Actual Effect 
NPT ê ê ê ê 
CSA ê - ê - 
NWFZ ê ê ê ê 
IAEA 
Noncompliance 
é é é é 
Umbrella Alliance ê ê ê ê 
U Enrichment é é é é 
Pu Separation é é é é 
Reactor Strength é é é é 
 
With the exception of IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, which results 
indicate have no independent effect on either the likelihood of occurrence or hostility of positive 
response-years, each of the signals investigated herein conform to expectations.  It is misleading, 
however, to accept these results without further investigation.  More specifically, I argue that the 
                                                
135 (-)s denote results that did not reach statistical significance, (ê)s denote an expected decrease compared to the 
baseline level, (é)s denote an expected increase compared to the baseline level 
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effect of each of these signals is conditioned by the characteristics of the relationship between 
the nuclear technology developing and/or possessing state and any potential respondent.  This is 
because the information with which states make decisions about both whether and how to 
respond to proliferation-related activities is subject to interpretive bias informed by the nature of 
their historical interactions with the suspected proliferator.  This should be evidenced by a 
systematic increase in both the likelihood and hostility of responses by states with more 
historically conflictual interactions with potential proliferators, when compared to states with 
more neutral historical interactions, and a systematic decrease for those states with a history of 
more cooperative/peaceful relations.  An investigation of this relationship produced the 
following results (shown in Table 8.2). 
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Table 8.2 – Effect of Relational Context on Proliferation Signals136 
Signal 
Peace Scale 
Level 
Occurrence of Positive 
Response-Years 
Hostility of Response-
Years 
Expected Effect Actual Effect Expected 
Effect 
Actual 
Effect 
Compared to .5 Baseline Level 
NPT 
Plural Comm. êê - êê - 
Pos. Peace ê - ê - 
Neg. Peace é é é - 
Rivalry éé éé éé é 
CSA 
Plural Comm. êê - êê - 
Pos. Peace ê - ê - 
Neg. Peace é é é - 
Rivalry éé éé éé é 
NWFZ 
Plural Comm. êê - êê - 
Pos. Peace ê é ê é 
Neg. Peace é é é é 
Rivalry éé - é ê 
IAEA 
Noncompliance 
Plural Comm. êê - êê - 
Pos. Peace ê - ê ê 
Neg. Peace é é é é 
Rivalry éé éé éé éé 
Umbrella 
Alliance 
Plural Comm. êê - ê - 
Pos. Peace ê - ê ê 
Neg. Peace é - é ê 
Rivalry éé ê éé ê 
U Enrichment 
Plural Comm. êê - ê - 
Pos. Peace ê - ê é 
Neg. Peace é - é é 
Rivalry éé é éé éé 
Pu Separation 
Plural Comm. êê - êê - 
Pos. Peace ê - ê ê 
Neg. Peace é ê é ê 
Rivalry éé - éé é 
Reactor Strength 
Plural Comm. êê - êê - 
Pos. Peace ê - ê - 
Neg. Peace é ê é - 
Rivalry éé ê éé é 
 
Taken as a whole, the results presented above confirm the expectations of the interpretive bias 
framework, at least as it relates to states on the conflictual side of the peace scale (at the .75 and 
1.0 levels) and particularly those classified as rivals (the 1.0 level).  There are a few notable 
                                                
136 (-)s denote results that did not reach statistical significance 
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exceptions where the behavior of states on the conflictual side of the peace scale does not 
conform to expectations.  First, states on the conflictual side of the peace scale seem to view 
umbrella alliances as stronger indications of what might be called proliferation non-intent (i.e. a 
signal that suggests that a state does not want nuclear weapons, rather than compliance with a 
norm), than states at the baseline .5 level.  As discussed previously, this may be because states 
view such agreements as stronger signals than, for example, the ratification of the NPT.  Second, 
rivals also seem to be less concerned about the conduciveness of nuclear reactors than states at 
the baseline level, at least as it relates to the likelihood of the occurrence of a response. They are, 
however, likely to adopt more hostile forms of response if and when they do respond than those 
at the baseline level.    
 States on the cooperative/peaceful side of the peace scale, which are identified as those 
either in Pluralistic Security Communities or Positive Peace relationships with nuclear 
technology developing/possessing states (the 0.0 and .25 levels, respectively), by contrast, do not 
conform to the expectations of the presented theoretical framework.  In most cases, they respond 
both with the same frequency and at similar levels of hostility as those at the .5 baseline level.  
There are a few notable exceptions to this general result, however.  The first concerns findings of 
non-compliance by the IAEA.  Perhaps one of the clearest signals of proliferation intent, a 
finding of the IAEA is generally viewed as a definitive indicator that proliferation is occurring or 
has occurred.  The expectation is that, even in the presence of such a definitive signal of intent, 
states on the cooperative side of the peace scale are much less likely to respond than those either 
at the baseline .5 level or on the conflictual side of the scale.  This is, I argue, because such states 
are more likely to view such a finding as either not definitive enough to warrant a response or, 
even if a weapons production capability is being acquired, not a direct threat to them.  This 
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should be evidenced by a decreased likelihood of both the occurrence of responses and the 
hostility of responses if and when they do occur.  Although statistical analysis indicates that 
states on the cooperative/peaceful side of the peace scale are just as likely to respond to findings 
of non-compliance as those at the baseline .5 level, they are likely to adopt less hostile forms of 
response to such a finding, thus suggesting that there is a difference in perception between the 
two categories of states. 
The systematic lack of evidence of the type of bias seen by states on the conflictual side 
of the peace scale predicted by the interpretive bias theory suggests a number of possible 
conclusions, each of which may be characterized as being either methodological or theoretical.  
For the former, the comparatively small number of cases of states being in either pluralistic 
security communities or Positive Peace relationships with nuclear-technology 
developing/possessing states may be introducing bias into the estimates of their effects.  Even 
after employing a number of methodological approaches designed to address the potential 
problem of case asymmetry, however, the results are found to be largely consistent.  This 
suggests that the theoretical framework may be incorrectly predicting similar or what might be 
more accurately described as symmetrical results for states on the cooperative side of the peace 
scale as those on the conflictual side (albeit in the opposite direction).  
Instead of the approximately linear relationship between the perception of threat and the 
likelihood and hostility of responses assumed in Chapter 3, it may be that states on the 
conflictual side of the peace scale are much more likely to over-estimate the level of threat of 
another state’s activities than cooperative states are to under-estimate the level of threat of those 
same or similar activities.  This would lead to different expectations not of the direction of the 
effect of the bias on the interpretation of proliferation signals, but on their magnitude.  This 
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would suggest a future focus not on whether bias exists, but to what extent bias affects the 
responses adopted by states at the various positions on the peace scale, taking into consideration 
that the magnitude of the effect may be much smaller for states on the cooperative side of the 
peace scale than for those on the conflictual side.  
Implications for the Study of Nuclear Proliferation 
 The theory presented in this dissertation and the results of an investigation of its 
expectations have a number of implications for the study of nuclear proliferation.  Theory-
making/building in the nuclear proliferation literature has often focused on extrapolating the 
logic of the possession of nuclear weapons to its development; applicability of deterrence logic 
for high latency states is but one often discussed example.  What work does exist on the 
proliferation phase focuses almost exclusively on the factors that may lead states to engage in the 
development of nuclear weapons.137  Yet, this approach largely ignores the fact that the 
development of nuclear technologies that may be weapons-related is both a unique political 
phenomenon and has possible causes and consequences independent of the actual possession of 
nuclear weapons.  The uncertainty at the core of the presented theoretical framework, while 
perhaps analogous to aspects of the consequences of nuclear weapons possession, gives rise to 
unique interstate dynamics and assumptions that may, and have for this dissertation, produce 
different expectations about behavior, than if no such uncertainty were to exist (as is largely the 
case for the possession stage).   
 Also somewhat unique in the study of the consequences of nuclear proliferation is the 
focus not on specific forms of response, but the entirety of the possible responses that states may 
adopt when choosing to respond to proliferation-related activities and/or behavior.  This reflects 
                                                
137 The non-proliferation literature largely mirrors this focus, paying almost exclusive attention to the question of 
why states will not develop nuclear weapons.   
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the assumption made herein that responses are largely “substitutable,” in that they are all 
intended to accomplish the same goal:  threat reduction.  Although I believe that this assumption 
is valid in the majority of cases, it is conceivable that there may exceptions to this rule.  One 
could envisage a scenario wherein a state chooses to respond to a nuclear technology 
developing/possessing state that they really do not believe will actually carry through with the 
development of nuclear weapons, not to reduce the threat of their development, but to signal to 
other states, whose threat of development may either be more credible or perceived as more of a 
threat to the responding state, that a similar response may be adopted against them.  For such 
motivations, whether the logic of the presented framework remains applicable is unknown, or at 
least not explicitly investigated. 
Implications for International Relations Research 
 The applicability of the interpretive bias framework extends to other facets of 
international relations besides nuclear proliferation.  In virtually any context wherein there exists 
some level of uncertainty as to another state’s intentions (whether it be in trade policy, 
negotiations, or support of international or multi-lateral treaties) or capabilities (whether they be 
economic, military, etc.), there exists the possibility of the effect of interpretive bias.  This is 
especially true in cases involving the perception of threat; which, again, can take a number of 
forms (economic, military, cultural, etc.).  A state may, for example, misjudge another states’ 
intentions regarding the possibility of the imposition of trade barriers because they viewed the 
information they received within the context of their particular relationship.  This may, at least in 
part, lead to the adoption of different behaviors than if no such preconceived notions existed.   
 The possibility that interpretive bias may affect decision-making extends beyond the 
traditional focus by international relations scholars on the behavior of states.  It potentially 
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impacts the decision-making processes of actors in many different contexts and at many different 
levels of analysis.  It is conceivable that organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund 
or World Bank, as examples, may be biased in their interpretation of information regarding the 
intentions of states to repay loans based on their previous interactions and arrive at a different 
conclusion regarding whether to provide support or the terms of the support agreement than if 
their past interactions taken a different form.   
Implications for Policy-Makers 
 One of the principle goals of this project is to better reflect the realities of the policy-
making process, as it relates to nuclear proliferation, than what is often found in the literature.  
This is done, in large part, to better inform policy-making on the subject.  Ideally, the results of 
this dissertation would shed light on the potential consequences of the development/possession 
of nuclear weapons-related technologies by states under different circumstances, i.e. whether 
they are or are not party to the NPT, the type of technologies being developed, etc., beyond the 
often-cited concern of falling nuclear dominos.  Numerous scholars, including Hymans (2012) 
and Montgomery and Sagan (2009), have both argued and demonstrated empirically that 
responsive proliferation is both an incredibly rare phenomenon and much less of a concern than 
it is often portrayed or feared to be, but this research has largely treated all possible dominos 
equivalently.  That rivals are both more likely to overestimate the level of threat of the nuclear-
related activities of their neighbors and more likely to adopt hostile forms of response should be 
a bigger concern to policy-makers than the possibility of but one of a range of possible forms of 
response; many of which, including the imposition of harsh economic sanctions or the conduct of 
military strikes, can have major internal and external ramifications. 
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From the perspective of potential nuclear technology developing/possessing states, the 
result that states are less likely to respond to the development/possession of nuclear weapons-
related technologies by states that are members of the NPT suggests that treaty accession is 
advisable for states, if avoiding responses by other states is a concern.  States should consider, 
however, the result that rivals are still likely to respond to the development/possession of nuclear 
technologies, even when NPT membership is taken into consideration.  Furthermore, that states 
on the cooperative/peaceful side of the peace scale respond with the same frequency and hostility 
as those at the .5 baseline level, even for states party to the NPT or under CSAs, suggests that 
even allies might view a state’s development of nuclear technologies as a cause for concern, even 
if said state has signaled its compliance with the non-proliferation norm.   
The results of the presented analysis also suggest that states should consider carefully the 
possible ramifications of entering into CSA agreements.  First, the results indicate that being 
party to such agreements does not reduce either the likelihood or hostility of responses beyond 
what is gained from being party to the NPT.  Entering into such agreements, does, however, 
bring the possibility of being found in non-compliance about.  The results definitively show that 
virtually all states view non-compliance as one of the strongest and clearest signals of 
proliferation intent.  Rivals, in particular, who are already more likely to respond in hostile ways 
than states at other levels of the peace scale, are likely to view such a finding as justification for 
action.   
Although the additive effect of being party to Additional Protocols (AP) agreements 
cannot be determined using statistical methods, the non-existence of cases where states have 
responded to the development and/or possession of nuclear technologies by states party to such 
agreements suggests that they may be the clearest signal that states can send regarding their 
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compliance with the non-proliferation norm.  This supports the IAEA’s contention that, because 
they are the only piece of the non-proliferation treaty regime that imposes universally enforced 
verification mechanisms on states, the widespread adoption of AP agreements is a necessary step 
in preventing new cases of nuclear proliferation.  
Directions for Future Research 
This dissertation, although an important contribution to the literature in and of itself, is 
subject to both extension and refinement.  Furthermore it is but a first step in a bigger research 
program.  One of the primary questions that this dissertation does not address, but certainly is 
important to answer, is why states would choose one form of response over another.  Why is it, 
for example, that Israel chose to launch cyber-attacks against Iranian nuclear facilities in 2011, 
but launched a conventional attack against Iraq in 1981?  That they did not launch cyber-attacks 
against Iraq is perhaps no surprise, but why not launch conventional attacks against Iran?  It is 
likely that there exist factors that determine why states adopt one form of response over another 
for given situations, but thus far no research has been conducted on this question.   
Identifying these factors is important to developing an understanding of the composition 
of each individual state’s “response toolkit.”  In Chapter 5, I briefly discussed that this 
dissertation gives each and every state the same opportunity(ies) to respond in all of the different 
ways that states can respond identified in Chapter 4.  This decision is largely methodologically 
driven.  The reality is that there may be some responses that are simply unavailable to certain 
states, or other responses that may be more or less likely for some states than others.  Future 
research on this subject will seek to develop an understanding of the factors that both inform the 
composition of a particular state’s response toolkit, which will then provide a launching point to 
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investigate the factors that condition the choice of response of the available options in said 
toolkit. 
Another avenue for further investigation is whether there exist either temporal or spatial 
variations in the processes discussed herein.  Although developing a general theoretical 
framework and testing said framework systematically is a necessary step in developing a 
comprehensive understanding of this phenomenon, it is equally important to investigate whether 
the effects described herein are either temporally or spatially contingent.  For example, one such 
question might be whether responses to the development/possession of nuclear technologies 
prior to the institution of the NPT in 1969 differ from those adopted afterwards.  Obviously, 
states could not signal their compliance with the norm of non-proliferation prior to the creation 
of the NPT in the same way.  Perhaps this inability had an effect on how states perceived nuclear 
technologies prior to this point in history.  There may also be differences in how states view the 
development of nuclear technologies in the Middle East, versus how they perceive similar 
development in Latin America.  Future research will thus endeavor to address these questions, 
using both comparative small-n quantitative methods and qualitative case studies. 
One of the primary assumptions of this dissertation is that states, as singular entities, 
make decisions regarding both whether and how to respond to proliferation.  It assumes that the 
interpretive bias present in the decision-making process affects all decision-makers equally, and 
is thus reflected in the choices states ultimately make.  This assumption is made largely for the 
sake of theorization and consistent with much of the literature in international relations, rather 
than a judgment that differences in domestic perceptions may have an effect on both whether and 
to what extent the bias discussed herein affects the behavior of states.  It is likely, in fact, that 
such variations exist.  As such, a logical extension of this dissertation is to investigate these 
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differences, seeking to determine, for example, if the size and composition of the foreign policy 
decision-making apparatuses of states affect the extent to which they are affected by interpretive 
bias. 
  Two final avenues for future research that build directly from this dissertation are 
whether there exists differences in how states and organizations view each other’s role in 
detecting, deterring, and/or preventing proliferation, and whether there exist differences in 
perception between individuals in different political contexts as to whether the development of 
nuclear weapons-related technologies should be prevented or deterred.  For the former, I intend 
to investigate whether there exist differences in perception between, for example, individuals at 
the CTBTO and those in the US intelligence community as to each other’s role in detecting the 
conduct of nuclear tests.  One such question would be whether individuals at the CTBTO view 
their organization as supplementary to, complimentary to, or independent of national technical 
means, and contrast these results with similar questions posed to US policy-makers.  For the 
latter,  I am interested in investigating whether their exists, for example, differences in elite 
versus public perceptions of the role of states, such as the U.S., in the prevention or deterrence of 
the development of nuclear weapons-related technologies, and under what circumstances would 
public support for the more hostile actions identified herein coalesce, compared with 
circumstances wherein no such support might be found. 
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Appendix A: Coding Rules and Data Sources for Responses to Proliferation 
 
Nuclear Preemptive or Preventative Attack (or Threat of Attack) 
 According to Fuhrmann and Kreps (2012) and Kreps and Fuhrmann (2012), although 
there have been no recorded instances of nuclear preemption, there are recorded instances 
where states considered using nuclear, when a small number of individuals within the US 
defense community publicly advocated the use of tactical nuclear strikes against Chinese 
nuclear facilities in 1963.  Similarly, they also point out that, although many historians have 
suggested that the United States seriously considered nuclear preemption against Soviet 
weapons facilities in the 1946-1949 timeframe, there is no archival evidence suggesting such 
discussions actually occurred.  Thus, consistent with their coding, I do not record any instance 
of the use, or even the legitimate threat of use of nuclear weapons in a preemptive or 
preventative fashion. 
Responsive Proliferation 
 I define responsive proliferation as the initiation or continuation of a program directly or 
indirectly intended to produce nuclear weapons or the capability to produce nuclear weapons.  
Identifying cases of responsive proliferation therefore rests largely on the ability to attribute, to 
some extent, either the initiation or continuation of a nuclear weapons program to the perceived 
threat of a target state’s proliferation-related activities or behavior.  Thus, for response-years 
where archival evidence suggests that a nuclear weapons program was either initiated or 
purposefully continued in response to another state’s nuclear proliferation-related activities or 
behavior, I code the variable responsive proliferation as 1.  For years where no such response 
occurred, or could be reliably attributed based on archival evidence, I code a 0.  I measure 
program initiation and continuation based data obtained from Singh and Way (2004), Gartzke 
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and Jo (2007), Montgomery (2012), Sagan (2012), Montgomery and Sagan (2009), and Bleek 
(2013), supplemented with data compiled from the narratives presented on both www.nti.org, 
www.world-nuclear.org, and the Atomic History Project at the National Security Archives, 
which can be accessed at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/.  The list of states that 
initiated or purposefully continued a nuclear weapons development programs in response to 
another state’s nuclear proliferation-related activities or behavior is shown below, in Table 
A.1.138 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
138 Excluding those, like the Soviet Union, who begin to develop a nuclear program as a response to the actual 
development of nuclear weapons by other states. 
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Table A.1: States That Have Engaged in Responsive Proliferation 
Responding State Target State Program Initiated or 
Resumed 
Program Paused or 
Concluded 
Argentina Brazil 1978 1990 
Brazil Argentina 1978 1990 
Sweden USSR 1946 1949 
Italy France 1957 1958 
Egypt Israel 1960 1967 
India China 1964 1964 
India Pakistan 1972 1998 
Iran Iraq 1975 1978 
Iran Iraq 1984 1989 
Iraq Iran 1974 1989 
Pakistan India 1972 1998 
 
Conventional Military Attack/Unconventional Attack/Threat of Attack 
For military attacks, I employ the coding rules found in Fuhrmann and Kreps (2012), 
with each response-year where an attack was launched against a target’s nuclear facility(ies) 
being coded as 1.  Response-years where no such attack was carried out is coded as 0.  This is 
supplemented by data on unconventional attacks, such as cyber attacks on nuclear facilities or 
assassinations on nuclear scientists, obtained from archival research using Lexis Nexis Academic 
Universe, which are coded in a similar manner to conventional attacks (1 for attack, 0 for no 
known attack). 
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Table A.2: Instances of Conventional Attack Against Nuclear 
Facilities 
Attacking State Target State Year of Attack 
Iran Iraq 1980 
Iraq Iran 1984 
Iraq Iran 1985 
Iraq Iran 1986 
Iraq Iran 1987 
Iraq Iran 1988 
Israel Syria 2007 
Israel Iraq 1981 
United Kingdom Iraq 1998 
USA Iraq 1991 
 
 
Table A.3: Instances of Unconventional Attack Against Nuclear 
Facilities 
Attacking State Target State Year of Attack 
Iran Iraq 1980 
Iraq Iran 1984 
Iraq Iran 1985 
Iraq Iran 1986 
Iraq Iran 1987 
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Table A.4: Threat of Conventional Attack Against Nuclear 
Facilities 
Attacking State Target State Year of Threat 
Iran Iraq 1980 
Iraq Iran 1984 
Iraq Iran 1985 
Iraq Iran 1986 
Iraq Iran 1987 
 
Imposition of Economic Sanctions/Threat of Sanctions 
 For both the imposition and the threat of the imposition of economic sanctions, I use data 
from Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott (2009) and the Threat or Imposition of Economic Sanctions 
(TIES) dataset (Bapat, Heinrich, Kobayashi, and Morgan, 2013).  As I am interested in years in 
which sanctions were either initiated or purposefully ongoing, rather than whether sanctions 
escalate in their breadth or harshness, I therefore code a 1 for every year where a sanctions was 
either imposed or continued, recognizing that these observations may not necessarily be 
independent of each other and 0 for every years where no sanctions where in effect.  This 
produces the following list of sanction events. 
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Table A.5: Instances of the Imposition of Economic Sanctions 
Attacking State Target State Year of Imposition Year Sanctions Removed 
China Japan 1987 1988 
China Iraq 1992 1992 
Egypt Israel 1952 1957 
Egypt France 1960 1961 
France Iraq 1992 1992 
France North Korea 2003 2006 
Ghana France 1960 1962 
Germany North Korea 2002 2006 
Japan France 1960 1961 
Japan North Korea 1991 1994 
Japan North Korea 2002 2006 
Nigeria France 1960 1961 
South Korea North Korea 1991 1994 
South Korea North Korea 2002 2006 
USSR German Federal Republic 1966 1969 
United Kingdom USSR 1947 1949 
USSR Iraq 1992 1992 
United Kingdom Pakistan 1974 1981 
United Kingdom India 1974 1976 
United Kingdom Iraq 1992 1992 
United Kingdom North Korea 2002 2006 
USA USSR 1947 1949 
USA Pakistan 1974 1980 
USA Argentina 1977 1978 
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Table A.5 cont. 
USA Brazil 1978 1981 
USA India 1974 1982 
USA Iran 1983 2007 
USA Iraq 1980 1992 
USA Libya 1980 2004 
USA North Korea 1991 1994 
USA North Korea 2001 2006 
USA USSR 1947 1949 
USA South Africa 1975 1991 
USA Taiwan 1976 1977 
USA Ukraine 2002 2003 
 
Table A.6: Instances of the Threat of Economic Sanctions 
Threatening State Target State Year of Threat 
USA South Korea 1975 
USA South Korea 1976 
USA Pakistan 1988 
USA Pakistan 1989 
United Kingdom South Korea 1975 
United Kingdom South Korea 1975 
 
Chargé d'affaires  
For a chargé d'affaires, which is the cessation of formal diplomatic ties between two 
states, I use data from the Correlates of War dataset on Diplomatic Exchanges (v2006.1).  As the 
COW dataset is only available up to 2006, and is formatted in five-year increments, I supplement 
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using archival research from Lexis Nexis Academic Universe.  There are no known instances of 
this form of response. 
Démarche 
 A démarche is a formal protest pronounced by one state against another state’s activities.  
I identify cases of the issuance of demarches using archival research.  Sources consulted include 
http://www.nti.org, http://www.atomicarchive.com, and the national security archive 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/.  The following cases are thus identified. 
Table A.7: Instances of the Issuance of Demarches 
Threatening State Target State Year of Threat 
USA Taiwan 1976 
USA Taiwan 1977 
USA Taiwan 1978 
USA Algeria 1992 
 
Umbrella Alliance 
 A nuclear umbrella alliance, also often referred to as a positive security assurance, is an 
alliance between two states whereby one state, the mentor, extends their nuclear deterrence 
capability over the other, the protégé.  I employ the data and coding rules presented in Rapp-
Hooper (2009).  For states who entered into such agreements in direct response to another state’s 
nuclear proliferation-related activities or behavior, I code a 1 for the response-year.  Alternately, 
if a state entered into no such alliance in a given year, if they were already under a nuclear 
umbrella, or if the entrance into such an alliance could not be attributed to the target state, I code 
a 0 for the response year.  There are no known instances where a state either offered or entered 
into such a relationship in response to the proliferation-related activities and/or behavior of 
169 
 
another state.  All nuclear umbrella alliances on record were formed in response to the testing 
and/or possession of actual nuclear weapons.  As such, they are excluded from this analysis. 
Conventional Alliance 
 For conventional alliance formation, I use data from the Correlates of War dataset 
(Alliances v4.1).  For years where a conventional alliance was formed that is at least partially 
attributable to the nuclear proliferation-related activities or behavior of a target, I code a 1.  
Otherwise, I code a 0.  There are no recorded instances of such a response.   
Conventional Arms Increase  
 For conventional arms increases, I used data obtained from the Correlates of War project 
(military expenditures).  As I am primarily interested in responses that could be considered 
“arms racing behavior,” I restrict my coding of the occurrence of a significant increase in 
military capabilities to those that are at least partially attributable to a target’s proliferation-
related activities and are at least 8% higher than the previous year, which is consistent with 
previous academic work on the subject (eg. Rider et al 2009).  For years in which this occurred, 
and all subsequent years in which spending was sustained at this level or increased, I code a 1.  
Otherwise, I code a zero.  There are no known instances where this occurred in the 1943-2007 
timespan. 
Trade Reduction 
 For a reduction in trade volume, I use data from the Correlates of War dataset on 
International Trade (v3.0).  To distinguish a marked reduction in trade from normal ebbs and 
flows of trade relations between states, I code a 1 only for those years where there was at least a 
10% reduction in the overall volume of trade between a sender and a target that was at least 
partially attributable, based on archival research, to the target’s nuclear proliferation-related 
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activities or behavior.  For the time frame under analysis, 1945-2007, there are no recorded 
instances of a purposeful reduction in trade volume as a response to the proliferation-related 
activities or behavior of another state.  Several examples exist more recently, including the 
reductions adopted by UAE, Qatar, and Jordan against Iranian nuclear activities (2012 & 2013), 
but as these are outside of the timeframe of the present investigation, they are excluded from the 
dataset. 
Initiation of or Participation in Negotiations 
 For the initiation of or participation in negotiations with the target state, I use data 
obtained from archival research using Lexis Nexis Academic Universe.  For years where 
negotiations were initiated, I code a 1.  For years where no negotiations were initiated, I code a 0.  
Alternately, I code years where negotiations were ongoing as a 1, and years where no 
negotiations occurred as a 0.     
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Table A.8: Proliferation-related Negotiations 
Side A Side B 
(Proliferator) 
Years of Negotiation 
Participation 
USA Israel 1964-1968 
USA South Korea 1972-1974 
USA Taiwan 1973-1975 
USA South Africa 1977 
USA North Korea 1991-1993, 2002-2006 
France South Africa 1977 
Russia North Korea 2002-2006 
China North Korea 2002-2006 
South Korea North Korea 2000, 2002-2006 
Japan North Korea 2002-2006 
USA Algeria 1992 
 
Offer of Incentives  
 An offer of incentives, independent of formal negotiations, has only occurred twice in the 
1945-2007 timeframe.  The United States offered incentives to South Korea in 1974 to halt the 
acquisition/development of Uranium enrichment technologies and to North Korea in 1994 to 
freeze their development of weapons-usable plutonium.  I thus record a 1 for these two isolated 
instances, and 0 for all other years. 
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Appendix B: Summary Statistics 
Table B.1 – Signals and % of Occurrence in Positive Response Years 
(375 Recorded Positive Response Years) 
NPT CSA AP NWFZ Noncomp Umbrella Enrich Separ 
38.67% 26.4% 0% .05% 15.20% 22.67% 41.01% 43.73% 
 
Table B.2 – Signals and Response Hostility Index Years (Crosstabs) 
 
 Level 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
NPT Membership Yes 7820 0 8 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 49 2 3 
 No 2882 0 15 0 0 0 0 2 5 0 59 0 77 
Comprehensive Safeguards Yes 7558 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 21 2 3 
 No 3144 0 23 0 0 0 0 4 6 0 87 0 77 
Additional Protocols Yes 2602 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 No 8100 0 23 0 0 0 0 4 6 0 108 2 80 
Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Yes 687 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 
 No 10015 0 23 0 0 0 0 4 6 0 108 2 71 
Nuclear Umbrella Yes 7974 0 17 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 52 0 1 
 No 2728 0 6 0 0 0 0 2 5 0 56 2 79 
IAEA Non-Compliance Yes 95 0 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 44 1 0 
 No 10607 0 12 0 0 0 0 4 6 0 64 1 80 
Uranium Enrichment Yes 9444 0 9 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 63 2 73 
 No 1274 0 14 0 0 0 0 2 4 0 45 0 7 
Plutonium Separation Yes 3398 0 19 0 0 0 0 4 5 0 78 0 55 
 No 7320 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 30 2 25 
 
 
Table B.3 – Signals and Categorical Response Hostility Index Years (Crosstabs) 
 
  Level 
  0 1 2 3 4 
NPT Membership Yes 20379 9 104 6 26 
 No 9716 16 87 6 95 
Comprehensive Safeguards Yes 15719 0 70 3 26 
 No 14376 25 121 9 95 
Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Yes 3555 0 4 0 13 
 No 26540 25 187 12 108 
Nuclear Umbrella Yes 15505 17 63 2 3 
 No 14574 8 128 10 118 
IAEA Non-Compliance Yes 307 11 45 1 0 
 No 29773 14 146 11 121 
Uranium Enrichment Yes 9444 9 65 4 76 
 No 20651 16 126 8 45 
Plutonium Separation Yes 3398 19 82 5 58 
 No 26697 6 109 7 63 
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Appendix C: Robustness Checks 
  
Membership in the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 
Table C.1 – Logistic Regression of Responses to Proliferation 
(All Categories, Negative Peace as Baseline) 
  Model I Model II Model III 
  Coeff. (Std. Error) Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
(Intercept)  -3.86*** 
(.007) 
-4.32*** 
(.010) 
-4.81*** 
(.11) 
NPT  -1.08*** 
(.11) 
-2.03*** 
(.21) 
-2.95*** 
(.22) 
Plural. Comm.  - 1.64e+06 
(1.10e+03) 
1.64e+06 
(1.10e+03) 
Pos. Peace  - .03* 
(.46) 
.47 
(.47) 
Low Lev. Con.  - .84** 
(.32) 
1.19* 
(.33) 
Rivalry  - 1.93*** 
(.15) 
2.28*** 
(.16) 
N.S.G.  - - .16 
(2.53) 
N.P.D.I.  - - .16*** 
(.25) 
NPT*PluralCom  - -146e+06 
(1.15e+03) 
-1.47e+06 
(1.15e+03) 
NPT*PosPeace  - 2.10e+05 
(3.93e+02) 
1.97e+05 
(3.80e+02) 
NPT*LowLevCon  - 2.15*** 
(.47) 
1.96*** 
(.48) 
NPT*Rivalry  - 2.26*** 
(.26) 
2.48*** 
(.26) 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
174 
 
Table C.2 – Logistic Regression of Responses to Proliferation 
(Collapsed Categories as Baseline) 
  Model I Model II Model III 
  Coeff. (Std. Error) Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
(Intercept)  -3.86*** 
(.007) 
-4.33*** 
(.10) 
-4.80*** 
(.11) 
NPT  -1.08*** 
(.11) 
-2.11*** 
(.21) 
-3.08*** 
(.22) 
Low Lev. Con.  - .84* 
(.32) 
1.18* 
(.33) 
Rivalry  - 1.93*** 
(.15) 
2.28*** 
(.16) 
N.S.G.  - - 2.05*** 
(.13) 
N.P.D.I.  - - .17 
(.25) 
NPT*LowLevCon  - 2.24*** 
(.47) 
2.09*** 
(.48) 
NPT*Rivalry  - 2.35*** 
(.26) 
2.61*** 
(.26) 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements 
Table C.3 – Logistic Regression of Responses to Proliferation 
(All Categories, Negative Peace as Baseline) 
  Model I Model II Model III 
  Coeff. (Std. Error) Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
(Intercept)  -3.86** 
(.007) 
-4.37 
(.01) 
-4.86 
(.11) 
NPT  -.74*** 
(.16) 
-.51* 
(.16) 
-1.56*** 
(.18) 
CSA  -.47* 
(.17) 
-2.64*** 
(.41) 
-2.25*** 
(.41) 
Plural. Comm.  - 5.05e+05 
(6.1e+02) 
4.73e+05 
(5.90e+02) 
Pos. Peace  - .24 
(.46) 
-.12 
(.46) 
Low Lev. Con.  - 1.04* 
(.28) 
1.30*** 
(.28) 
Rivalry  - 2.05*** 
(.14) 
2.47*** 
(.15) 
N.S.G.  - - 2.05*** 
(.14) 
N.P.D.I.  - - .17 
(.25) 
CSA*PluralCom  - -2.76e+05 
(7.4e+02) 
-2.51e+05 
(7.15e+02) 
CSA*PosPeace  - 4.42e+05 
*5.7e+02) 
4.18e+05 
(5.54e+02) 
CSA*LowLevCon  - 3.06*** 
(.59) 
3.18*** 
(.60) 
CSA*Rivalry  - 3.39*** 
(.42) 
3.44*** 
(.42) 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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Table C.4 – Logistic Regression of Responses to Proliferation 
(Collapsed Categories as Baseline) 
  Model I Model II Model III 
  Coeff. (Std. Error) Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
(Intercept)  -3.86** 
(.007) 
-4.39*** 
(.01) 
-4.88*** 
(.11) 
NPT  -.74*** 
(.16) 
-.54** 
(.16) 
-1.58*** 
(.18) 
CSA  -.47* 
(.17) 
-2.65*** 
(.41) 
-2.52*** 
(.41) 
Low Lev. Con.  - 1.07** 
(.28) 
1.32*** 
(.28) 
Rivalry  - 2.08*** 
(.14) 
2.49*** 
(.15) 
N.S.G.  - - 2.06*** 
(.14) 
N.P.D.I.  - - .16 
(.25) 
CSA*LowLevCon  - 3.10*** 
(.59) 
3.28*** 
(.59) 
CSA*Rivalry  - 3.43*** 
(.42) 
3.53*** 
(.42) 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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Nuclear Weapon Free Zones 
Table C.5 – Logistic Regression of Responses to Proliferation 
(Plural Comm. Excluded, Negative Peace as Baseline)139140 
  Model I Model II Model III 
  Coeff. (Std. Error) Coeff.  
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
(Intercept)  -3.82 
(.07) 
-4.75 
(.11) 
-5.24 
(.12) 
NWFZ  -.77* 
(.25) 
-1.36* 
(.51) 
-1.84* 
(.51) 
NPT  -1.05*** 
(.11) 
-.63*** 
(.11) 
-1.61*** 
(.14) 
Pos. Peace  - -1.23 
(1.00) 
-1.35 
(1.00) 
Low Lev. Con.  - 1.20** 
(.28) 
1.40** 
(.29) 
Rivalry  - 2.82*** 
(.12) 
3.20*** 
(.13) 
N.S.G.  - - 2.24*** 
(.15) 
N.P.D.I.  - - -2.63e-02 
(.25) 
NWFZ* 
PosPeace 
 - 4.59** 
(1.23) 
4.68* 
(1.24) 
NWFZ* 
LowLevCon 
 - 3.09*** 
(.68) 
4.08*** 
(.69) 
NWFZ* 
Rivalry 
 - 1.20e+06 
(9.40e+02) 
2.12e+06 
(9.08) 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
139 There are no recorded instances in the PR3 Reactor Pool where a state was in a pluralistic security community 
with a state that is a signatory of a NWFZ treaty, this category is thus excluded from this analysis. 
140 I introduce membership in the NPT as a control for this model, as I am interested in determining whether 
membership in a NWFZ treaty has any independent effect if membership in the NPT is taken into consideration.   
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Table C.6 – Logistic Regression of Responses to Proliferation 
(Collapsed Categories as Baseline) 
  Model I Model II Model III 
  Coeff. (Std. Error) Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
(Intercept)  -3.82 
(.07) 
-4.81 
(.11) 
-5.30 
(.12) 
NPT  -.77* 
(.25) 
-.65*** 
(.11) 
-1.66*** 
(.14) 
Low Lev. Con.  -1.05*** 
(.11) 
1.27*** 
(.28) 
1.48*** 
(.29) 
Rivalry  - 2.88*** 
(.12) 
3.28*** 
(.13) 
N.S.G.  - - 2.24*** 
(.15) 
N.P.D.I.  - - -4.46 
(.25) 
NPT*LowLevCon  - 2.42*** 
(.58) 
3.38*** 
(.59) 
NPT*Rivalry  - 5.97e+04 
(2.10e+02) 
1.51e+05 
(3.34e+02) 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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IAEA Non-Compliance 
Table C.7 – Logistic Regression of Responses to Proliferation 
(Plural Comm. Excluded, Negative Peace as Baseline) 
  Model I Model II Model III 
  Coeff. (Std. Error) Coeff.  
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
(Intercept)  -4.62 
(.006) 
-5.49 
(.01) 
-5.97 
(.12) 
NonComp  2.94*** 
(.16) 
3.47*** 
(.21) 
3.19*** 
(.22) 
Pos. Peace  - .25 
(.46) 
.11 
(.50) 
Low Lev. Con.  - 1.92*** 
(.25) 
2.11*** 
(.25) 
Rivalry  - 3.10*** 
(.13) 
3.38*** 
(.14) 
N.S.G.  - - 1.12*** 
(.12) 
N.P.D.I.  - - -.37 
(.26) 
Noncomp 
*PosPeace 
 - 4.91e+06 
(1.90e+03) 
4.91e+06 
(1.90e+03) 
Noncomp 
*LowLevCon 
 - -.99 
(.73) 
-.86 
(.74) 
Noncomp 
*Rivalry 
 - -1.04* 
(.38) 
-1.13* 
(.39) 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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Table C.8 – Logistic Regression of Responses to Proliferation 
(Collapsed Categories as Baseline) 
  Model I Model II Model III 
  Coeff. (Std. Error) Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
(Intercept)  -4.62 
(.006) 
-5.52 
(.01) 
-6.00 
(.12) 
Noncomp  2.94*** 
(.16) 
3.38*** 
(.21) 
3.08*** 
(.21) 
Low Lev. Con.  - 1.95*** 
(.25) 
2.15*** 
(.25) 
Rivalry  - 3.12*** 
(.13) 
3.42*** 
(.14) 
N.S.G.  - - 1.01*** 
(.12) 
N.P.D.I.  - - -.31 
(2.54) 
Noncomp 
*LowLevCon 
 - -.90 
(.73) 
-.74 
(.74) 
Noncomp 
*Rivalry 
 - -.95* 
(.38) 
-1.01* 
(.39) 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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Umbrella Alliances 
 
Table C.9 – Logistic Regression of Responses to Proliferation 
(All Categoreis, Negative Peace as Baseline) 
  Model I Model II Model III 
  Coeff. (Std. Error) Coeff.  
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
(Intercept)  -4.01*** 
(.06) 
-5.06*** 
(.11) 
-5.83*** 
(-.15) 
Umbrella  -1.20*** 
(.13) 
-.38* 
(.17) 
-.19 
(.18) 
Plural Comm.  - -14.51 
(629) 
-14.61 
(613) 
Pos. Peace  - 1.17* 
(.47) 
.93* 
(.47) 
Low Lev. Con.  - 1.73*** 
(.27) 
2.16*** 
(.28) 
Rivalry  - 3.09*** 
(.14) 
3.62*** 
(.16) 
N.S.G.  - - 1.4*** 
(.12) 
N.P.D.I.  - - -.21 
(.25) 
Umbrella 
*PluralComm 
 - .38 
(748) 
-.05 
(731) 
Umbrella 
*PosPeace 
 - -15.30 
(374) 
-15.24 
(364) 
Umbrella 
*LowLevCon 
 - -.07 
(.51) 
-.50 
(.52) 
Umbrella 
*Rivalry 
 - -1.02*** 
(.29) 
-1.39*** 
(.30) 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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Table C.10 – Logistic Regression of Responses to Proliferation 
(Collapsed Categories as Baseline) 
  Model I Model II Model III 
  Coeff. (Std. Error) Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
(Intercept)  -4.01*** 
(.06) 
-5.03 
(.11) 
-5.79 
(.14) 
Umbrella  -1.20*** 
(.13) 
-.51* 
(.17) 
-.36 
(.17) 
Low Lev. Con.  - 1.74*** 
(.27) 
2.16*** 
(.28) 
Rivalry  - 3.07*** 
(.14) 
3.59*** 
(.15) 
N.S.G.  - - 1.37*** 
(.12) 
N.P.D.I.  - - -.20 
(.25) 
Umbrella 
*LowLevCon 
 - .11 
(5.11) 
-.27 
(.52) 
Umbrella 
*Rivalry 
 - -.88* 
(.29) 
-1.19** 
(.29) 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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Uranium Enrichment 
Table C.11 - Logistic Regression of Responses to Proliferation 
(All Categoreis, Negative Peace as Baseline) 
  Model I Model II Model III 
  Coeff. (Std. Error) Coeff.  
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
(Intercept)  -4.67 
(.07) 
-5.48 
(.12) 
-6.21 
(.15) 
Enrich  .55*** 
(.11) 
.61** 
(.17) 
.84*** 
(.17) 
Plural Comm.  - 1.93e+05 
(3.77e+02) 
1.85e+05 
(3.68e+02) 
Pos. Peace  - 1.80e+05 
(3.64e+02) 
1.71e+05 
(3.55e+02) 
Low Lev. Con.  - 1.98*** 
(.28) 
2.21*** 
(.28) 
Rivalry  - 2.82*** 
(.16) 
3.27*** 
(.16) 
N.S.G.  - - 1.37*** 
(,12) 
N.P.D.I.  - - -.16 
(.25) 
Enrich 
*PluralComm 
 - 6.75e+05 
(8.84e+02) 
6.84e+05 
(8.80e+02) 
Enrich 
*PosPeace 
 - -1.80e+05 
(3.64e+02) 
-1.71e+05 
(3.55e+02) 
Enrich 
*LowLevCon 
 - -.35 
(.49) 
-.19 
(.50) 
Enrich 
*Rivalry 
 - .92* 
(.24) 
.67* 
(.24) 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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Table C.12 – Logistic Regression of Responses to Proliferation 
(Collapsed Categories as Baseline) 
  Model I Model II Model III 
  Coeff. (Std. Error) Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
(Intercept)  -4.67 
(.07) 
-5.57 
(.12) 
-6.31 
(.15) 
Enrich  .55*** 
(.11) 
.73** 
(.17) 
.94*** 
(.17) 
Low Lev. Con.  - 2.08*** 
(.28) 
2.31*** 
(.28) 
Rivalry  - 2.91*** 
(.16) 
3.37*** 
(.17) 
N.S.G.  - - 1.35*** 
(.12) 
N.P.D.I.  - - -.16 
(.25) 
Enrich 
*LowLevCon 
 - -.47 
(.49) 
-.30 
(.49) 
Enrich 
*Rivalry 
 - .80 
(.24) 
.57 
(.24) 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
185 
 
Plutonium Separation  
Table C.13 – Logistic Regression of Responses to Proliferation 
(All Categories, Negative Peace as Baseline) 
  Model I Model II Model III 
  Coeff. (Std. Error) Coeff.  
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
(Intercept)  -4.97 
(.07) 
-5.80 
(.12) 
-6.64 
(.15) 
Separ  1.94*** 
(.11) 
2.07*** 
(.17) 
2.31*** 
(.17) 
Plural Comm.  - 1.73e+05 
(3.56e+02) 
1.64e+05 
(3.48e+02) 
Pos. Peace  - .64 
(.46) 
.42 
(.47) 
Low Lev. Con.  - 2.38*** 
(.26) 
2.65*** 
(.27) 
Rivalry  - 2.99*** 
(.16) 
3.42*** 
(.17) 
N.S.G.  - - 1.61*** 
(.13) 
N.P.D.I.  - - -.18 
(.25) 
Separ 
*PluralComm 
 - 1.68e+06 
(1.22e+03) 
1.62e+06 
(1.20e+03) 
Separ 
*PosPeace 
 - 1.54e+06 
(1.06e+03) 
1.42e+06 
(1.02e+03) 
Separ 
*LowLevCon 
 - -2.04** 
(.58) 
-2.08* 
(.59) 
Separ 
*Rivalry 
 - -.20 
(.24) 
-.20 
(.24) 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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Table C.14 – Logistic Regression of Responses to Proliferation 
(Collapsed Categories as Baseline) 
  Model I Model II Model III 
  Coeff. (Std. Error) Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
(Intercept)  -4.97 
(.07) 
-5.81 
(.12) 
-6.65 
(.15) 
Separ  1.94*** 
(.11) 
2.02*** 
(.17) 
2.25*** 
(.17) 
Low Lev. Con.  - 2.39*** 
(.26) 
2.68*** 
(.26) 
Rivalry  - 3.00*** 
(.16) 
3.44*** 
(.17) 
N.S.G.  - - 1.57*** 
(.13) 
N.P.D.I.  - - -.26 
(.25) 
Separ 
*LowLevCon 
 - -1.99* 
(.58) 
-2.01* 
(.59) 
Separ 
*Rivalry 
 - -.15 
(.24) 
-.15 
(.24) 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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Reactor Strength 
 
Table C.15 – Logistic Regression of Responses to Proliferation 
(All Categories, Negative Peace as Baseline) 
  Model I Model II Model III 
  Coeff. (Std. Error) Coeff.  
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
(Intercept)  -7.96*** 
(.33) 
-9.30*** 
(.59) 
-10.89*** 
(.61) 
Reactor  .49*** 
(.004) 
.56*** 
(.008) 
.69*** 
(.08) 
Plural Comm.  - 2.21e+05 
(1.08e+03) 
5.79e+05 
(1.67e+03) 
Pos. Peace  - 1.24 
(2.44) 
1.71 
(2.51) 
Low Lev. Con.  - 4.57* 
(1.17) 
5.10* 
(1.23) 
Rivalry  - 3.78** 
(.70) 
4.95*** 
(.72) 
N.S.G.  - - 1.50*** 
(.12) 
N.P.D.I.  - - -.16 
(.25) 
Reactor 
*PluralComm 
 - -.16 
(1.61e+02) 
-4.23e+04 
(2.48e+02) 
Reactor 
*PosPeace 
 - -.11 
(.35) 
-.21 
(.36) 
Reactor 
*LowLevCon 
 - -.38 
(.16) 
-.42 
(.16) 
Reactor 
*Rivalry 
 - -.09 
(.09) 
-.21 
(.09) 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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Table C.16 – Logistic Regression of Responses to Proliferation 
(Collapsed Categories as Baseline) 
  Model I Model II Model III 
  Coeff. (Std. Error) Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
Coeff. 
(Std. Error) 
(Intercept)  -7.96*** 
(.33) 
-9.32*** 
(.57) 
-10.89*** 
(.60) 
Reactor  .49*** 
(.004) 
.56*** 
(.007) 
.69*** 
(.008) 
Low Lev. Con.  - 4.60** 
(1.16) 
5.14** 
(1.22) 
Rivalry  - 3.81*** 
(.68) 
4.98*** 
(.71) 
N.S.G.  - - 1.46*** 
(.12) 
N.P.D.I.  - - -.15 
(.25) 
Reactor 
*LowLevCon 
 - -.38 
(.15) 
-.42 
(.16) 
Reactor 
*Rivalry 
 - -.009 
(.009) 
-.21 
(.009) 
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